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LANGUAGE, MEANING AND PERSONS

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by the same author

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

9

LANGUAGE, MEANING AND PERSONS

BY

NIKUNJA VIHARI BANERJEE
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Delhi



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PREFACE

This book is devoted to the continuation of the line of thought pursued in my earlier work *Concerning Human Understanding*. My main object in this work is to develop an independent outlook on philosophy and *inter alia* make out a case for metaphysics—of course, metaphysics in a sense of my own which is different from that in which this discipline has, in the fitness of things, sunk into opprobrium. In consequence of my individual reaction to the history of philosophic thought the conviction has grown on me that philosophy can leave behind its proverbial frustrations and failures once for all and come to stay as a stable and independent discipline if it could only awaken itself to its essential anthropocentric character and thus realise that its primary interest lies in the analysis of the human situation with a view to ascertaining how man can live a liberated life or, in other words, live as a strictly human being held in inter-personal relations with his fellows.

This view of the nature and function of philosophy has led me, as the first step to my investigations, to explore the foundations of the epistemological situation at a deeper level than I was able to do in my earlier work. As a result, I have arrived at the concept of 'I with others=*we*' which I have characterized as the 'realm of the personal'. This concept has provided me with the ground-plan of the whole book by way of offering me the key for unlocking the store-house of the powers or activities of the human mind and thereby enabling me to build up a presumably comprehensive and complete inventory of these activities. In the absence of more suitable words due to the poverty of the language available for the purpose of philosophical investigations, the ordinary words 'imagination', 'understanding', 'reason—theoretical and practical' and lastly 'human autonomy' may well serve as their respective designations and indicate their distinction from one another. But even then I must tell the reader that these words in their usual interpretation by philosophers and psychologists can hardly convey my own view of the nature and function of the activities concerned.

Philosophy regarded as primarily concerned with the analysis of the human situation cannot, for obvious reasons, be a complete discipline without being a critique of the entire inventory of the activities of the human mind ranging between Imagination and Human Autonomy. Judged in this light, this book as a philosophical treatise is incomplete, because it mainly contains a critique of Imagination, although, as I must confess, I have not been able to make even this fragment of the complete critique that philosophy must be, as thorough as one would wish it to be. But even then, as a compensation, however inadequate, for its incompleteness, I have tried to probe the depths of Understanding, Reason—theoretical and practical and Human Autonomy in connection with my attempt to ascertain the ways and means of dealing with the human predicament which it is the special prerogative of Imagination to bring into focus.

I am fully aware that, not to speak of the basic concepts and the outstanding views which I have arrived at as a result of my investigations, even the procedure I have followed in this work is rather unusual. So I apprehend that my interpretation of the words I have used as the designations of the activities of the human mind and my understanding of the nature and function of the activities so designated may not be easy of approval.

PREFACE

And the difficulty in this respect is likely to be greater regarding my concepts of 'the realm of the personal' and 'the plan for action' as well as regarding my view of time as 'after', of philosophy of history as a pseudo-discipline, of the concept of society as self-contradictory, and ethics, aesthetics and traditional religion on the one hand and physics, mathematics and logic on the other as escapisms from philosophy. Lastly I have no expectation of a better reaction than a volley of protests from interested philosophical circles against my bold declaration that in philosophical investigations, linguistic analysis, however necessary and useful it may be, must culminate in the surrender of the all-importance of language, yielding place to philosophic vision. But even then I would urge the reader not to lose patience with the results of my investigations and in particular to bear in mind that, in view of the unfortunate situation in which philosophy has been placed through the centuries, there is need for a revolution in the philosophical outlook far more drastic than that which was first introduced by Kant or even than that the inauguration of which is ascribed by the followers of Wittgenstein to the credit of their master. Be it far from me to suggest however that the revolution in demand would consist merely in following an unusual procedure and constructing unusual concepts and theories in the name of original thinking.

It does not generally suit my interest to discuss philosophical movements, old or new, or the views of individual philosophers on their own account. But with a view to placing my views on a more or less secure foundation I have tried to examine what seems to me to be the dominant trends in contemporary philosophy. I do not know how far or whether at all I have succeeded in this attempt. For, as I must confess, I have not undertaken a detailed discussion of the views of any particular contemporary philosopher and so it may be that in my criticisms of the present day philosophical situation I have only fought with a shadow. But even then I feel that I have made an earnest endeavour to save philosophy from her detractors and enemies who, as seems plain from the misadventures of the human mind masquerading as philosophies specially in our day, are none other than philosophers themselves. In any case I would consider my labour amply rewarded if the sympathetic reader could find in this work suggestions as to how philosophy may end its age-old nomadic career and come into its own.

The encouragement of my immediate colleagues, specially Dr B. N. Ray and many friends in different parts of India has sustained me throughout this work. The writing of this book has been greatly facilitated by my stay at three different hill-stations in the Himalayas during three successive long vacations. I would be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge with thanks the assistance rendered by Dr Santosh Kumar in the preparation of the manuscript. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Margaret Chatterjee for her valuable help at all stages in the preparation and publication of this book and specially for her suggestions which have been of help to me in resolving some of the doubts and difficulties I have felt in the course of this work.

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PART ONE

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL
BACKGROUND

I

TOWARDS PHILOSOPHIC ACTIVITY

Philosophy is, in a sense, as old as man in so far as he is endowed with a capacity for knowledge, feeling and action and especially for reflection upon the affairs of the world, including himself and his fellow men. This, of course, involves a concept of philosophy, but obviously one that is vague and far short of a definition of philosophy. The definitions of philosophy that have come down to us generally seem, however, to betray the heteronomy of philosophy and sometimes even the idiosyncrasy of philosophers. Judged from this point of view, the idea of building up a school of philosophic thought, not to speak of the schools of philosophy that have actually come into existence, is an absurdity. And the overwhelming influence, which certain ways of philosophical thinking, especially at the present time, are found to exercise on account of their sheer eccentricity, not only does no credit to philosophers but is a sign of the prevailing unhealthy atmosphere in philosophy.

All this indicates that philosophy awaits its birth; its foundation is yet to be laid. To start with a definition of philosophy is therefore not feasible. The definition may emerge in the course of our procedure or at the end of our task. The immediate fact about philosophy is, then, that it stands in a paradoxical situation: it is old and yet unborn. This initial paradox, however prejudicial to the history of philosophy and vexing to philosophers themselves, is profoundly significant, and indeed vitally important for the future of philosophy. In the absence of its recognition it is more likely than not that philosophy will wander in foreign territories, remaining a stranger to its own; invite other disciplines within its fold, instead of cultivating itself; use language other than what is appropriate to its task. And, as a matter of fact, this has happened in the course of the history of philosophy. As a result, some of what goes by the name of philosophy is fiction;

some of it is an approach to or rather an apology for science; but most of it is a curious mixture of both. It needs to be added, however, that while the term 'science' is used here in the definite sense that it carries in modern times, the term 'fiction' is taken to cover an indefinite range so as to represent any outlook that is not only non-scientific, but is in direct or indirect opposition to common sense and science. But then, strictly speaking, philosophy in the garb of science should have hardly any advantage over philosophy in its degeneration into fiction. And this for the simple reason that philosophy can avoid its degeneration, not by taking on the shape of science—because that would be tantamount to its extinction—but by proving an 'other' to science.

Nevertheless, one cannot help admitting that the activity of the human mind, which is to develop into philosophical enquiry, has persisted through long ages of human history and as yet shows no sign of coming to an end. Yet there remains the significant fact that this activity is immediately aroused by man's natural interest in the outer world. Testimony to this fact is provided by the speculations of the ancient Ionian philosophers and the Vedic seers of ancient India. But then, it seems that the activity in question has generally been left directly or indirectly affiliated to the occasional cause of its origin.¹ Exceptions to this rule, whenever and wherever they have arisen, have, however, arisen not in a normal way but by interfering with the free play, and producing adverse effects on the fruition, of man's natural interest in the outer world.² But the result in either case has proved disastrous to the cause of philosophy. It is but the failure on the part of the activity to win the autonomy that is essential to philosophy as distinguished from science and its auxiliaries. It is, however, most significant that the immediate causes of this result, as we shall see, are in their turn the effects of something wrong lying deep in human nature. For this very reason this fact is apt to be ignored. But, plainly enough, without its recognition, the meaning of philosophic autonomy cannot be grasped nor can philosophy come into its own.

¹ This seems to be true of the general trend of Western Philosophy.

² This refers to some of the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy, especially Advaita Vedānta and, in a sense, Sāṃkhya.

II

PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

The activity of the human mind is *heteronomous* in so far as it is inseparably bound up with man's natural interest in the outer world, that is, the world of physical things and organic bodies. But even in this aspect it is no less an activity than in any other, and need not suffer any condemnation. On the contrary, it has a specific function to perform. Thus it is not only unique and irreplaceable, but does not admit of a comparative estimate in terms of its superiority or inferiority. What, then, is its function? In order to avoid the crude thinking conjoined with the rigmarole that this question has given rise to in the philosophical world, it is first necessary, however, to ascertain what that function is *not*.

Volitional action, supposed, of course wrongly, as has been evident since the time of Hume, to be the action of mind on body as well as on physical things, may be, and, in fact, has sometimes actually been regarded as an obvious case of the function under discussion. But, in this respect, philosophers have generally been interested in perceptual knowledge rather than in volitional action. And in this they seem to be under the influence of an inveterate intellectualist bias rather than to be actuated by any desire to get rid of the mistake exposed by Hume.

Now as regards perceptual knowledge, philosophers, with a few exceptions, including Leibniz, have generally exhibited sufficient common sense in realizing that it cannot be due to any creative activity on the part of the mind. Accordingly they have dissociated it from the autonomy or spontaneity of the mind and eventually ascribed it to what they have taken to be the mind's heteronomous activity. The so-called heteronomous activity has, however, been understood in no one sense, but primarily in two distinct senses, viz., as *pure passivity* and *activity-passivity*. But of what avail is this difference in the understanding of the heteronomous activity in question, when, as a common result, it becomes unavoidable to construe perceptual knowledge as a *casual phenomenon*, and, this is especially important, a gulf, in effect unbridgeable, is brought about between the immediate objects of sense characterized by *privacy* and *relativity*, and the *common* or *public* world of physical things we are supposed to know by means of perception? This really points to the crude thinking and the rigmarole referred to above, which make up the philosophical

discipline known as epistemology—epistemology, of course, understood in the sense that has prevailed till this day.

The fact of the matter seems to be this, that the causal relation between the mind and some physical thing or other—granted that it is a necessary prerequisite of the possibility of perceptual knowledge—constitutes only an *occasion* for, but is no guarantee of, the *occurrence* of that knowledge. In order that perceptual knowledge may take place, perception must develop from a lower level of causation where the physical thing to be known functions as a *cause*, to the higher level, where the same physical thing ceases to be a *cause*, and becomes an *object* to a knowing mind. Of course, perception does not necessarily yield knowledge. It may develop into *knowledge* or *error*. And there must be some *object* in the case of error as well as in the case of knowledge. But, then, the object of erroneous perception, unlike the object of perceptual knowledge, is no thing itself, but only the *effect* produced by a thing in conjunction with the psycho-physiological adjunct of the mind. This means that error is failure on the part of perception to rise from the level of causation to the level of perceptual knowledge. Thus it is in a class apart from, and indeed has no sense of, perceptual knowledge.¹

So it would be a sheer absurdity to treat erroneous perception and perceptual knowledge together, as philosophers have generally done, so as to make out a case for the doctrine of 'ideas' or 'sense-data' and thereby to cause a problem to break out in connection with perceptual knowledge. Of course, the problem of the status of the object of erroneous perception is legitimate, because, it may incidentally be observed, philosophy, as distinguished from other disciplines, seems to be peculiar in that in its case truth only calls for acceptance, and it is error or falsity that sets a problem or problems on foot. But then, the problem just now before us is one that seems to leave no scope for the philosopher to show off by calling into existence such things as 'ideas' or 'sense-data'. On the contrary, it only calls for his humility, which he can best express by proclaiming that the object of erroneous perception has no place in the spatio-temporal world, where alone it could lay claim to a place for itself; so that its status is metaphysically indeterminate and indeterminable.

The conclusion to which the above discussion leads is that perceptual knowledge as such is *sui generis* and so should be taken to be an ultimate datum, standing in no need of explanation, whether with

¹ Vide my *Concerning Human Understanding* (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1958) pp. 138-9.

reference to the heteronomous activity of the mind or in any other manner. Hence it is evident that no philosophical problem worth the name can arise in connection with perceptual knowledge and that any attempt to treat this knowledge philosophically can at best produce a fiction, instead of anything of real importance. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of an investigation, naturally scientific and especially psychological, of perception, as distinguished from perceptual knowledge. But this can be no ground for reopening the question of the philosophical treatment of perceptual knowledge on the basis of the psychology of perception—a question which has played the most dominant rôle in the history of epistemology. For, from what we have already seen, it seems clear that no answer to this question can be anything but what has been previously spoken of as a curious mixture of fiction and science.

It needs to be added, however, that perceptual knowledge, free from complications as this brief discussion has presented it to be, is what *knowing* primarily signifies. True, the English verb 'to know' is ambiguous and has different significations in different contexts. But that is due, not to any fault of perceptual knowledge, but to the peculiarity of the genius of language to which the English language is no exception. This is far from conveying advice against the analysis of this verb. On the contrary, there is no gainsaying the fact that the analysis can serve a most useful purpose by clarifying the ambiguity of the *analysandum*. Nevertheless, it seems, the analysis provides no guarantee for, and may indeed leave untouched the question of, the emancipation of perceptual knowledge from unnecessary and misleading complications. In any case it can make no difference to what perceptual knowledge is; and there is no doubt that perceptual knowledge is something on its own account, irrespective of how it is expressed in language.

III

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES AND OTHERS

Besides volitional action and perceptual knowledge, there seems to be at least one other thing that does not admit of ascription to any kind of activity on the part of the mind, and, for that matter, of any explanation whatsoever. And on this account it may well be said to belong to the class of things that are in need of being accepted as ultimate data. It is that which ordinarily passes for our *knowledge of other selves*. But in their understanding of our knowledge of other

selves philosophers have generally indulged in crude thinking under the misleading influence of language and, as a result, have fallen into error. The crudity, which has thus led them into error, proceeds from the misleading conception of self-knowledge as expressible in the proposition 'I know my self'. The verb 'to know' used in this proposition has, curiously enough, been taken even by philosophers, of course, with a few exceptions,¹ to have the same sense as it bears in the context of perceptual knowledge, viz., to apprehend something as object. But, on this interpretation of knowing, the self that is said to be known can at best be another name for body and/or bodily behaviour; and, whether philosophers are able or willing to realise it or not, it seems absolutely certain that there arises in consequence the unavoidable demand for the expunction of the word 'I' along with the word 'my' from the proposition in question. Accordingly the proposition itself is in need of being translated into the bare statement: 'a body or bodily behaviour is known of itself and to itself'. But this statement, it is hardly necessary to point out, is flagrantly absurd and, in fact, is no less so than the statement that the tree said to be known to me is really known of itself and to itself and not to myself as knower. It may only be added that this absurd position is such that the phenomenalist analysis of self-knowledge cannot escape from it, and that any attempt on the part of the phenomenalist to avoid it by falling back upon behaviourism or even consciousness psychology would amount to extending the scope of crude thinking and to prevaricating without attending to the real points in question.

Now in the case of our knowledge of other selves, unlike in the case of our knowledge of ourselves, there is, obviously enough, little scope for mystifying the meaning of the verb 'to know'. So philosophers, unwilling to eschew crude thinking as most of them naturally seem to be, and guided by the absurd way of conceiving self-knowledge after the pattern of perceptual knowledge, have no option but to understand our knowledge of other selves on the analogy of perceptual knowledge. This makes it inevitable for them to construe our knowledge of other selves in behaviourist terms; so that the proposition

¹ The prominent exceptions are Berkeley and Samuel Alexander who drew a qualitative distinction between self-knowledge and perceptual knowledge. The former did this in terms of his distinction between 'notion' and perception and the latter by designating self-knowledge as 'enjoyment' in distinction from perceptual knowledge designated as 'contemplation'. But in this they only mystified, instead of clarifying, the meaning of the verb 'to know' as employed in the context of so-called self-knowledge.

'I know other selves, or briefly, others' is in need of being translated immediately into the proposition 'I know others' behaviour'. But that can by no means be the end of the matter. On the contrary, the translation brings to the surface difficulties of which there is hardly any clear hint in the original proposition so far as it goes. Of course, there seems to be no difficulty about our knowledge of behaviour. I may know others' behaviour as certainly as others may know mine. But how can I speak of others' behaviour as that of 'others', instead of as just some behaviour? This brings to light the real crux of the situation, from which the behaviouristically-minded phenomenalist seems to have no escape. Curiously, however, he feels neither hesitation nor qualm in resorting to analogical inference with a view to restoring the 'others' which he, strictly speaking, has already left behind once for all. And in this he is completely oblivious of the fact that, apart from the inherent and insuperable weakness of analogical inference consisting in its inconclusiveness, the very idea of this inference is ruled out by the meaninglessness of the 'I' as well as 'my', following from the behaviourist-phenomenalist analysis of the proposition 'I know my self'.

Indeed from the psycho-analytical point of view, the behaviourist-phenomenalist is, then, one who is seized with make-believe. He professes to do what he really does not and also cannot do. But logically speaking, he lands himself in a position which is as absurd as it is appalling. From his standpoint, the world of minds is a mere world of behaviour, where each behaviour is known of itself and to itself. This is no mere behaviour-solipsism (if we are allowed to use this expression), but amounts to relegating the world of selves to the limbo of nescience. And with the world of selves rendered impervious to light, perceptual knowledge becomes nugatory and the world of physical things and organic bodies is of necessity plunged into eternal darkness.

The point which our procedure so far has particularly in view is that no attempt to clarify the meaning of a word is likely to succeed unless it is first realized that the function of language is not to create anything, but to *express* and especially to *communicate* something or other; and that conventional language in particular, while being the most useful and the most convenient way of communicating that something is the case, is prone, among other things, to *oversimplify* the situation relating to what is the case so as to prove misleading.¹

¹ That language may, and indeed often does, disguise what is the case is generally admitted. But its proneness to oversimplification is too subtle to admit of easy detection.

This point, in view of what we have previously observed, needs to be especially borne in mind in understanding the meaning of the English verb 'to know' in the contexts of perceptual knowledge, our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of others.

Now what seems to be common to the meaning of this verb in all these contexts is the affirmation that something is the case. Thus perceptual knowledge comprehends affirmations such as 'this is a table'. To self-knowledge is essential the affirmation that 'I am'. Likewise my knowledge of others is expressible in the affirmation that 'there are others (as I am)'.¹ But then, these affirmations, no matter whether they are grammatically and logically alike or different, are certainly different in one fundamental respect, which, from its very nature, not only does not, but cannot, reflect itself in their grammatical and logical meaning, and yet is such that, apart from reference to it, they would be statements that state nothing of real significance. This, on the one hand, points to the inevitable consequence of what has previously been spoken of as oversimplification, and, on the other, brings us to the question of the respective grounds of these affirmations, which are obviously *factual* and, as such, determine, instead of being determined by, the meanings of the affirmations regarded as linguistic expressions.

In the case of our perceptual knowledge the ground in question is the simple fact of the presentation of something as an object—the fact that determines the meaning of the verb 'to know' in this context. This only means that perceptual knowledge is object-consciousness or, if anyone prefers, empirical apprehension. Now, if empirical apprehension be the only thing that this verb can mean, then perceptual knowledge must be knowledge *par excellence*. As regards this position, it seems unexceptionable so far as it goes. But, in view of our foregoing discussion, its scope must be said to be too narrow to include what passes for our knowledge of ourselves as well as our knowledge of others. Besides, the all-importance of perceptual knowledge should not, from the nature of the case, be so construed as to demand the meaninglessness of the propositions: 'I am' and 'there are others (as I am)'. In fact, these are propositions which, it should be admitted on all

¹ For the simple reason that my knowledge of others, as already seen, can by no means be a case of analogical inference, the proposition that 'there are others (as I am)' is preferable to the proposition that 'there are others (like me)'. But even then, the former proposition, as we shall see, cannot restore the truth about our 'knowledge' of others which the latter completely misses.

hands, can by no subtlety of logical analysis be reduced to meaninglessness.

It still needs to be reiterated, however, that such things as my toothache or stomach-ache cannot really be spoken of as *mine*, nor, in consequence, can my awareness of them be said to constitute, or even contribute to, my knowledge of my self except in so far as I, in some way or other, find myself in a position to affirm that 'I am'. Likewise the phenomenalist treatment of our knowledge of others is unable to account for this knowledge, simply because it has no means of its own of affirming that 'there are others (as I am)'. Thus it is plain that in its approach to the problem of our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of others, empiricism, whether old or new, is vitiated by the fallacy popularly called 'putting the cart before the horse'. Judged differently, the fallacy proceeds from the illegitimate acceptance of object-consciousness in the sense of perceptual knowledge as the epistemic paradigm. In the treatment of these problems we are therefore required to go beyond the province of phenomenalist-linguist analysis and primarily to solve the problem how the propositions 'I am' and 'there are others (as I am)' can be legitimately affirmed. This brings us to the question of the *grounds* of their affirmation—a question that empiricism never asks.

As regards the proposition 'I am', it hardly remains necessary to point out that the ground of its affirmation cannot be object-consciousness otherwise called empirical apprehension, understood in the sense which characterizes perceptual knowledge. But to go to the other extreme and to hold that the ground in question is what passes for subject-consciousness is either to indulge in mystification useful for hiding a fiction, or to resort to dogmatism. For so-called subject-consciousness regarded as co-ordinate with object-consciousness is a clear case of impossibility, which cannot be taken to be a fact except as a mystery. And if it is regarded otherwise, it can only serve to affirm the proposition in question without any justification, with no reference to the ground on which the affirmation could be made.¹ But, notwithstanding their difference, both these alternatives are equally ways of escape from the point in question. And the reason seems to be no other than this, that mysticism and dogmatism in the present context, like objectivism which regards perceptual knowledge as the epistemic paradigm, derive from want of proper analysis of object-consciousness.

¹ This is dogmatic affirmation of the existence of the self as typified by the Cartesian *cogito*.

It is a truism that no thing as such, despite whatever changes may happen to or within it, is or can be characterized by consciousness of itself as an object. In order that it may be an object of consciousness it is necessary that it be *referred* to something else. But, be it noted with care, this reference should be purely *one-sided*, and that to bring in the question of this something else's being in turn referred to the thing as such is to renounce the problem of object-consciousness. Another point of fundamental importance in this connection is that the reference in question must be *occasional* and not invariable or essential; for, as another truism goes, no thing is essentially an object of consciousness, but may be one only on occasion.¹ But even then, whether a thing is an object of consciousness rests upon what the reference means and what that 'something else' is, depending upon the meaning of the reference. For deciding these two points it is, however, necessary to see that one thing's being referred to another thing implies the establishment of a *relation* between the two. What then, should be the nature of this relation?

The relation cannot be *internal*. For an internal relation is obviously such that it does not permit the leniency of one term's being referred to another occasionally instead of invariably or essentially. Thus the view of the relation as internal contradicts the truism that states that no thing is essentially an object of consciousness. This difficulty is, however, one that can be easily avoided on the view of the relation as *external*; because in the case of an external relation the reference of one term to another, if such reference be allowable at all, should naturally be occasional and certainly not invariable or essential. But then, the difficulty here is that the terms related merely *externally* may just be without there being any question of one term's being referred to another. And this hardly makes room for the possibility of object-consciousness. But apart from all this, neither the notion of internal relation nor the notion of external relation has really anything in it to show that the reference in question should necessarily be one-sided instead of being double-sided, with the result that the whole problem of object-consciousness is thrown into jeopardy.

The conclusion that one is tempted to deduce from the above considerations is that object-consciousness involves no relation whatsoever and, consequently, that the reference in question is irrelevant to it. But one should be aware at the same time that to draw this con-

¹ There seems to be no way of refuting Berkeley's thesis: '*esse is percipi*' except by pointing out that it is a flagrant violation of this truism.

clusion is suicidal; for to admit such a thing as object-consciousness and yet to deny that it involves the reference and so has a relational basis is, as our foregoing discussion has made abundantly clear, flagrantly self-contradictory. The situation, then, is really this, that object-consciousness is inseparable from the 'reference', but that the relation implied by the reference is unique and unparalleled, not admitting of interpretation as internal on any account, or as external in the usual spatial or temporal sense.¹ This, in the background of what we have seen above, marks the limit beyond which the factual analysis of object-consciousness seems immediately unable to lead us. And it is precisely on this account that the meaning of the 'reference' which we have been in search of, and the nature of the 'something else', which we are in need of ascertaining, are left hitherto undiscovered.

But then, it is necessary for us to realize that in the case of philosophy, if not in the case of any other discipline, mere factual analysis cannot finally decide the question of the clear definition or definite meaning of things, and that for such decision factual analysis should, at some stage or other, give way to some means that can make good its shortcomings. In the latter respect there is, it seems, one, and only one alternative, which philosophers have no option but to adopt, and which they have, in fact, invariably adopted—no matter whether they are always conscious of it or not. And the means in question is none other than the use of *ordinary language*. But ordinary language, be it borne in mind, is open to abuse as well as proper use. Its abuse may arise in either of two ways according as it is employed in the background of improper or inadequate factual analysis or as its employment supersedes, instead of being faithful to, the deliverance of this kind of analysis. The former gives rise to crude thinking which we have earlier had occasion to condemn; the latter is characteristic of what passes for metaphysics—metaphysics in its traditional sense, which has, in the fitness of things, sunk into opprobrium especially in our day. To ensure the proper use of ordinary language for philosophical purposes it is, therefore, necessary to steer clear of the Scylla of crude thinking and the Charybdis of transcendent speculation and to employ suitable words in common use solely for the purpose of defining, or clarifying the meaning of, things naturally obscure, but brought to the surface by proper and adequate factual analysis. This, incidentally, makes no secret of the fact that philosophy is no mere

¹ That object-consciousness is, in the final analysis, relational is too hard a fact to be denied.

analysis of ordinary language, but factual analysis informed with clarity derived from appropriate vocabulary of the laity. But even in this sense philosophy, from the standpoint we propose to uphold, is a mere attempt to ascertain and clarify certain ultimate data, and, as such, is but propaedeutic to philosophy as an autonomous activity.

Let us now return to the question of the meaning of the 'reference' involved in object-consciousness, and the nature of the 'something else' to which a thing as *object* necessarily bears reference. In the light of what we have seen above, the key to the answer to this question is to be found in a word from ordinary language, and the word in demand should naturally be none other than the verb 'to know'. Now, understood with reference to this verb, an object of consciousness is a thing as *known*. How the fact of a thing's being known should be treated is, however, the crucial question. Of course, a thing's being known is a *happening*; and a happening must be due to something or, in other words, have a *cause*. But this suggests a line of procedure which is a sure way of escape from the question under consideration. Moreover, the fact remains that the suggestion is absolutely unwarranted. For a thing as known is obviously such that it has passed out of the stage where the question of the cause concerned is germane; so that in its own case causal reference is altogether irrelevant. What is really relevant, nay, necessary in its case is this, that it is known to 'something else'; because for a thing to be known and yet not to be known in this sense or in this manner is not only contradictory to the element of 'reference' laid bare by the factual analysis of object-consciousness, but utterly nonsensical.

As a result of the foregoing discussion, the answer to the question under consideration is as follows. The 'reference' found to be essential to object-consciousness involves an *external* relation, but one so peculiar that it defies causal and indeed any manner of spatial or temporal interpretation. This peculiarity comes to be positively determined in the light of the fact that one of the terms in the relation is a thing as known, which is but an object of consciousness with its meaning clarified by the employment of the verb 'to know', and the other the 'knower' or 'I' which is nothing but the 'something else' rendered definite and determinate in the same manner. In any case the fact that stands out in connection with this answer is that object-consciousness, while serving to affirm such propositions as 'this is a table', cannot but serve at the same time to affirm that 'I am'. This fact is, however, as simple as Berkeley took his '*esse is percipi*' to be; but it is as true as the latter is false. Why Kant, who made the 'I' central in his epis-

temological position, then had to make a strenuous effort to vindicate it, instead of being able to find it easy of recognition, may indeed sound strange. But that was inevitable simply because he had started from the phenomenalist position of Hume and not from unprejudiced common sense. This is also the reason why Hume's position remained unaffected in spite of the most significant discovery of Kant, and the door was left open for the revival, after Kant, of the phenomenalist standpoint of viewing the problem of knowledge in general and the problem of our knowledge of ourselves in particular. The point here seems important and may well deserve the attention of the phenomenologists of today.

However that may be, the thing that specially concerns us and remains yet to be mentioned is this. As already seen, the ground of the affirmation of the proposition: 'I am', if it is to be found anywhere, must be found in object-consciousness. But then, the fact is that object-consciousness is at once the ground of the affirmation of the proposition: 'I am' and of propositions of an admittedly different kind such as 'this is a table'. This indeed suffices to indicate that the sense in which object-consciousness can serve in this capacity must be different in the two cases. And the difference may well be expressed by saying that object-consciousness is predominantly objectivist in the latter case and primarily *reflective* in the former.¹ But the term object-consciousness, while being sufficient by itself to convey its objectivist sense, is obviously unable to bring its reflective sense into clear perspective. So there is need for the addition of a new term that can remedy its shortcoming. And, it seems, no term is more suitable to this end than *transcendental awareness*. But, be it borne in mind, transcendental awareness should not only not be confused with object-consciousness in its objectivist sense, but is not identifiable with so-called subject-consciousness; for subject-consciousness, in either of the senses previously considered, is a false abstraction from object-consciousness which transcendental awareness is not. Our final conclusion, then, is that the ground of the affirmation of the proposition is none other than transcendental awareness regarded as the reflective aspect of object-consciousness.

Transcendental awareness, it may be added in further clarification

¹ 'Reflection' as understood here is an aspect of object-consciousness and so cannot be synonymous with what is called 'introspection'. So-called introspection can at best be a way of subject-consciousness which is a fiction. This of course lends support to behaviourism. But behaviourism can hardly survive the discovery of transcendental awareness.

of its meaning, has not the sense of 'knowledge' and so should not be regarded as self-knowledge. In fact, self-knowledge is a misnomer. To admit such a thing as self-knowledge is to commit oneself to the mistake of treating object-consciousness in its objectivist sense as the epistemic paradigm. My muscle sensations, my feeling of headache or stomach-ache, etc., which are ordinarily supposed to contribute to my knowledge of my self, really constitute something else—my knowledge of my body or bodily state. Of course, the supposition may be said to have a factual basis, the fact in question being that our body or bodily state, unlike things such as a tree or a chair, is such that we can feel it as our own and in a manner which is not open to others. But cannot we have a feeling more or less in the same sense and in the same manner towards a tree in our own garden, a chair in our own room, our own clothes, wife and children and our own country? So it seems arbitrary to restrict so-called self-knowledge to knowledge of our body or bodily state with a view to separating it from our knowledge of the external world. Either admit self-knowledge and do not at the same time admit the self or admit the self and do not at the same time speak of any such thing as self-knowledge—these are the two horns of a dilemma between which we have then to choose, and, from what we have already seen, our choice cannot but be in favour of the latter.

The fact is that the self that is said to be known is not the self itself or 'I' but *me*. Nevertheless, since '*me*' is grammatically the accusative of 'I', one is apt to regard the '*me*' as identical with the 'I' as known. But this grammatical interpretation of the '*me*' only serves to illustrate how ordinary language, divorced from factual and logical considerations, may prove misleading. Considered factually and especially logically, the '*me*' is *object to*, and so other than, the 'I' and hence cannot be the same as 'I' as known. This goes to show once more that my feeling of toothache, stomach-ache, etc., which constitutes the '*me*', can have no sense of my knowledge of my self. But then, it may be objected, to entertain the notion of the self as envisaged here is to invoke what has been condemnably spoken of as 'the ghost in the machine'. As regards this objection, apart from the question whether it affects Descartes and the Cartesian tradition, it is, so far as we are concerned, the offspring of pathological fear. As our analysis of object-consciousness has revealed, the 'I' as distinguished from the '*me*' and indeed things as known in general, has a legitimate right to posit itself. And this right is legitimate, because it is not self-

acquired,¹ but is a necessary implication of what is admittedly beyond dispute, viz., object-consciousness in its objectivist sense. But this is not enough to combat the propositions which Descartes had arbitrarily deduced from his equally arbitrarily formulated principle of the *cogito*. So, for the completion of the therapy for the pathological fear, the analysis of transcendental awareness needs to be carried still further.

Transcendental awareness, as previously indicated, is peculiar in that, unlike object-consciousness in its objectivist sense, it serves to affirm the proposition 'I am', without being itself 'knowledge' at all. And this peculiarity reflects itself in the fact that, whereas object-consciousness in its objectivist sense which is 'knowledge', naturally serves to affirm many and various propositions according as the object varies from one case to another, transcendental awareness has one, and only one proposition to affirm in all cases—the proposition: 'I am'. But then, object-consciousness in its objectivist sense being inseparable from transcendental awareness, the many and various propositions that come to be affirmed on the basis of object-consciousness in this sense are, despite their multiplicity and variety, necessarily set in the background of the one proposition 'I am'. This, it is needless to say, places the 'I am' in a *unique* position. And it is on this account that this proposition has proved tantalizing to philosophers from time to time. Not to speak of the entire gamut of propositions deduced by Descartes from the *cogito*, idealism, whether subjective or absolutist, and indeed all theories which are conspicuous for their emphasis upon the primacy of the self in one sense or another, owe their origin to this tantalizing influence, and are but tributes to the uniqueness of the 'I am'.

That the 'I am' is unique in the sense indicated above is, however, beyond dispute. But its uniqueness is entirely its own, and cannot hold good in contravention of, and even without reference to, the relation it bears to object-consciousness in its objectivist sense and the propositions educible therefrom. And this is only a reminder of the truth that transcendental awareness and object-consciousness in its objectivist sense are correlatives, and, consequently, that the former cannot be treated independently of the latter any more than the latter can be treated independently of the former. Herein lies a point which is of profound philosophical importance, but which is at the

¹ It is sheer dogmatism that led Descartes to hold that the self's right to posit itself is self-acquired.

same time the one that has been completely ignored by the philosophers and the philosophical theories referred to above.

In the light of what we have just observed, that way of treating the 'I' alone can be legitimate, which conforms to the relevant requirement of object-consciousness in its objectivist sense, ordinarily called perceptual knowledge. Now, with the exception of a few psychologists of recent times who too are not quite clear in their mind, hardly anyone is clearly aware that perceptual knowledge is not purely an individual affair, but is by and large determined by the imperceptible influences of the social environment that are wont to contribute to the moulding of one's mental equipment, including interests, dispositions and predilections. This, of course, raises a question which is too big to be dealt with here and really needs a separate investigation. But in any case it seems true that our perceptual knowledge is incurably *selective*. To attribute the selectivity of one's perceptual knowledge exclusively to one's own individuality, instead of, at least partly, to the ethos that permeates one's whole being from the cradle to the grave, seems, however, to betray the atrociously egocentric standpoint of viewing our knowledge of the external world, which has vitiated epistemology throughout its history. It is curious indeed that philosophers, while they may be more or less easily ready to recognize the rôle that social factors are wont to play in human *behaviour*, should remain indifferent, if not altogether blind, to the social aspect of human knowledge—and this, notwithstanding the remarkable fact that our knowledge and our behaviour are unavoidably interdependent. And this points to the disability of traditional epistemology consisting in its treatment of human knowledge as in a class apart from human behaviour in every aspect.

If the insufficiency of the above argument is not made up for by its cogency, which seems irresistible, then all that lies within our competence to do in order to disarm sceptical doubts is: firstly, to recall our earlier discovery that for the final clarification of its meaning and its implications our perceptual knowledge is dependent upon ordinary language; secondly, to advert to the undeniable fact that ordinary language does not owe its origin to any prerogative of the individual, but is an unquestionable social product. If this addition to our argument seems trivial, it may do so on account of its unfamiliarity and, perhaps, for no other reason.

IV

I WITH OTHERS = WE

We are now entitled to a conclusive position which is none other than this, that my perceptual knowledge, where, apparently or on a more or less superficial view, my *pure* self or the solitary 'I' is subject or witness to things other than myself as objects, ultimately presents a situation, where the subject or witness is 'I' as bearer of the reflections of other minds, that, is, I with others = 'we'. And this obviously means that transcendental awareness in the final analysis is wider in scope than it seems at first sight to be, and that the proposition educible from it is 'we are' instead of the mere 'I am'. As a result, the ego-centric theory of perceptual knowledge, with which we are presented by traditional epistemology, is in need of being replaced by another which insists on the essentiality of inter-subjective *co-operation* and *participation* to perceptual knowledge. The suggested reform is indeed salutary in a remarkable way. It overcomes solipsism on the one hand and the difficulty of accounting for the objectivity or commonness of the world of perceptual knowledge on the other, from both of which the ego-centric epistemological theory seems to have no escape. Of the philosophers in the West it is perhaps Malebranche and, in a sense, Berkeley in his later writings, who came near to the truth adumbrated here. But then, their mentalism on the one hand and their theological bias on the other prevented them from realizing the truth. In contrast with the position of Malebranche and Berkeley ours is fully alive to the *independence* of things as known, and places inter-subjective cooperation and participation on the strict human level instead of on the divine level, where both of these are bound to be lost to the omnipotence and omnipresence of God, with the result that our perceptual knowledge is exposed to the danger of being rendered nugatory.

The point that is of far-reaching importance¹ and of immediate interest to us is, however, that the ultimate datum as revealed by transcendental awareness is 'we' = I with others (you, he, she, they). Now

¹ It is for the discerning reader to see that 'we' = 'I with others' not only serves to extricate the epistemological situation from much of the confusion that usually surrounds it, but holds the key to the solution of, among others, the problems relating to the individual and society, the citizen and the state, and even our moral obligation and religious experience—problems that have perplexed philosophers from age to age.

this equation seems to be not only the way of expressing the meaning of the 'we', but also of admitting such a thing as the 'we' which, as we have found, we have no option but to admit. In particular—and this is especially significant—it achieves what the grammatical interpretation of 'we' fails to do. Grammatically, 'we' is plural and means 'I and others'. But why should 'I and others' be called 'we' instead of 'they'? And how, to ask a more fundamental question, can we at all admit and speak of the 'I' and the 'others'? Neither of the questions can receive an answer from the mere words with which grammar deals here. The answers to the questions, if attainable at all, must, it is needless to add, be attained from the deliverance of transcendental awareness in its final analysis, with its meaning clarified by appropriate words from ordinary language, viz., the personal demonstratives.

Neither the 'I' as such nor the 'others' as such is, then, an ultimate datum. And yet without both of these the we, besides being a word, can mean nothing at all—not to speak of its being an ultimate datum as it really is. But then, the fact stands out that the 'I' or the 'others' is not admissible and so is, for us,¹ nothing at all, except in virtue of the 'I with others = we'. What follows is that the 'we' cannot be a pure unity, an identity without difference. Nor again can it be a unity in difference. For how can there be difference within it when it is 'I with others' instead of 'I and others'? The fact is that the 'we' refuses categorization and cannot be characterized except as the mere 'I with others'. To characterize it in any other way is to dislodge it from its proper place by elevating it to a superhuman sphere or by lowering it down to a subhuman level, the result in either case being its being rendered meaningless on the one hand and, as our analysis would amply testify, defiance of the evidence of fact and the demand of logic on the other hand.

What we have so far seen is perhaps sufficient as a remedy for the pathological fear of 'the ghost in the machine'. For we need no more argument to realize that the *ultimate* fact about the 'I' lies not in its being in the machine—where, in the nature of things or, if one prefers, as a matter of destiny, it must be—but in its being with 'others' and thus being well established in the 'we'. But if even then, the 'I' be said to be a ghost, the 'others' cannot but be regarded as its kindred, with the result that the ghost itself is sure to go without any chance of revealing its identity and so must be as good as nothing. In any case, if the 'I' be a ghost and as such an evil fit only to be

¹ The use of the word 'us' may be excused.

exorcized, the 'others' can claim no preferential treatment and, in consequence, there would be nothing left except a world of machines, but machines capable of performing feats no less miraculous than those with which ghosts may be credited.

But then, the pathological fear is such that, even if it be allayed, it may reappear in the guise of a question supposed to be philosophical, the question: 'What is the "I"?' This brings in a point of wider interest and of fundamental philosophical importance, which naturally escapes the notice of philosophers, but is certainly one of which they can ill afford to remain ignorant. It is, therefore, worth while to consider the point in order that what we have to say about the question before us may be of due significance. Now, no matter how a philosophical question originates, it is incumbent upon the philosopher, in order that his labour may not be lost, to ascertain whether it is genuine, and, in particular, why it is not genuine in case it happens to be such. This task seems never to have been so seriously undertaken and yet so iconoclastically executed as it has been by linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language. The view has been held that, not to speak of this philosophical question or *that*, all such questions are due to 'the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' and as such are fictitious. And in consequence of this way of wholesale rejection of what passes for philosophy, an altogether new conception of philosophy has been upheld—the conception according to which the aim of philosophy is to fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence with the help of the analysis of language or, as stated in a much-quoted phrase, 'to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'.¹

The above position is indeed of importance with regard to the matter under discussion, in so far as it is fully alive to the fact that questions ordinarily regarded as philosophical may not really be so, and that any fictitious philosophical question that there may be owes its origin to the bewitchment of our intelligence. But it suffers from a twofold fault—the fault of exaggeration coupled with a measure of self-contradiction in its dismissal as fictitious of all questions that tradition assigns to the field of philosophy; and the fault of superficiality and oversimplification in its estimate of the importance of the relation of philosophy to language and of linguistic analysis in philosophical investigations.

Even granted that traditional philosophy is adept in inventing questions when there should be none, the question regarding the aim

¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*.

of philosophy at least, which seems all-important in philosophy of language and which, according to this philosophy, must be genuine and not due to the bewitchment of our intelligence, is undoubtedly as old as philosophy itself. And, as already seen, language, despite the good offices performed by it in defining, and clarifying the meaning of facts, is no substitute for facts themselves; and linguistic analysis, whether grammatical or logical or both, however important or necessary it may be, can only supplement, but cannot supplant factual analysis with respect to philosophical investigations. This brings us, however, to our main point which is none other than this, that the bewitchment of our intelligence, the immediate source of all fictitious philosophical questions, which, only on a superficial view, is brought about by language, is ultimately due to some serious defect or other of factual analysis. That this is so is at least in a small measure borne out by the affirmation of the 'I' as an ultimate datum. But this is by no means the end of the matter so far as the question: 'What is the "I"?' is concerned.

In the case of our affirmation of the 'I' as an ultimate datum the bewitching defect of factual analysis is in its turn due to something wrong lying deep in our nature. And this something is none other than egoity attended by insularity, both consequent upon our unavoidable biological birth. It does not, however, require much ingenuity on anyone's part to see, and to be impressed by, the remarkable vastness of the empire of egoity and insularity. These are wont to vitiate our thoughts, feelings, sentiments and actions not only on the individual level, but on the level of the group, community and nation. It is, therefore, no wonder that they should produce misleading effects upon our philosophical investigations. But then, curious though it may seem, it is yet a fact that our affirmation of the 'I' as an ultimate datum is inseparable from the dread of ourselves as lonely and solitary. This naturally affects the philosophic mind most vitally, leaving the laity more or less unconcerned.

But how is the philosopher to combat this dread? Either of two ways is open to him. One, curative and, as the history of philosophy would readily testify, rare rather than common, with no question to ask and no answer to demand, lies in the discovery of the illusoriness of the dread by means of realizing that the ultimate datum concerned is not the pure ego or the solitary 'I', but the 'I' with others=*we*. The other, palliative and indeed escapist, presents itself in the shape of a question demanding an answer or rather an entire gamut of answers¹

¹ One has only to turn to Descartes for the verification of this point.

—the question: 'what is the "I"?' But since escapism is never detached from, but, on the contrary, is bound up with, that from which escape is sought, this question itself as well as the answers offered to it are after all the offspring of the dread in question. And this points towards the unconscious psychology that has at least in part and in different ways determined the history of philosophy from Descartes to contemporary existentialism.

In consideration of the peculiar requirement of the philosophical procedure and in fairness to the philosophers and philosophies concerned, it needs to be added, however, that the question under discussion may have a legitimate place in philosophical investigations, but subject to the fulfilment of two conditions, one negative and one positive. The former is that this question should on no account be treated as parallel to, and co-ordinate with, similar questions concerning external things, for example, the question: 'What is a table?' The latter, consequent upon the former, is that, instead of being taken to have the usual sense of interrogation, it should be regarded as at best a demand for the elaboration of the final deliverance of our transcendental awareness, the deliverance that *I am with others*, that is, *we are*. On this point we may make bold to suggest that that which our perceptual knowledge merely hints at by implication is brought into the clearest perspective and firmly established by the gifts of inestimable value with which human life is enriched—the gifts of sympathy, charity, benevolence, the sense of obligation, and to crown all, love. In any case, to ask the question, 'what is the "I"?', is to find it lost to the question, 'what is the "we"?', a question which is most easily answered, simply because the 'we' is an ultimate datum.

The main point here is simple, though not quite familiar. It calls for the substitution of the *reflective* for the *objectivist* standpoint of viewing the 'I' and the 'others' (you, he, she, they), which is no less prejudicial to philosophical thinking than to the affairs of our day to day life. The question of *persons* as denoted by proper names such as Mr Murray, Mrs James and Miss Brown, it is to be admitted however, falls apart from the question of the personal demonstratives, I, you, he, she, they (that is, 'others'). But even then, the former question needs to be treated, not in isolation from, but with reference to, the latter, in order that the distinction between *persons* and *things* may not be obliterated.

Now as regards the question of the ground of the affirmation of the proposition: 'there are others (as I am)', which still remains to be answered, it seems that its answer is readily available through trans-

centidental awareness in virtue of what has been found to be its final deliverance. But the matter is not really as simple as that. The deliverance in question is 'I with others', and not 'I and others'. It only seems to affirm that 'we are'. But what is this 'we'? It is not only not 'I' nor 'others' nor even 'I and others', but cannot also be a person or persons. Yet, if it is not anything concrete, it is an ultimate datum and as such, is not, like the pure 'I' or the mere 'others', an abstraction either. It must have a definite function to perform; and its function cannot be anything but to define. But what else can it be given to it to define except the realm of the personal? And it is only in this sense, and in no other, that the proposition: 'we are' is meaningful. On the other hand, the 'with' in the deliverance of transcendental awareness is positively dissuasive of the affirmation of the proposition 'there are others' as well as of the proposition 'I am'. To affirm either is to mistake the abstract for the concrete, to invoke an apparition or apparitions. Hence there arises a curious predicament.

But what are the 'others' (you, he, she, they)? Of course, persons bearing proper names, and lending meaning to the personal demonstratives except 'we' and, for the present, 'I'; because the 'we' is not a person, or persons, and the 'I' does not come under the 'others'. And this, in the light of what we have observed above about the distinction between the question of persons and the question of personal demonstratives, provides for the release of the others from the tie (as signified by the 'with' in the deliverance of transcendental awareness) which binds them with the 'I', and thereby alters the situation with respect to the affirmation of the proposition: 'there are others'. In fact, propositions like 'there he or she is', considered by themselves and without reference to any context, are useless—of course, except for the fact that they point to the realm of the personal. But then, in that case they are already lost to, and form part and parcel of, the proposition 'we are'. On the other hand, propositions such as 'there is Mr Murray or Mrs James or Miss Brown', are useful on their own account and indeed no less so than propositions like 'there is a table'.

Does it, then, follow that our 'knowledge' of Mr Murray, Mrs James or Miss Brown carries the same sense and takes place in the same manner as our knowledge of a table, a chair or a tree? This conclusion is one which it may be natural for many to draw, and which even the philosophers whose name is legion have actually drawn. But, as the foregoing discussion suffices to show, it contradicts some of the inevitable results of the factual analysis of the epistemo-

logical situation, or, as one might in conformity with a philosophical fashion of the day say, is not *logical*. In any case the conclusion amounts to upholding a position which, as we have previously argued, is based on the arbitrary acceptance of perceptual knowledge as the epistemic paradigm and, as our later discovery goes to show, is vitiated by the confusion of the personal with the impersonal, of *persons* with *things*. And this latter point, whether one is able or willing to realize it or not, is at least in *theory*, if not altogether in *practice* (but why not in practice also when theory and practice go hand in hand?), of disastrous consequence to Mr Murray, Mrs James, Miss Brown and all their fellows. The consequence is none other than their being deprived of the blessings of sympathy, charity, benevolence and, above all, love. And this is indeed a sad commentary on the philosophers' rôle in the world of human affairs, and at any rate speaks of the absurdity of the empiricist theory of our knowledge of others.

The fact of the matter is that the 'others' as *persons*, despite their release from the tie that binds them with the 'I' and despite whatever loss of epistemic autonomy or right to self-affirmation they suffer on this account, are inseparable from the *we*, that is, the realm of the personal. And since the realm of the personal is coextensive with the sphere of transcendental awareness, the 'others' as *persons*, while deprived of the right to self-affirmation, remain strangers to epistemic heteronomy unavoidable in the case of things—things, all affirmations about which presuppose their being *known* as *objects*. Thus, whereas the proposition, for example 'there is a table' expresses the fact that *I know* a thing called a table as *object*, the proposition 'there are others (other persons)' has no similar fact to express, but is only an abbreviation of the statement: 'I affirm that there are others (other persons)'. And the primary affirmation that, from the nature of the case, it goes to the credit of transcendental awareness to make with respect to *persons*, relates to the proposition 'there are other persons (Mr Murray, Mrs James, Miss Brown *et al.*)'. This conveys the answer to the question under discussion, but subject to clarification of a few outstanding points which may be offered as follows.

In speaking of other persons as the subject of the primary affirmation that transcendental awareness serves to make, it is far from us to imply, however, that 'I' is not a person or that no affirmation can be made with respect to it regarded as a person. But the fact is that that cannot be said to be a person, which *merely* affirms, but about

which no affirmation is made.¹ The 'I' in the statement: 'I affirm that there are others (other persons)' obviously answers to this description and so cannot be spoken of as a person. Besides, and this is the most fundamental point, that which is to be affirmed to be a person is under the necessity of being released from the tie that binds it with the 'I'. But so far as the 'I' itself is concerned, its release from its tie with itself is absolutely out of the question in as much as it is absurd to speak of its having a tie at all with itself. The only alternative for which room may be left in consequence is then this, that the 'I' is a person, not unto itself, but unto other persons, and that for its affirmation as a person it is solely dependent upon other persons. Judged from this point of view which seems unquestionable, the proposition, which is crudely and incorrectly stated as 'there are others like me' and less crudely and less incorrectly as 'there are others as I am', should find its proper and legitimate expression in the mere statement: 'there are others (Mr Murray, Mrs James, Miss Brown *et al.*)'. And, further, the bare statement: 'I am' is in need of being made complete in the statement: 'I am as others are'. Thus the affirmation of the 'I' as a person presupposes the affirmation of others as persons. And this suggests a standpoint demanding thorough reversal of, and a complete departure from, the ego-centric standpoint set on foot by Descartes, which has since his time dominated Western thought in one way or another. Even empiricism, boastful of its programmes of philosophical reform, has only played with the standpoint handed down by Descartes, but has remained unaware of his gross misunderstanding of the human situation and the far-reaching evil consequences of this misunderstanding.

V

KNOWING EACH OTHER

That persons are immune from epistemic heteronomy or, in other words, do not admit of being *known* as objects may, however, be further argued thus. In the case of the epistemic relation between one person and another, unlike in the case of the same kind of relation between a person and a thing, there may be absolute parity between

¹ This points to a seeming resemblance between our 'knowledge' of persons and our knowledge of things, which has misled many philosophers, especially the empiricists, into the understanding of the former on the analogy of the latter.

the terms. Thus, while the table which I happen to know cannot, in its turn, know me, a person whom I come to know is free from this disability of the table and is capable of knowing me. In other words, while I and a thing such as a table cannot, I and another person can, be spoken of as *knowing each other*. And this brings out the crux of the situation. As previously observed, the 'reference' involved in the epistemic relation as signified by the verb 'to know' is one-sided, not double-sided and really cannot mean the mutuality of 'knowing each other'. Now since the sacrifice of the parity of the terms in the epistemic relation between one person and another would inevitably result in solipsism and since solipsism is self-stultifying and indeed stands negated by the fact of intersubjective communication, the difficulty with which we are confronted here—if it is to be solved at all as it should be—can be solved only thus. The verb 'to know' in the case of 'knowing each other' not only cannot mean what it is ordinarily intended to mean, but is only an inadvertent substitute for the verb 'to affirm'—to affirm without 'knowing', without apprehending anything as *object*. Thus, while things are characterized by epistemic heteronomy and are affirmable only on the ground of their being *known as objects*, persons are in a class apart, being *merely affirmable*, of course by one another, but not on the same ground as things. This *mere affirmability* of persons, it should be noted, however, falls short of the epistemic autonomy or right to self-affirmation which, on a superficial view, is ascribed to the 'I' as arbitrarily abstracted from the 'I with others' but, strictly speaking, belongs to the 'I with others' = we, that is, the realm of the personal, as distinguished from persons as such.

The above discussion serves to confirm some of our previous conclusions, which, in view of the confused state that prevails today in the philosophical world, we should not be tired of mentioning even at the cost of repetition. In the first place, the inappropriateness of the verb 'to know' in the case of 'knowing each other' indicates, at least in a small measure, that linguistic analysis, unless it is based on a due consideration of facts, may prove as ineffective and even misleading in philosophical investigations as is that factual analysis, which is either inadequate in itself, or indifferent to the meaning of relevant words from ordinary language. So even granted that the aim of philosophy is to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle, philosophy regarded as mere linguistic analysis may have to suffer the fly to remain in the fly-bottle and to die a natural death, or, if it can somehow show the fly the way out of one fly-bottle, it may have no

guarantee to offer against its flying into another. Of course, factual analysis may not, in this respect, be in a better position than linguistic analysis. But, as previously observed, that must be due to something wrong lying deep in human nature, and the remedy for it, which philosophy should be in need of, whatever else may be its source, cannot come out of linguistic analysis.

Secondly, our interpretation of 'knowing each other' not only makes for the mere *recognition*, but for the *vindication*, of the distinction between *persons* and *things* which, if it is to be vindicated, must be done at the epistemic level, or else not at all. Empiricism, in so far as it depends solely on the consideration of behaviour in its treatment of the problem of our knowledge of persons, ignores the need for the *vindication* of this distinction and, in fact, proceeds as if *persons* were *things*. The fact is that one *behaves* because one is a person, and not that one is person because one behaves; so that to start from behaviour, instead of from persons, as empiricism does, is to leave behind persons once for all, on account of the impossibility of reconstructing persons from mere behaviour. The idea underlying all this is not, however, to detach persons from behaviour and to make ghosts of persons, but to realize the fact of their attachment to the realm of the personal, as distinguished from the world of things, and, in particular, to recognize behaviour as *personal*, instead of *impersonal*. The position envisaged here is characterized by the certitude guaranteed by factual analysis carried to its furthest limit, which seems to lie beyond the reach of mere linguistic analysis.

VI

CONCLUSION

The conclusion which the foregoing discussions force upon us is as simple as those discussions themselves have unavoidably proved complicated, and may be stated thus. That there is, on the one hand, a world of (impersonal) *things*, and there are, on the other hand, *persons* belonging to, and inseparable from, an entire realm of the personal, and that persons act with respect to one another, as well as with respect to the world of things—these are facts which are not due to anything that the human mind does or does not do, and so require no explanation, but are to be accepted as ultimate data in philosophical investigations. But then, the proposition 'I (as a person) am' falls apart from such ultimate data. And this is due, not to any fault

of the 'I' as a person, but to the fact that 'I am' presupposes, and depends for its affirmation on 'others (other persons) are'. This only suggests that the ego-centric standpoint as dictated by the supposed primacy of the 'I am', which has misled philosophical thinking more often than not and in various ways, is as unwarranted by fact as it is productive of vicious results. But even when the 'I am' is superseded by the 'we are' the philosopher should have no reason to be complacent. For the realm of the personal, in the name of society and in virtue of its heteronomous activity, may, and indeed naturally does, produce results in the shape of science and its auxiliaries, especially mathematics and logic. And these, in the absence of the recognition of their limitations and especially the mighty illusions they are apt to call into existence, surpass the mere 'I am' in their ability to vitiate the affairs of our day to day life as well as our philosophical thinking. But this is a matter demanding a separate investigation, which, together with the one made here, is essential to the understanding of the nature and subject-matter of philosophy proper.



PART TWO

IMAGINATION, TIME AND THE PLAN FOR ACTION

I

THE CASE FOR PHILOSOPHY

As seems to have already been evident, our main object is to try to make out a case for the necessity of philosophy as an independent discipline, with reference to the activity of the human mind that could be called autonomous. What exactly that activity is, and, in particular, what is meant by its autonomy are, however, matters from which we are as yet far off. But why, it may be disparagingly and even rebukingly asked, should these questions be raised at all, and why should not the usual procedure be followed—the procedure consisting in an enquiry into the function of philosophy as such, and the problem or problems with which philosophy may be said to be specially concerned? This is, of course, a challenge for us to encounter. But it is one, to which we have no reason, at least none derivable from the history of philosophy, to succumb. In the course of its long history philosophy has proved unable to establish itself as a discipline with a specific function to perform and any definite problem or problems to deal with. Although its name has persisted, its career, with respect to its function and its problems, has been rather episodic, not continuous nor uniform, as must have been brought home to the students of philosophy specially in recent times. It is not that philosophers have remained unaware of this circumstance. On the contrary, it is their awareness of it that has stirred them into activity, much of which is naturally adventitious, and has made for the continuance of what passes for philosophic thought. But what has been left undone is to hold a serious enquiry into the activity of the human mind that is to develop into philosophy.

It is necessary at the outset to steer clear of the difficulty which is apt to be created by the idea of understanding the nature of philosophy with reference to an activity of the human mind. This idea, it may be contended, obviously envisages the conception of philosophy

as anthropocentric, whereas philosophy, strictly speaking, should be objective, that is, free from the limitations of whatever the human mind may have to do. But it may be replied that the anthropocentricity and the objectivity of an enquiry are not incompatibles, because an enquiry is said to be anthropocentric in so far as it springs from or is motivated by an activity of the human mind and this, not on account of the fiat of the activity concerned, but on account of the fulfilment of certain objective conditions. Judged from this point of view, all enquiries, scientific enquiries perhaps not excepted, are anthropocentric. In any case so far as philosophy is concerned, it is in need of being conceived to be the elaboration of the deliverances of a certain activity of the human mind in order that it may find the surest and the safest ground to stand upon and thus come into its own, ending its nomadic career or outgrowing its parasitical existence.

But then, though it may seem strange, yet it is a fact that an enquiry once set on foot loses its hindsight and is blinded to its source, viz., the activity of the human mind concerned. As a result, either it is misled, travels along a wrong road, launches on a fruitless journey as is generally the case with philosophy and allied enquiries; or its road grows wider and wider as it travels, and its scope goes on extending farther and farther beyond legitimate limits as is evidenced, on the one hand, by the undue prominence attached to the idea of history from time to time and, on the other, by the devastating influence which science, mathematics and logic have come to wield specially in recent times. In this circumstance it is no wonder that philosophy, which has initially deviated from its proper field, should come under the influence of one or other of its powerful rivals. But the overbearing influence of philosophy's rivals is no recompense for the predicament of philosophy itself any more than is the tyrant's supposed gain for the loss suffered by the victim of tyranny. This points to a critical situation, the way out of which is to be found nowhere else than in the rehabilitation of philosophy on the one hand and the reorientation of the outlook of the rivals of philosophy on the other. And, from the nature of the case, it seems that no means is finally suited to this end except a careful consideration of the activities of the human mind which respectively motivate the discipline known as philosophy and the others that are supposed to be its allies, but have really proved to be its rivals. This opens up a vista to an enquiry, the need for which is seldom recognized, but which is undoubtedly the foundation of all other enquiries, considering that

these are unavoidably anthropocentric. The enquiry in question is the one which may well be designated as metapsychology.

II

KNOWLEDGE, ACTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MIND

Our initial investigation centred round the concept of *knowledge*, and only incidentally referred to two others, those of action and the activity of the human mind. And this, not because knowledge is more important than action or the activity of the human mind, but because the former, being, as a matter of historical fact, more open to misunderstanding and apt to be misunderstood in more ways than the latter, demands a comparatively serious enquiry. Now though the word 'knowledge', as previously argued, means something fundamentally different in the case of our so-called knowledge of ourselves and other persons from what it means in the case of our knowledge of impersonal things, yet its applicability in both the cases may have some justification on account of usage and specially on account of what is common to them, viz., that neither entails the idea of action or the idea of any activity of the human mind. This, however, raises the question of the distinction between action and the activity of the human mind on the one hand and between these two and knowledge on the other. The treatment of this question, as will be evident from the following discussion, is of paramount importance for the present as well as the subsequent phases of our investigation.

One of the truths well established as a result of our earlier discussions is that knowledge *qua* knowledge, as distinguished from what constitutes the *occasion* for the occurrence of knowledge, is of the nature of an accomplished *fact* and so is no *process*, whether an action or an activity or anything else of a similar kind. But what is an action? What is an activity of the human mind? And how do these differ from each other? These are the outstanding questions which need to be answered and we may now attempt to answer them as follows. In understanding the *nature* of an action we have primarily to bear in mind that the question of actions arises in connection with our *ordinary* dealings with impersonal things and persons such as making a bed, withdrawing the hand from the fire, planting a tree, picking a flower, showing a stranger the way to his destination,

advising a friend, giving alms to a poor man, rebuking a child for his faults, etc. Here then we have instances of action which, notwithstanding their difference with respect to content and context, are characterized by certain common features. In the first place, all these actions and others of a similar kind, obviously too numerous to be enumerated here, are so called because of the fact that they are not impersonal, but *personal*, personal in the usual sense that they are performances of individuals as *persons*. Be it noted, however, that, although our behaviour towards persons may be said to be in a class apart from our behaviour towards impersonal things, that difference is mainly one of content and context, which is indeed of supreme importance in a valuational approach to human behaviour, but is of little consequence in a scientific treatment of our dealings with persons regarded as *ordinary* happenings. This, it is needless to say, amounts to conceding to psychology the utmost that this branch of knowledge as an empirical science could legitimately claim.

Secondly, an action strictly so called only *presupposes* knowledge—the knowledge of a situation, whether impersonal or personal or both. But it is *stimulated* and indeed brought about by the demands of the situation as *felt* by the so-called ‘agent’ concerned. For the completion of the analysis of this feature of action it is, however, necessary to realize that the element of knowledge may on occasion be no knowledge at all, but error instead; or it may be incomplete, that is, less adequate than it could be. And the demands of the situation may be felt differently by different ‘agents’ or even by the same ‘agent’ at different times and in different circumstances. All this seems contradictory to the predictability of actions and is enough to expose the futility of the idea of understanding *actions* on the analogy of reflex movements, and to refute the behaviourists’ stimulus-response theory of action which, after all, is based on this idea. But even if this position be judged to be inconclusive, it may perhaps still be maintained that no manner of the analysis of actions can exorcize the elements of *knowledge* and *feeling* and thereby deprive an action of its personal character which we have emphasized earlier, but which is ignored specially by behaviourism. It is at this point that we should be on our guard against the much too common tendency towards oversimplification which is apt to create the misunderstanding that actions, as our analysis has so far revealed them to be, are the culmination or even the paradigm of all our performances as persons. And what is of immediate help in this respect is the consideration of another characteristic feature of actions properly so-called, which is as follows.

Let us begin by reminding ourselves that our *actions* are confined within the domain of our *ordinary* dealings with impersonal things and persons. Keeping this clearly and steadily in view, we may perhaps accept it as an unquestionable fact that, in the case of our actions, the sole importance of knowledge lies in its serving as the necessary *occasional cause* of our performances while the performances themselves are primarily due to the respective situations as *felt* by us. Thus in the case of an action the relation between knowledge and performance is rather loose. But it is far from us to suggest that knowledge is something inert or unconnected with actions. On the contrary, knowledge as such is imbued with the tendency towards action, as is specially demonstrable from the fact that there is an unbroken continuity between the sensory and the motor arcs in our nervous system. And it is precisely for this reason that knowledge can serve as the necessary occasion for our performances in the case of our *actions*. But then, for knowledge and performance to be loosely connected with each other is, plainly enough, an altogether different matter, which, however, shows, not that actions are impersonal—for how can they be so when, as previously seen, they involve knowledge and feeling and are unpredictable?—but that they can by no means be regarded as constituting the highest stage in the development of our performances as persons or even as the paradigm of such performances.

The looseness of the relation between knowledge and performance noticed above obviously points to a sort of *want* in the case of what we have called an action. And as regards this want, it gives rise to a twofold question, the question about its *ultimate significance* and the question about its *demand* coupled with the question as to how the demand is to be fulfilled. The former, theoretical in appearance, but really having a profound practical bearing, is, by its very nature, of fundamental importance, but is apt to be ignored and, as we shall see later, has generally been ignored by philosophers as well as men of science to the detriment to the cause of the understanding of the concept of man. The latter, predominantly practical and bearing the promise of opening up a vista to a variegated field commonly but mistakenly supposed to be purely theoretical, is obviously so appealing to the natural interest of man that it cannot go unheeded and, as a matter of fact, receives his unceasing attention with a view to its solution. Of the questions thus formulated it is the latter that is specially relevant to the present phase of our investigation, while the former promises, on the one hand, to indicate the limitation of the

solution of the latter and, on the other, to convey the demand for a separate enquiry to serve as the final phase of our investigation.

It is indeed true that in considering the actions of men we should have in view men integrally related to some community or other as they naturally are, and not hypothetical individuals living solitary and insular lives from the cradle to the grave. Yet the 'want' referred to above, if it is as it seems to us to be a fact, is, however curious this may be, indicative of the non-fulfilment of the social demand or, to state more specifically, the social norm of conduct. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that our ordinary actions generally suffer from deprivation in this sense, no matter whether we are always or ever at all aware of this or not. Eating a meal while some of one's fellows may have to go without it, motoring a certain distance while many others have no option but to walk the same distance on foot, building a house for oneself while many are without the requisite financial resources for launching upon the same project, etc., are instances of such actions. It should be noted, however, that our concern here is not with the *evaluation* or the determination of the rightness or wrongness, but with the *analysis*, of actions in the sense on which we have been insisting in the present context. And it is in the light of their analysis that actions are found to bear a demand for their socialization, a demand which, owing to the inherent social nature of man, is but inevitable. Of course, the arousal of such a demand seems at first sight to be theoretically inconsistent with the essential social nature of man. But the demand is so widely and certainly warranted by fact that its legitimacy cannot be surrendered for the sake of mere logical consistency. Moreover, and this is especially significant, the sense in which the 'socialization' of actions needs to be understood, as we shall immediately see, is in no way prejudicial to the essential social nature of man.

Before proceeding to determine the meaning and the form or forms of the socialization of actions, we may better attempt further clarification of our position with respect to what has previously been spoken of as the looseness of relation between knowledge and performance in the case of our ordinary actions, and the 'want' consequent thereupon. The looseness and the non-fulfilment of a social norm of conduct said to be indicated by the want in question are inseparables so far as our experience goes. Of course, the looseness may simply be dismissed as something purely imaginary or unreal, with reference to the alleged fact that in the case of all our actions, including our ordinary actions, knowledge and performance, far from

being loosely related, are knit together in virtue of what is called *purpose* or *intention*. In consequence, it may be contended, the argument for the non-fulfilment of a social norm of conduct in the case of our ordinary actions is altogether lost. But, while not disputing, but even granting the supposed efficacy of purpose or intention, one may still be in a position to maintain that purpose or intention is not sufficient to knit knowledge and performance together in all respects, and may, and in fact does, leave them in a state of greater or less isolation from each other in a certain respect. It is such isolation that reveals itself in the 'want' signifying the unquestionable fact of the non-fulfilment of the social norm of conduct in the case of our ordinary actions.

The point here is really twofold: first, that the nonfulfilment in question, which is a fact beyond dispute, cannot be reconciled with the inherent social nature of man unless it be also a fact that knowledge and performance are not knit together, but loosely related in the case of our ordinary actions; secondly, that the looseness of relation between the two is, in its turn, socially significant in that it contributes to the fulfilment of a social purpose by calling forth the demand for the socialization of actions.

The first thing to be noted in connection with the idea of the socialization of action is that a socialized action can, for obvious reasons, be no mere *performance*, that is, a pure organic movement; nor mere knowledge—and this despite the fact that knowledge naturally tends towards action—nor even an *action* as such in its strict sense, in the sense in which we have preferred to understand it. Keeping this in view and considering that socialization promises to be the remedy for the looseness of the relation between knowledge and performance, one may perhaps be sure that a socialized action must be of either of two forms: knowledge-with-a-view-to-performance and performance-with-a-view-to-knowledge. Being thus connected, and yet unidentifiable with knowledge on the one hand and with performance on the other, the two forms of socialized action, dependent as they must be on two of the major powers of the human mind, are but the mind's activities, which, for want of more suitable names, may respectively be designated as *Imagination* and *Understanding*. The difficulty in the way of our realizing that this is so is, however, due to our common, but misleading tendency to understand a mental activity with reference to *knowledge* which is really no action, or else with reference to a *performance* which is an action minus knowledge, that is, a mere organic movement, and so is not of the mind. In fact,

it is this tendency that is responsible for our failure to recognize any such thing as a socialized action and for the confusion and misunderstanding that prevail in the fields of philosophy and psychology with respect to the nature of Imagination and Understanding and the relation between the two. And this serves to remind us of the truth that the analysis of language, specially *ordinary words* such as 'imagination' and 'understanding' with which we are concerned in the present context, is not likely to carry us far, if it is pursued independently of the analysis of the corresponding *concepts* and more particularly the analysis of the *facts* concerned.

III

FICTIONS OF 'REPRODUCTIVE' AND 'CREATIVE' IMAGINATION

The difficulty about understanding the nature of Imagination lies mainly in the usual conception of it as subservient to, or at best as a form of, knowledge, in terms of the view, endorsed by the dictionary, that Imagination is the faculty of forming images of things not present to the senses. Here Imagination, of course, under the title of 'reproductive imagination', is obviously confused with *memory*, but memory worst misconceived, in fact no less misconceived than perceptual knowledge has been by both traditional and contemporary epistemology. According to the traditional as well as most of the contemporary theories of knowledge, our knowledge of material objects is not, strictly speaking, *direct* as it should be in order that it can be worth the name, but *indirect*, taking place through the intermediary of so-called sense-contents. And it is on the analogy of perceptual knowledge thus understood that memory is conceived to consist in calling up *images* of things 'past' instead of in apprehending directly such things themselves. But 'images' themselves being, like so-called sense-contents, 'present' and not 'past', how can memory with images as its contents be, as it should be, the apprehension of something 'past' in distinction from perceptual knowledge which is the apprehension of something 'present'? The difficulty of constructing what is 'past' from what is 'present' or of deriving something 'present' from something that is 'past', in which the present conception of memory is involved, is, however, no less acute and no more amenable to solution than the difficulty of constructing 'public' physical things regarded as the objects of our perceptual knowledge, from our 'private' sense-

contents—a difficulty that vitiates most of the contemporary theories of perceptual knowledge.

The point here is that to apprehend what is past as being resident in what is but present is not to apprehend the past at all and, consequently, not to have any such thing as memory. But since man is unquestionably gifted with memory, there is no denying the fact, however paradoxical it may at first sight seem, that, in addition to his capacity for apprehending directly that which is present, man is endowed with the capacity for apprehending no less *directly* that which is past. And as regards the latter capacity, it is hardly necessary to observe that it is one of the essential factors that serve to differentiate man from animals, and, in particular, contributes to man's sense of *time*—and this for the simple reason that our awareness of time would be out of the question apart from our apprehension of the past as past. All this, however, goes to show only this, that memory is a way of *knowledge*, which is not parallel to or co-ordinate with, perceptual knowledge, but, in a sense, the same as perceptual knowledge and yet differing from it mainly in the temporal context.¹ And what is thus shown suffices to indicate that Imagination, not being knowledge, whether of anything present or of anything past, is not only not perceptual knowledge but also not memory, and that 'reproductive imagination' is a mere fiction.

The time-honoured admission of so-called 'productive' or 'creative' imagination in distinction from so-called 'reproductive imagination', of course, seems at first sight to recognize an aspect of Imagination in which this activity of the human mind is in a class apart from memory as well as perceptual knowledge. But if Hume is right, as he seems to us to be, in insisting on the limitation of creative imagination to the objects of perceptual knowledge and memory, this mental faculty, despite its supposed freedom to manipulate those objects, cannot, strictly speaking, be qualitatively different from memory and, on account of this very freedom, should rather be regarded as a source of illusions. And judged from this point of view, so-called creative imagination cannot obviously be said to have any contribution to make to the possibility of perceptual knowledge.² In particular,

¹ Any other way of understanding the difference between perceptual knowledge and memory would amount to denying memory the status of a form of knowledge which it undoubtedly has.

² This remark would have been uncalled for but for Kant's and his followers' insistence on the importance of Imagination in the elaboration of perceptual knowledge.

it is far removed from that activity of the human mind which expresses itself in artistic creation, and with which it is usually identified—and this for the obvious reason that the aim of art, whatever else it may be, is certainly not to produce illusions. In view of all this it may be safely concluded that Imagination, despite whatever resemblance it may be found to bear to perceptual knowledge, memory and artistic creation, falls as apart from perceptual knowledge and memory on the one hand as from artistic creation on the other.

IV

AN APPROACH TO TIME

Though it has not always received the serious attention of philosophers that it deserves, yet it seems unquestionably true that no investigation of perceptual knowledge, memory and imagination is strictly philosophical or even worth the name apart from special reference to *time*. It is to be noted, however, that in this respect space is too compelling to be ignored, but that, while being invariably essential to perceptual knowledge and also to memory, it relates to Imagination, if it at all does, in an altogether different manner and in any case, not in the same manner as does time. Thus Imagination is comparatively free from concern with space, but is essentially related to time. Nevertheless, what is meant here is not that time as such is subjective. On the contrary, it is objective, independent of the affairs of man; for otherwise the question of the relation of perceptual knowledge, memory and Imagination to time would not have arisen at all. But, then, the question remains: how are we to account for our *sense of time*? In this connection it should be borne in mind that, however time as such be conceived, it is for us a triad, past-present-future. And this points to the essential relation of time to perceptual knowledge, memory and imagination. Perceptual knowledge, of course, is full of content—content given (*dr̥ṣṭa*)¹ but obviously variable from one case to another. But what is especially important is that its content invariably and uniformly presents itself in a *form* which is evidently that member of the temporal triad which is characterizable as 'present'. And what is thus true about perceptual knowledge is also true about memory except in this, that the content in the case

¹ The Sanskrit word *dr̥ṣṭa* which literally means 'seen', may be taken to signify whatever is given to the senses.

of memory, unlike in the case of perceptual knowledge, is *ungiven* (*adr̥ṣta*),¹ and that the form in which it presents itself should naturally be that member of the temporal triad which is characterizable as 'past'.

Making allowance for forgetfulness, one could, however, say in this connection that the content of memory is the same as that of the corresponding perceptual knowledge. But then, the fact remains that we are said to remember only that which we perceived *before*. Taking these two considerations into account, we have no option but to characterize the content of memory merely negatively as *ungiven*, although this word does not fully convey the required meaning as is conveyed by the Sanskrit word *adr̥ṣta* which is also negative. In any case no attempt to characterize it positively can avoid obliterating the distinction between perceptual knowledge and memory or else reducing memory to a misnomer.

As regards the remaining member of the temporal triad, the one that is characterizable as 'future', it is customary among philosophers as well as laymen to associate it with *expectation*. But what is expectation but one of the human frailties varying in content and taste from one man to another and, even in the case of the same man, from one situation to another, and, this is specially important, lacking the foundational solidity and objectivity by which perceptual knowledge and, to some extent, even memory are characterized? Of course, expectation looks forward to the future and indeed is an impossibility apart from reference to it. But that future, on account of the very nature of expectation, is not only foreign to the present and the past envisaged by perceptual knowledge and memory respectively, but is spurious, having no legitimate claim to be a member of the temporal triad. The case of *hope* in this respect seems still worse, because being allied with *desire*, it is apt to visualize a future more distorted and more abused than that which is envisaged by mere expectation, and because time as such is no respecter of human desires.

¹ The Sanskrit word *adr̥ṣta*, while signifying that which is 'unseen' or rather 'ungiven', serves to indicate the inexplicability of the 'ungiven' and hence is preferable to the English word 'ungiven' which seems to have no such indication to its credit.

V
TIME AND SELF

In order that we may be in a position to associate the 'future' with Imagination as, specially in view of what we have seen above, we find it proper to do, it is necessary for us to consider a matter that is of fundamental importance with regard to the problem of our sense of time. Time, admittedly being *one* indivisible whole, and not *multiple*, made up of distinct and separate parts, how can the 'present', the 'past' and the 'future' be said to be knit together so as to make up a whole, viz., time, in the face of the fact that perceptual knowledge, memory and Imagination, with which they are respectively connected, are themselves distinct and separate from one another? This brings in the matter in question which is unquestionably genuine and can resist any attempt to reduce it to meaninglessness. To surrender this would be to leave the problem of our sense of time unresolved. But how are we to meet the difficulty? To this question, as one should have the wisdom to see, there can be one, and only one answer, which, from the nature of the case, is free from the demand for its own verification, and should necessarily relate to a postulate, alone competent to serve as the solution of the problem concerning our apprehension of time.¹ And the postulate in demand perhaps pertains to *something unitary* which is such that it holds perceptual knowledge, memory and Imagination together and is the common witness to the 'present', the 'past' and the 'future' (*trikāla*jna), and which is, to use a word in ordinary language, the self.² Apart from this and also apart from the specific problem of perceptual knowledge which we have had occasion to discuss earlier, memory regarded, as it should be regarded,

¹ One may in this connection well hazard the general remark that in the understanding of 'meaning', verifiability, if and when it is in demand, is only the *surface*, whereas some postulate or other is the underlying *core*, and that, in some cases, the core is left alone with no visible surface. In view of this the positivist theory of 'meaning' is in need of being enriched by at least this addition, that a postulate, of course not arbitrarily admitted, but necessarily warranted by the consideration of empirically verifiable facts, is no less meaningful than statements amenable to empirical verification.

² It is for the discerning reader to see how much I owe to Kant, and how I differ from him throughout the present discussion and the discussion that follows.

as the way of direct knowledge of something 'past' is obviously such that it is absolutely inexplicable without reference to the postulate in question. And it is left for us to add only this, that the problem of our apprehension of time as stated and briefly discussed here is to the behaviourist-phenomenalist outlook on the self what the last straw is to the camel's back.

VI

THE TEMPORAL TRIAD: BEFORE-NOW-AFTER

The main point emerging from the above discussion is that something unitary popularly called the self is the ultimate presupposition of our apprehension of time comprising the 'present', the 'past' and the 'future', and that Imagination, together with perceptual knowledge and memory, is inseparable from the self. But what is the 'future'? What is Imagination? and, in particular, why should the 'future' be associated with Imagination or the latter with the former? These are the questions that are specially relevant to our immediate purpose and remain yet to be resolved. With a view to convenience, perspicuity and some measure of thoroughness, we may begin here with the consideration of the 'present' the 'past' and the 'future' as most significantly expressed respectively by the ordinary words 'now', 'before' and 'after'. Now, in spite of their obvious temporal divergence, these are all equally of the nature of *form*. But then, the 'now' and the 'before', while being in themselves of a formal character, are inseparably bound up with some *content* or other which, however, is evidently *foreign* to them as *forms*. In other words, the questions 'now-what?' and 'before-what?' are unavoidable with regard to the 'now' and the 'before' respectively. And the 'what', whatever it may specifically be, is of the *same status* in both cases. All this is bound to be so when the fact is that *for us* the 'now' and the 'before' are essentially related to our *knowledge*, perceptual knowledge in the former case and memory in the latter, and that there can be no knowledge apart from some content to be known. The identity of the status of the content of perceptual knowledge and of memory, far from being prejudicial to the difference between these two ways of knowing, is, however, essential to that very difference, because memory is not worth the name except in virtue of this identity, and because the difference between the two as ways of knowing mainly

relates to their temporal divergence and not essentially to any supposed difference between the status of their respective contents.

The 'after', in the above respects, is, however, in a class apart from the 'now' and the 'before'. For one thing, even if it be not a mere form, but a form bearing a content, the content cannot be *foreign* to it, because no foreign content is available except through the means of *knowledge*, and because knowledge, whether perceptual knowledge or memory, is out of the question with regard to the 'after'. It is for this reason that the question 'after-what?' is not significant in the same sense as is the question 'now-what?' or 'before-what?'. Of course, statements such as 'it rained *after* I had arrived home', 'a clap of thunder is heard *after* lightning is seen', and 'in a numerical series 2 comes *after* 1' are significant. But in none of these statements does the 'after' have its appropriate meaning, viz., the 'future'; it only serves to contrast one past event with another of its kind or a past event with a present one or to indicate the relation of logical sequence between two abstract entities with no reference to time whatsoever. Judged from this point of view, in the case of the 'after', the question 'after-what?' is unwarranted and uncalled for and, if we must have anything in its place, the substitute in demand cannot but be the simple 'after-nothing'. And this brings out the essential peculiarity of the 'after'—the 'after' (future) as distinguished from, not erroneously understood on the analogy of, the now (present) and the before (past).

But then, if the 'after' cannot be said to bear any foreign content, it cannot be regarded as a mere form either, because that which is a form without content is either everything or nothing, and because the 'after' must be *something in particular* and not everything or nothing, in order that it may at least be distinguishable from the 'now' and the 'before'. And this brings to light the real crux of the situation. But let us not forget that the 'after', like the 'now' and the 'before', is *for us*. May it not then be that, on account of its being *for us*, the 'after' is not a bare form but a form that is at the same time a content? A similar question with regard to the 'now' and the 'before' would, of course, demand a negative answer, because these, while being *for us*, are in a sense otherwise, being *directly* determined by something foreign to us, viz., the content concerned. And this suggests that the 'after' may be both a form and a content provided that, besides being *for us*, it is also *of us*. But then, it cannot be so in the sense that it is our arbitrary creation; for in that sense it would be a fiction without any temporal significance and with no title to

membership of the temporal triad including the 'now' and the 'before'. Thus one thing at least is certain about the 'after': it does not admit of being conceived as our creation, far less a creation of ourselves as mere individuals, that is, I's or egos, for any creation of the ego as such is something brought into existence in an arbitrary manner which the 'after' certainly is not. But so far as we are concerned, this need not worry us. As one of our earlier discoveries goes, the self, which is a necessary implication of our perceptual knowledge, and which is apt to be misconstrued as the bare I, is really I with others=*we*. And that being so, there is no reason why the self, which has previously been found to be the ultimate presupposition of our apprehension of the temporal triad, and with which the 'after' as a content may be said to be held in a peculiarly intimate relation, should not likewise be the 'we' instead of the bare I or the ego.

Are we then to hold that the 'after' as a content is a *creation* of ourselves regarded as I with others=*we*? The answer should be in the negative for the reason that the 'after', either as a form or as a content, is not a creation, and that it is not given to the 'we' to create anything. Both these points, however, need elucidation. As regards the first point, it would perhaps suffice to observe that that which is created is, of course, in *time*, but that to be in time is obviously not the same as to be *time itself* or even a member of the temporal triad as the 'after' is. And as regards the second, however important the 'we' may be, and there is no doubt that it is important with respect to our creations, the fact is that all our creations as such are due to ourselves as individuals, whether severally or collectively, and not due to ourselves as I with others=*we*. In other words, creative agency is inseparable from individuality, so that to ascribe it to anything else is really tantamount to denying it. But then, it would be arbitrary and unwarranted to jump from this to the conclusion that the 'we' is something inert or inactive. On the contrary, the 'we', which, as we have seen earlier, serves to define the *realm of the personal* as distinguished from the *world of impersonal things*, should, for this very reason, be inconceivable except as a centre of *activity*. And this raises the crucial question: what is the activity concerned?

As will be evident in the course of our further procedure, the activity in question is not single but of more than one kind. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that *activity* is in need of being distinguished not only from *creativity*, but from *action* which, as we have preferred to view it, is knowledge-cum-performance. Thus being unidentifiable, though, for obvious reasons, not unconnected with

performance, that is, organic movement, activity may, to use a word in ordinary language, be called 'mental'. But it is necessary here to notice that the question of mental activity would not have arisen at all and any such thing as mental activity would have for ever remained unknown to us, but for a fact recognizable only on the closest scrutiny—the fact that our ordinary actions suffer from 'deprivation' due to the looseness of the relation between knowledge and performance, which, together, make up these actions, and that, in consequence, there arises the demand for a remedy for this looseness. Now, since knowledge is confined within the bounds of the now (present) and the before (past), and performance following upon knowledge is, from its very nature, inseparable from reference to these two members of the temporal triad, the demand for the remedy in question is, of necessity, directed towards the future (after). This is profoundly and, as one might say, most unexpectedly significant in that the question of mental activity at least in one of its forms is inseparably bound up with the question of the 'after' especially in its aspect as content. Thus we have a clear indication as to how we have to decide the issue under discussion. And the decision should be none other than that the mental activity concerned and the content of the 'after' are correlatives.

VII

IMAGINATION AND THE 'PLAN FOR ACTION'

If for the reason previously explained, the 'after' cannot have for its content anything *foreign* to itself and, in particular, anything that may be an object of knowledge or, in other words, is capable of being perceived or remembered, its content—and some content it must have—should, as perhaps the only possible residue left by this process of elimination, be the *plan for action*. A plan, however determined by the present and the past, is obviously imbued with the meaning of the 'after' (future) and so is inherent in, not foreign to, the 'after'. Now since there is no sense in speaking of plans for *natural events*, and plans for *things* and *persons*, it is plain that these necessarily pertain to *action*. The following points need to be noted, however, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding and for the sake of the clarification of the meaning of what we have called the 'plan for action'.

In the first place, a plan for action is obviously no action as such;

nor does it bear an assurance of its execution or of the manner in which it needs to be executed. How it is executed and whether it is executed or not are dependent upon individual 'agents' and their circumstances. It only envisages the possibility of what may be called *planned action*. The importance of the matter under discussion, however, lies specially in this, that it provides a clue, in fact, the only available clue, to the identity of that activity of the human mind which is correlative to the content of the 'after', and with which this content may be said to be held in a peculiarly intimate relation. With reference to what we have previously observed about what Imagination is not, and in the light of what we have just learnt about the meaning of the 'plan for action', we are perhaps fully justified in identifying the mental activity in question with Imagination properly so called. Since, as already seen, it must be in a class apart, on the one hand, from *knowing*, whether perceiving or remembering, and, on the other, from so-called creative imagination held, of course, mistakenly, to be responsible for artistic creation; and since it cannot for obvious reasons be identified with the activity of *understanding*, Imagination cannot possibly be anything but that activity of the human mind which is peculiarly fitted to envisage the 'plan for action'. But all this amounts only to the discovery of the identity of Imagination. For the characterization of this activity we are dependent upon further clarification of the meaning of the 'plan for action'.

Secondly, the 'plan for action' can bear no particularistic sense—the sense in which he has one plan for action, you have another and I have still another or, let us even say, different social groups, communities or nations have different plans for action. For in this sense a plan for action is obviously subservient to individual, social, communal or national *desires* naturally varying from one case to another, and as such must, for the reason previously indicated, be *foreign* to the 'after' regarded as a member of the temporal triad. Thus, not being open to interpretation in the particularistic sense, the plan for action must be *one* and concern *all* human beings, irrespective of any difference that may divide one man from another. And this is bound to be so when, as already seen, it is a fact that the activity, which is the correlative of the 'after' as *form* and also as content (that is, the plan for action), has its source, not in the I, but in the 'we' that serves to define the realm of the personal.

So far as the above conclusion is concerned, one may, however, go so far as to declare the plan for action in the universalistic sense

to be a mere figment. But to do so would be to shut one's eyes to the inner working of the history of civilization as distinguished from the visible manifestations of this history in the ever increasing development, among other things, of arts and crafts intended to contribute to the amenities of life. The history of civilization is ordinarily divided into certain well-marked phases. But this only speaks of the ordinary historian's exclusive interest in the outer manifestations of civilization to the neglect of the inner motive of the march of human history. The fact is that the progress of civilization from the so-called Palaeolithic to the so-called Neolithic phase and gradually from the latter to the successive phases culminating in the predominantly scientific phase in modern times is a continuous process of the unfolding of a plan for action, essentially *one* and *universal*, but subject to change in detail due to the exigency of circumstances. Of course, there is no denying the fact that hardly any phase of civilization arrives simultaneously among all peoples—peoples belonging to different races and inhabiting different geographical regions. But that is due to the variation of the human as well as non-human situations. The fact that any well-marked phase of civilization tends to spread far and wide, and that its actual spread in this manner is merely a matter of time is enough to indicate that the plan for action in question is one and universal. What exactly the one universal plan for action is, and what is signified by its changing character are, however, questions of great importance deserving separate treatment. In the meantime it is necessary for us to consider that characteristic of Imagination which is correlative to the oneness and universality of the plan for action.

One may easily be able to see that, having its source in the 'we', that is, the realm of the personal, as it undoubtedly has, Imagination as an activity of the human mind, unlike expectation and hope and indeed any mental phenomenon fit only to be interpreted in a particularistic sense, must be *universal*. What is meant may be clarified thus. The content of Imagination is, of course, *schematic* and as such is, in all cases, one and the same, viz., the plan for action. And—this should be especially borne in mind—its content, being inherent in, not foreign to, itself, cannot, like the content of perceptual knowledge and memory, be spoken of as an object of contemplation. In other words, in the case of Imagination the usual distinction between *act* and *content* is out of the question. To express the idea in popular language, among the powers of the human mind Imagination is per-

haps singularly 'unconscious'.¹ And this is enough to show that it is no special prerogative of anyone to be gifted with Imagination, but that Imagination is a common possession of all men. With one universal plan for action as its content, Imagination then is a tie to bind mankind together on the common plane of practical interests and indeed is the spring of 'socialized actions' which promise to be the remedy for the 'deprivation' from which our ordinary actions suffer due to the looseness of the relation between knowledge and performance. But then, it is far from us to suggest that, in this respect, Imagination is sufficient unto itself or that its power is unlimited. On the contrary, as we shall see in due course, the fulfilment of its promise does not rest entirely with itself, but is dependent on an activity of the human mind higher in authority than itself. But in any case it is up to Imagination and Imagination alone to open up a vista to the final remedy for the deprivation in question.

Thirdly, that which refuses particularistic interpretation and is one and universal, cannot be ascribed to the 'agency' of individuals severally or collectively nor is *in* time, but, on the contrary, is itself essential to time or to a member of the temporal triad, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a creation. Since it completely answers to this description, the plan for action is something without being created. But then, though not created, the plan for action is not *eternal*, but *temporal* (that is, of time), temporal in the strict human sense, being confined within the world of human affairs. Since the plan for action is essential to the 'after' and since the 'after' is but a member of the temporal triad, the understanding of the plan for action in this restricted sense, it may be objected however, would undermine the objectivity of time. But this really does not matter. For the objection, despite its unquestionable theoretical correctness, presupposes a purely *abstract* view of time, while the fact remains that it is not given to us to consider time as it is in itself, but only as it is for us. What, then, is the exact nature of the plan for action? This is the outstanding question, but is one which, while obviously being of fundamental importance in the present phase of our investigation, is of a rather complicated nature and so deserves a careful treatment.

The realm of the personal, with which we have been so familiar, and which, as previously mentioned, is the source of the activities of the human mind, is replete with all possible human needs. Although

¹ This suggests a corrective of the superficiality, crudity and even fanaticism in which psychoanalysis has often indulged.

these needs are not all of the same kind, we are immediately concerned only with those basic ones which, generally speaking, are of a biological nature. But it is of special importance to realize that to treat them as purely and exclusively biological is really to detach them arbitrarily from the realm of the personal and thereby deprive them of their strictly human character. It is precisely this illusory process that, curiously enough, operates in and through our ordinary actions, specially those which relate to the so-called biological needs, it being understood however that the scope of these needs is much vaster than it is usually supposed to be. Herein lies the explanation of the looseness of the relation between knowledge and performance, and the consequent deprivation consisting in the non-fulfilment of the social norm of conduct in the case of our ordinary actions.

Now, the deprivation in question would have for ever remained unknown to us had we not been gifted with Imagination having its source in the realm of the personal. And this points to another characteristic of Imagination which, it is too obvious to need mention, consists in the capacity of Imagination to throw light on what is *basically* wrong in the domain of our day to day affairs. But complementary to this characteristic, Imagination must have another on account of the very fact that it owes its origin to the realm of the personal. If on this account it is but natural for Imagination to make the deprivation in question reveal itself, one perhaps cannot avoid admitting that it is on the same account inspired to redress the deprivation by helping the restoration of the affairs of men to their strictly human character or, in other words, making them conform to the dictates of the realm of the personal.

But then, Imagination, dependent as it is on a higher source for its function as well as its origin, cannot do this spontaneously or independently, but only in virtue of the plan for action, which obviously cannot be created by it, but may only evolve out of it, and that, too, on account of its higher origin. Thus the plan for action, while being internally related to Imagination, bears the reflection of the realm of the personal so as to be able to serve as the means of the rehabilitation of the world of human affairs. This is all that can be said about the 'what' of the plan for action, schematic in character and without any *determinate* constituent as it is. And, correspondingly, Imagination may be said to be that activity of the human mind which is eminently fitted to give man *general* guidance in his actions by constantly inviting his attention to the need for the fulfilment of the social or rather human norm of conduct and with a view to preventing

him from straying from the realm of the personal. Thus does Imagination beget what is popularly called 'social conscience', of which both philosophers and ordinary men speak glibly, but whose meaning generally remains hidden in their ignorance of its aetiology.

But then, Imagination is *heteronomous*; and, so far as we can see, it is so at least in two ways. In the first place it is heteronomous in so far as it not only owes its origin to the realm of the personal, but, as seen above, is dependent upon this realm for its function. But its heteronomy in this sense, far from being prejudicial to the authority of the realm of the personal, serves to reaffirm that authority and, what is more, points to the all-importance of this realm, thereby emphasizing the urgency of the need for the conformity of our actions to the social norm of conduct. Its heteronomy in the second way is, however, of a diametrically opposite nature and is *indirect* and *negative*, not direct and positive as it is in the first way, in which Imagination is *dependent* upon, and subservient to the authority of, the realm of the personal. The point here, though not obvious, is really this. Imagination would have been either non-existent or at best superfluous had it not been a fact that there exist forces to prevent us from conforming to the social norm of conduct in our dealings with one another and thereby to make us stray from the realm of the personal. And, despite the verdict of extreme environmentalism, among these forces the most difficult for Imagination to contend with are those that exist *within us* in the shape of the *passions*, the veritable sources of anger, hate, jealousy and, in fact, all the potent factors that are apt to divide us from one another. For while Imagination itself belongs to the realm of the personal, the passions left to themselves reduce us to mere egos or I's as opposed to the 'we', that is, the realm of the personal. But why man should have passions alongside of Imagination is no more relevant a question than why there should be human beings at all or why human beings should be what they actually are.

Now Imagination, of course, is *not dependent upon* the passions as it is upon the realm of the personal. Yet it is heteronomous in relation to them. But in this case its heteronomy is *indirect* in so far as the passions obviously set limits to its efficaciousness, and is *negative* due to the fact that its faithfulness to the authority of the realm of the personal is held under a constant threat of extinction by the hostile power of the passions. Imagination thus presents itself in a curious aspect: on the one hand it is essentially characterized by loyalty to the authority of the realm of the personal and on the other is exposed

to the hostility of the passions, with the risk of surrendering the task of humanization which is its trust. Hence there arises a conflict in which Imagination is inevitably caught, the conflict that poses a serious human problem, indeed the most fundamental problem of human life, and in any case affects the way of individual and social life and, in particular, the evolution of civilization, which, as previously seen, is but the gradual unfolding of the plan for action internally related to Imagination.

Lastly, whereas whatever is capable of being *known*, that is, perceived or remembered is, *in time*, the plan for action, being internally related to Imagination which is itself no knowledge and being the inherent content of the 'after', cannot be said to be *in time*, but is unquestionably an aspect of *time itself*. This must be so in so far as we are concerned with time, not as it is in itself—for thus viewed time is a mere abstraction and so to us is as good as nothing—but as it is for us. And for us that member of the temporal triad which is characterizable as 'after' is essentially the plan for action. But then, there is need for warning against a possible misunderstanding. The plan for action being one and universal, the 'after' (future) as essentially related to it is objective or public, not subjective or relative as it is presented to be by expectation and hope. It is, of course, anthropocentric, and any attempt to account for our sense of time must be such, as Kant alone had realized before, although he failed to grasp its full significance.

VIII

TIME AS ESSENTIALLY 'AFTER'

We have yet to deal with the question regarding the ultimate temporal signification of the 'after' and correspondingly regarding the final sense of the temporality of the plan for action, the question which, to say the least, may seem surprising, but is really unavoidable and of far reaching importance in connection with the discussions with which we are at present occupied. Of course, apart from the question as to what the 'after' finally means, we cannot even speak of the 'after' except as something standing in contrast with the 'now' and the 'before'. And this evidently points to the importance of the 'now' and the 'before' with regard to the possibility of our *recognition* of the 'after'. But why should we at all admit the distinctions of 'before', 'now' and 'after', and why should we have to depend upon

the one for our recognition of the other? These are questions which perhaps can find no answer except in the light of the fact that we are ourselves in time. What do the 'now' and the 'before' mean in the final analysis, and what new temporal significance is the 'after' consequently found to have? These are, however, the more important questions, questions that are seldom asked, but which really constitute the essence of the whole problem of time. To condemn the distinctions of 'before', 'now' and 'after' and to dismiss the 'after' as well as the 'before' and the 'now' not only amounts to denying, as Zeno denied, the reality of time, but—and this Zeno had failed to see—ignoring the undeniable fact that we are ourselves in time. But then, to accept Zeno's premises and yet to admit the reality of time is not only to leave the importance of this undeniable fact absolutely unrecognized, but to commit oneself to a view according to which time is something weird and in any case is not what it should be for us. And this is all that one could finally say about Bergson's attempt to rehabilitate time, besides the bulk of criticism that has accumulated since he propounded his fantastic theory of time. In view of all this and with a view to our further procedure it is necessary for us to deal with the questions just posed—precisely the questions that have generally escaped the notice of philosophers.

Now, despite the fact that it is unrecognizable, and indeed, as observed above, cannot even be spoken of, apart from reference to the 'now' and the 'before', the 'after', once it comes to be admitted, is found to be in a class apart from the 'now' and the 'before'. As previously seen, the 'now' is inseparable from a certain content—and a content that is *foreign* to it. The content concerned is, of course, in time, but certainly not time itself nor even an aspect of time as such. On the contrary, it is *spatial*. That being so, the 'now' as something inseparable from a content of this description, strictly speaking, means 'here' which is a spatial determination, not a temporal one. What this means is not however that the 'now' has no temporal sense at all, but that it is intrinsically spatial, and yet has a temporal sense which it owes not to itself but to something else. Hence it follows that to associate time *primarily* with perceptual knowledge which is concerned with the 'now', as Kant had done, is to confuse time with space, and the faculty of perceptual knowledge with another that is diverse from it, and that on the other hand to dismiss the 'now' from the realm of time is to overshoot the mark.

As regards the 'before', considering what has already been observed about the agreement and difference between perceptual knowledge

and memory which are respectively concerned with the 'now' and the 'before', one perhaps has no option but to hold that what is true about the 'now' is *mutatis mutandis* true about the 'before', so that, whereas the intrinsic meaning of the 'now' is 'here', that of the 'before' should be 'not here'.¹ Thus the 'before', like the 'now', is intrinsically spatial, although its nature is such that its spatiality can be expressed only negatively, and with reference to the spatiality of the 'now', this being exactly what is demanded by the affinity between the respective contents of perceptual knowledge and memory, which we have previously had occasion to notice. The fact that the spatiality of the 'before' is expressible only negatively should not, however, be construed as suggesting that the 'before' is intrinsically temporal, that is, of time. On the contrary, its temporal sense—and there is no doubt that it is possessed of this sense—like that of the 'now' is *extrinsic*, although it is undeniable that the impossibility of expressing its spatiality positively is apt to create the opposite impression. From what we have thus seen about the 'before' it follows that it would be arbitrary and unwarranted to associate time with memory and also to exclude the 'before' from the sphere of time.

The discovery of the intrinsic spatiality of the 'now' and the 'before' does, as nothing else can do, open our eyes to the true nature of time by breaking through the misleading effect of the ordinary words 'now' and 'before' and leaving us with no option but to concentrate our attention on the 'after'. In contrast with the 'now' and the 'before', the 'after', having for its inherent and inalienable content the one universal plan for action, which is no thing or event and indeed nothing that can be spoken of as capable of being *known*, that is, perceived or remembered, must, negatively speaking, be intrinsically non-spatial. But, it may be contended, to be non-spatial is not necessarily to be positively temporal and, further, the 'after' being unrecognizable apart from reference to the 'now' and the 'before', and the 'now' and the 'before' being intrinsically spatial, the 'after' should likewise be

¹ One may easily feel tempted to express the spatiality of the 'before' by the word 'there'. But that would be wrong because 'there' does not necessarily mean 'absence' as 'here' necessarily does 'presence', and because 'before' conveys the sense of 'absence'. The negative way of expressing the spatiality of the 'before' is, however, most appropriate in as much as it is in consonance with the view at which we have already arrived, viz., that while the content of perceptual knowledge needs to be characterized positively as 'given', that of memory does not admit of similar positive characterization, but must be characterized negatively as 'ungiven'. Vide ante pp. 48-9.

spatial and not otherwise. But as regards the latter part of the contention, it is completely ruled out by the unquestionable non-spatial character of the inherent content of the 'after', viz., the plan for action. And as regards the former, since the 'after' must be something and not nothing, we have only to ask: what else may it be, if it must not be spatial? To this question, so far as one can see, three possible answers may be given: (1) the 'after' is timeless or eternal; (2) it is not timeless or eternal and yet is such that the question of its being in time or of time (that is, denoting time) is, for some reason or other, irrelevant; (3) it is temporal, that is, of time. For our immediate purpose it is necessary to deal with these propositions separately and in the order mentioned here.

The first proposition calls for the following observations. That is timeless or eternal, which *excludes* time in every possible respect: it is neither in time nor of time and, in general, has nothing whatsoever to do with time. In other words, it is in itself the negation of time and is also the negation of whatever is in time or has anything directly or indirectly to do with time. But the word 'after', like the words 'now' and 'before', undoubtedly conveys a temporal sense, no matter whether in its case this sense is primary or derivative, intrinsic or extrinsic; so that it would be plainly improper to characterize the 'after' as timeless or eternal. But what is more important is that whereas the word 'after' and its equivalent or equivalents enjoy the sanction of universal usage and indeed is patently *meaningful*, the word 'timeless' or the word 'eternal' points to an absurdity. What is meant is not that there can be nothing regarding which the question of time does not arise or, rather, is irrelevant. On the contrary, logical and mathematical notions or truths, and, in particular, that which is popularly called the self, but which we have called 'we' or the realm of the personal are precisely what answer to this description.

But then, that with regard to which the question of time is merely irrelevant does not necessarily admit of being characterized as timeless or eternal. To identify the two would be arbitrary and unwarranted; for it would amount to taking a leap beyond legitimate limits by having recourse to extralogical considerations, say, in the manner of mysticism. That the identification is unjustifiable is testified to by the fact that logical and mathematical notions or truths, far from negating time, are applicable to spatio-temporal situations, and that the realm of the personal, as previously seen, is the ultimate presupposition of our awareness of time. But apart from the difficulty of pointing to

anything answering to the definition of the timeless or eternal, the very notion of timelessness or eternity is an absurdity for the simple reason that the timeless or eternal, like anything else, must be in need of being affirmed in order that it may be spoken of at all, and that, timeless affirmation being its own negation and consequently all affirmations being affirmations in time, the timeless or eternal admits of no affirmation and so cannot be spoken of at all. Judged from this point of view, it may be incidentally observed, the expression 'everlasting (timeless) after' is no less absurd than the expression 'everlasting now' which is at best an outcome of mystical feeling or excessive sentimentalism.

The second proposition need not detain us long as it is easy of dismissal in view of what we have observed above about all that is in itself unaffected by the question of time, including mathematical and logical notions or truths and the 'we', that is, the realm of the personal. Now although, as previously seen,¹ the word 'after' is used in more senses than one in ordinary language, the sense in which it is logical sequence may of course be taken to be fit for consideration in the present context. But this sense is also ruled out for the reason that we are at present concerned with the 'after' as distinguished from the 'now' and the 'before', and that logical sequence is absolutely unconcerned with the 'after' as thus distinguished. It therefore follows that the 'after' can by no means be brought under the same category as mathematical and logical notions or truths. Our next concern is with the 'after' vis-à-vis the realm of the personal. But in this regard all that can be said is that the realm of the personal being the ultimate presupposition of our awareness of time and the 'after' being at least a member of the temporal triad, if nothing more, the 'after' as such cannot be said to have the same status as the realm of the personal. We are then left with the third proposition: the 'after' is temporal.

Since, as previously seen, it is intrinsically non-spatial, and since, as the above conclusion shows, its non-spatiality cannot bear any positive sense other than temporality, the 'after', positively speaking, unlike the 'now' and the 'before', cannot but be intrinsically temporal or denote time. Time then is exclusively of the nature of the 'after'. This of course sounds extremely strange. But one should not fail to realize that our ordinary conception of time is vitiated by the confusion created by the misleading effect of the words 'now' and 'before'. While these words are primarily spatial in sense, they are

¹ Vide ante p. 52.

generally misconstrued as connoting temporality with the result that the 'now' and the 'before' are taken to be homogeneous with the 'after' and that time is conceived to be a whole made up of the three members thus regarded as homogeneous. This, of course, may well represent the popular view of time, but leaves unanswered the question as to what time *ultimately* is for us. In fact, the confusion in question is such that it generally prevents the discrimination of the core from the surface in the case of time. And it is due to their failure to discriminate between these that philosophers have sometimes been so disgusted as to go to the length of declaring that time is ultimately unreal or else they have been so overzealous as to give their imagination flight into an undiscovered and undiscoverable realm of time.¹ Of course, the problem of time is knotty as all fundamental problems must be. But in his attempt to deal with it, it is incumbent upon the philosopher to steer clear of the Scylla of defeatism and the Charybdis of mistaken enthusiasm and to realize that time is nearest to him, considering that he himself is *in* time, and that, if the 'now' and the 'before' are intrinsically spatial, the 'after' does not suffer from this disability, but is intrinsically temporal.

Returning to, and concentrating our attention on, the 'after', we cannot help realizing that the 'after' as such must be ceaseless or endless, because, although we may speak of an *after* to this or that, which should, however, be spatial, there can be no *after* to the 'after' itself unless we construe the latter as the 'now' or the 'before', that is, something spatial—which, from the nature of the case, we are precluded from doing. And that which is ceaseless or endless should necessarily be something without division or break within itself; for division or break, although it does not disallow new beginning, necessarily implies cessation or end. So the 'after', being ceaseless or endless, must be one undivided or unbroken whole. But then, ceaselessness or endlessness and oneness without division or break being but negative characteristics, that to which these negative characteristics are ascribable need not necessarily be positively characterizable as temporal, but, speaking negatively again, may well be regarded as timeless or eternal. And this is precisely the possibility that is commonly admitted by all those care-worn philosophers whose speculations aim at quiescence and find final rest in the static Absolute. But so far as the 'after' is concerned, it can be no Absolute, far less an Absolute of this kind.

¹The reference here is once more to the defeatists like Zeno and his followers on the one hand, and to the zealots headed by Bergson on the other.

For one of its essential characteristics which is most positive and is capable of being ascertained directly and not by mere implication is *onwardness*. And being *essentially* onward, the 'after' is *self-moved* and its essential nature is expressible neither by 'was' nor by 'is', but only by 'will be'. But then, as we shall see below, it does not exclude or negate 'was' (before) and 'is' (now). And these two considerations together go to show that the 'after' is neither *static* nor *absolute*. Positively speaking, it is dynamic as time must be. But in the other respect its positive characterization is unavailable in view of the fact that time is one and the only one of its kind. So we have no option but to characterize it, in this respect, negatively as *non-absolute*. Nevertheless, as the reader will see in due course, this drawback is amply compensated for by the profound positive significance that this negative characterization of time has in the understanding of the status and destiny of man.

The above analysis of the 'after' has, as expected, served to show that the 'after' is the same as, or indistinguishable from, time itself except for the fact that it has left the temporal sense of the 'now' and the 'before' unaccounted for. Of course, the 'now' and the 'before' are intrinsically spatial. Nevertheless, they do convey a temporal sense and are such that without reference to them the 'after' would not itself be recognized at all, not to speak of its indicating the nature of time. So if it be that the analysis of the 'after' finally comes to liquidate the 'now' and the 'before' in the temporal sense, the 'after' itself cannot but share the same fate. And in that case we shall have no option but to deny the reality of time or else to envisage an undiscovered and undiscoverable realm of time, the alternatives which we have previously had occasion to discuss and also to reject. In such a predicament the only thing that is necessary for us to do is to carry the analysis of the 'after' still further with a view to ascertaining whether or not the 'after' is inclusive of the temporal sense of the 'now' and the 'before'. But since with the recognition of the temporal sense of the 'now' and the 'before', the 'after' would come to present itself as posterior to them, we are at the same time required to consider the seemingly difficult question as to whether the 'after', which has been found to be endless, should be held to have a beginning or not.

To continue the analysis of the 'after', let us first take special notice of a fact which has no challenge to meet except that of philosophical sophistication, the fact that space is as real as time, that they are irreducible, but not opposed, to each other, and yet that time, so

far as we are concerned with it, is conspicuous for its governing influence over space. Why time should have such authority over space can no more be explained than why there should be both space and time, and why the two should respectively be what they actually are. The exercise of the governing influence on the part of time is, however, facilitated and indeed rendered definitive by the divisibility of space. But while space itself is *simultaneously* and *infinitely* divisible, space as governed by time, time as essentially characterized by *onwardness*, can and indeed actually does, from the nature of the case, present itself only *successively*, not *simultaneously*, and not as infinitely divided, but in and through the distinctions of 'now' and 'before'. It is necessary to notice, however, that the 'after' falls apart from these distinctions in virtue of the fact that in the case of space the 'after', unlike the 'now' and the 'before', is not anything on its own account, but may only rest between the 'before' and the 'now', thus losing its temporal sense to a mere conjunctive. And it may be added that we have no means of being aware of space except in virtue of perception and memory respectively concerned with the 'now' and the 'before'. All this makes no secret of the fact that whereas the 'now' and the 'before' are but temporalized spatial distinctions, the 'after', on its own account and in the temporal sense, is time itself, and that, while, being ceaseless or endless, it may figure in a successive series in the company of the 'before' and the 'now' and thus be a member of the temporal triad, it holds the 'before' and the 'now' under its sway. This is not, however, prejudicial to the recognized successive order of 'before', 'now' and 'after', but only amounts to stating that the 'after' in a sense, in fact in the sense of time itself, is the presupposition of the possibility of this order. Thus the 'after' is found to include the temporal sense of the 'before' and the 'now' much to our relief, freeing us from the predicament indicated by either of the two alternatives referred to above.

Added to the already established fact that the 'after' is endless, our new discovery that the 'after' is time itself, including the temporal sense of the 'now' and the 'before' is, however, most significant with regard to the question whether the 'after' has a beginning or not. The significance lies in that it liquidates this question by showing it to be irrelevant. The question of a thing's having a beginning arises when the thing concerned is *in* time and there is a 'before' to it. But the 'after', not being *in* time but being time itself and having no 'before' to itself on account of its being inclusive of the temporal sense of the 'before', is not a thing of this description; so that the question of its

having a beginning cannot arise. Are we then unavoidably committed to the acceptance of the alternative that the 'after' has no beginning or, in other words, is beginningless? But the affirmative answer to this question would lead to a disastrous consequence in view of the fact that the 'after' is *endless*. If the 'after' be beginningless as well as endless, that would mean its suicide, because, being both beginningless and endless, it should unavoidably be, not temporal as it really is, but *timeless* or *eternal*.

So the conclusion which we have no option but to draw is that the 'after', being time itself, including the temporal sense of the 'before' as well as the 'now', leaves no room for the question whether it has a beginning or not. And this must be so, if time is, as it must be, real, and if time as something real is to be found as it must be through the analysis of the 'after' lest we should fall into the error of denying the reality of time or else should have to engage ourselves in a vain search after something bizarre in the name of time. The view that that which is endless must be beginningless also, or, conversely, that that which is beginningless must be endless also, it needs to be added however, is one of the dogmas that die hard. But our view of time is an exception to this dogma in so far as it disallows the endlessness of time to be wedded to its supposed beginninglessness by liquidating the question whether time has a beginning or not.

IX

TIME AND HISTORY

Notwithstanding the fact that time, as understood and properly so done, through the analysis of the 'after', repels the question whether it has a beginning or not, it does not disallow, but, on the contrary, as previously seen, permits the distinctions of 'before', 'now' and 'after', because, it is hardly necessary to reiterate, these are distinctions in, and not of, time. This, however, proves profoundly significant and does so in a twofold way: negatively, by indicating that time itself has no history; and, positively, by providing for the possibility of that discipline which is known as history. As regards the former point, it is important to observe that nothing can strike us as having a history, which is not *successive* or divisible into gradual and yet well marked stages of development or, speaking more significantly, does not admit of the distinctions of 'before', 'now' and 'after'. But time, by its very nature, is contradictory to this description and

so is just that, though it may not be the only one of its kind, which may be spoken of as having no history. Yet, such is the curious situation, time, itself antithetical to the notion of history, performs a miracle in virtue of its authority over space. And this brings us to the latter point which may be explained thus. As already seen, there arise the temporalized spatial distinctions of the 'before' and the 'now' in consequence of the authority of time over space, and time itself, as cannot but be the case, brings about the addition of the 'after', the result of the whole process being the formation of the temporal series 'before-now-after'. And this, on the one hand, points to the determining principle of all historical enquiries and, on the other, as we shall see below, suggests the limitation to which history itself is subject.

The 'before', the 'now' and the 'after' are obviously such that they cannot even be spoken of at all except with reference to one another. Indeed, the 'before' is nothing without there being a 'now' and an 'after'. And what is thus true of the 'before' is *mutatis mutandis* true of the 'now' and the 'after'. This is precisely the reason why all these three are equally essential to the temporal series, although as we have been insisting, the 'after' in a sense, that is in the sense of time as such, is in a class apart from the 'before' and the 'now' and, in fact, is foreign to the very notion of 'series'. And it is the idea of the temporal series thus understood that lies at the basis of history and yields the foundational principle that governs all historical investigations, irrespective of the specific fields where the historical outlook is applicable. Of course, there is no denying the fact that the notion of the 'after' is as essential to history as those of the 'before' and the 'now'. But then, what is important here is that this fact should not be construed, as one may easily feel tempted to construe it, as indicating that in a historical enquiry the 'after' is amenable to a treatment analogous to that which holds good in the case of the 'before' and the 'now'. And this refers us to the temptation that has more often than not vitiated historical enquiries by misleading historians into the interpretation of the 'after' as signifying 'what will be or what will happen'. Of course, there is no way out of the interpretation of the 'before' and the 'now' as respectively signifying 'what was or what happened' and 'what is or what has happened'. And this is so because of the fact that both the 'before' and the 'now', despite their undeniable temporal signification, are intrinsically spatial determinations. But as regards the 'after', notwithstanding the fact that it is unavoidably dependent upon the 'before' and the 'now'

for its *recognition*, it is in itself purely temporal, without any spatial content whatsoever. And that being so, the interpretation of the 'after' on the analogy of the 'before' and the 'now', viz., in terms of 'what will be or what will happen' would obviously be as absurd as the idea of 'a barren woman's son' or of 'the hare's horn'.¹

With a view to a fuller treatment of the above situation it may be observed that the temptation in question invariably operates, not alone, but in cooperation with expectation or hope or else fear, anxiety or despair, and that their mutual cooperation not only results in the misinterpretation of the 'after', but is apt to go a step further in bringing the entire temporal series before-now-after under their sway and imparting to it a *peculiar meaning* so as to make room for the discipline known as philosophy of history. But in this regard it is necessary for us to bear in mind that the temptation and its associates are but human frailties, not powers of the human mind, and that history, however it may be related to any power or activity of the human mind, is by no means intended to bear the burden of the effects produced by human frailties. And this, on the one hand, conveys the demand for the revision of the usual historical outlook on the 'after' and, on the other, cuts the ground from under the feet of philosophy of history. Hence is indicated the nature of the limitation referred to above to which history is inevitably subject.

Speaking generally, history's limitation, then, consists in its incapacity for *prediction* and for divining, in the name of philosophy of history, the *meaning* of change in any field of its special concern. But this conclusion is such that there is need for caution against possible misunderstandings of its implication in either respect. In the first place, history's incapacity for prediction carries no authority to forbid prediction as such or, in other words, to rule prediction out of order in other fields of enquiry. On the contrary, it is a fact that belief in the predictability of events is a potent source of inspiration in the case of the physical sciences, that these sciences are well known for their indisputable capacity for prediction, and that to this capacity they owe their strength as well as their stability. Yet one can ill afford to ignore the truth that prediction in the field of the physical sciences cannot mean what it is intended to mean in the field of history. For these sciences, based on mathematics as they are, rely on mathematical calculations as their mainstay and thereby con-

¹ Bandhyā-putra (a barren woman's son) and śaśa-biśāna are two of the excellent examples of absurd concepts used in philosophical literature in Sanskrit.

vert the temporal series before-now-after to what may be called the 'specious present'; so that, from their point of view, the 'after' (what will be or what will happen) or, for that matter, the 'before' (what was or what happened) should, strictly speaking, have no temporal significance separate or distinguishable from that of the 'now' (what is or what has happened). And this points to the fact that it is not given to history to predict, the reason being that history is not mathematical, and for it to become mathematical is to commit suicide, and further that, as is already evident, the origin of the sense which prediction is intended to bear in the field of history is spurious.

Secondly, the fact that it is not given to so-called philosophy of history to divine the meaning of change, of course, clearly indicates that the teleological interpretation of change within the field of history would be arbitrary and unwarranted. But it would obviously be equally arbitrary and unwarranted to jump herefrom to the conclusion that change within this field is purposeless so as to admit of a purely mechanistic interpretation. To draw this conclusion, it is needless to observe, would, besides abusing the offices of the physical sciences, amount to assimilating history to these sciences; and this would once more prove suicidal to history. With regard to this point one could, of course, strengthen one's position by falling back upon the view held by many—the view that *man* falls apart from *nature* and, consequently, that history, being concerned with man, his institutions and his affairs in general, is not assimilable to the physical sciences that are concerned with nature. But then, this view is apt to be, and, in fact, often is, carried to the extreme so as to invite the dualism of man and nature and, correspondingly, the dualism of teleology and mechanism and, accordingly, to associate history with teleology as opposed to mechanism which tradition relegates to the sphere of the physical sciences. The difficulty here is however that the status of man *vis-à-vis* nature is of a paradoxical character: he is apart from nature and yet is a part of it. And this paradox being an unquestionable ultimate datum, history should unavoidably be no less a stranger to teleology than to mechanism at least for this reason that the admission of both these at the same time would not only produce the worst kind of confusion, but be a sheer absurdity.

The conclusion following from the above discussion, then, is that the age-old controversy concerning teleology versus mechanism is absolutely irrelevant to any discussion about the nature and aim of history. And this perhaps leaves no room for the possibility of philosophy of history and in any case does not permit the undue im-

portance which has from time to time been attached to the idea of history from the philosophical point of view.¹ But what is thus said about philosophy of history and about the philosophical significance of the idea of history leaves the consideration of the 'after' absolutely unaffected. For notwithstanding the fact that it is a member of the temporal triad or a constituent of the temporal series, the 'after', unlike any temporal series with which history may be concerned, is, as we have been insisting, purely temporal and indeed time itself, and as such is pregnant with a meaning at least so far as it concerns man or rather the realm of the personal.

The main points in the above discussion may, even at the cost of repetition, be stated thus. In the first place, it is not given to history to *predict*, and this must be so if history should be as it is really intended to be an objective enquiry into the changes in the world of human affairs, irrespective of the historian's individual likes and dislikes, desires and aversions, hopes and fears. There is no denying the fact that man is susceptible to these frailties; and it is bad enough that these should, and actually they do, play a part in determining the course of events in human history. But it would be the grossest abuse of the offices of history to resort to these frailties and make use of them as a means, perhaps, the only means, that there could be, of predicting 'what will be' or 'what will happen'. And this brings us to the second point which is none but this, that history's incapacity for prediction is in no way prejudicial to the capacity for prediction for which the physical sciences are well known; because in making predictions these sciences depend on mathematical calculations instead of on any human frailty, and because prediction in the fields of the physical sciences, consequently, does not mean what it is intended to mean in the field of history.

Thirdly, the reason given above to show history's incapacity for prediction argues equally well the unwarrantability of reading meaning into the historical process. But while this reason obviously is but *factual*, there is a *logical* reason to lend the firmest and most indisputable support to the unwarrantability in question. As already seen, the 'after', while being conventionally and conveniently a member of the temporal triad or a constituent of the temporal series, is really time itself. Hence it is evident that history, being unavoidably concerned with some kind of temporal series or other, has primarily to deal with the 'before' and the 'now'. At any rate it cannot be said to be concerned with the 'before' and the 'now' on the one hand and

¹ Vide ante p. 40.

the 'after' on the other in the same sense. This, incidentally, is an argument why it should be no part of the business of history to predict what will be or what will happen. But be that as it may, the 'before' and the 'now', as we have found, bear a temporal sense and yet are intrinsically *spatial* determinations. What else can this then mean but this, that these two, though not definitely characterizable as *non-connotative*, are primarily denotative and, what is more, are so in a definite manner? The underlying idea here is this. For us time, as the analysis of the 'after' has shown, is not a mere form, but has a content intrinsically related to itself as form, a content which, from its very nature, is most appropriately characterizable as the connotation of time. But what is thus said about time or the 'after' cannot be said about the 'before' and the 'now', because these are intrinsically *spatial*, and because, despite its temporalization, that which is *spatial* is such that we have no means of characterizing it except as denotative.¹

It needs to be added that denotation and connotation do not seem to have anything common between them that may warrant the designation of both as *meaning*, and that, the claim of connotation to be so designated being obviously superior to that of denotation, denotation falls apart from meaning. And this goes to reinforce our earlier conclusion that it is arbitrary and unwarranted to read meaning into 'history' and, consequently, that so-called philosophy of history has no foundation to stand upon. But then, this conclusion, from the nature of the case, is at the same time a warning. If we have no means of ascribing meaning to history, we are equally without any means of denying meaning to it. Hence follows the explanation of why history no more admits of being interpreted mechanistically than teleologically. The fact is that history is a separate and independent discipline no more amenable to subordination to the physical sciences as distinguished from philosophy than to the latter in distinction from the former. And this must be so, because the subject-matter of history is not only *spatial*, but *temporal*, and because the *temporal* aspect of its subject-matter, unlike that of the subject-matter of the physical sciences, does not admit of mathematical treatment. The reason ultimately is however this, that history centres round the affairs of man, and that man after all is not only a part of nature, but in a sense falls outside it.

¹ This further clarifies the meaning of 'before-what' and 'now-what'. Vide ante pp. 51-2.



PART THREE

LANGUAGE, TIME AND MEANING

I

LANGUAGE AND MEANING

Our previous conclusion regarding the bearing of the question of meaning upon history indicates only one side, indeed the negative side, of a truth, the other, that is, the positive, side of which relates to the meaningfulness of time or the 'after' as distinguished from any temporal series with which history may be concerned. But in order that we may at all speak of time as meaningful, not to say anything as to whether we are able to ascertain what time *means*, we should first enquire into the meaning of '*meaning*' specially in view of the confusion that surrounds the problem of meaning. This problem has, specially in recent times, presented itself to philosophers mainly, if not exclusively, in the linguistic context. And the question that is uppermost in their minds relates to the determination of the meaning of words and sentences in any language. Now as regards this question, one may simply hold that since language is essentially the medium of inter-personal communication, words and sentences are meaningful in the sense that they are the means of *expressing* something as to whether we are able to ascertain what time *means*, we objected, is not only too wide, but absolutely unwarranted, because meaning is something characterized by *forward* reference, instead of by *backward* reference as signified by the phrase '*expressing something or other*'. So the meaning of a word or rather a sentence, from this point of view, is not what is *expressed*, but what is *pointed to*, by it. And, further, the question that most pertinently arises in this connection is: what is the warrant for the legitimacy of this manner of forward reference? The reply that is widely current is that the warrant in question consists in *empirical verification*. In the light of this reply, words and specially sentences in a language cannot then be spoken of as meaningful if they do not point to something relevant and, further, if that something is not empirically verified or

verifiable. And this really brings out the crux of the whole situation.

It seems easy to dispute the validity of the theory of meaning outlined above; for it requires little effort on anyone's part to find words and sentences which are meaningful and yet do not involve any forward reference in the sense mentioned above, and, consequently, provide no occasion for any demand to arise with regard to the warrant for the legitimacy in question. But it may be replied that the present difficulty is superficial and in any case affects the theory, if at all it does, only partly and not wholly. For there is no dearth of words and sentences in any language which may be said to answer to the requirements of the theory. But then, this is of little consequence in view of the fact that the real difficulty lies deeper and consists in stating that the theory under discussion, as we shall see below, is based on the confusion of *meaning* and *truth* which, however they may be related to each other, are clearly not identical, but distinct.

It is indeed true that there are words, for example, those that are names of things such as 'tree', 'table', 'hill', etc., which point to things—things, the existence of which, moreover, is amenable to empirical verification. But this really does not affect the question of the meanings of words. Despite the apostolic pronouncement that in the beginning was the Word, words *follow* what is signified by them and not *vice versa*. And this relative position of words is unalterable in any circumstance, far less can it be altered by the fact that words are signs of things. But then, the statement of this fact, owing to its inclusion of the preposition 'of', may prove so misleading that, in the absence of a clear understanding of the real status of words as signs, it may permit the hypostatization of the abstractions, viz., words, amounting to nullification of the inseparability of verbal signs from what are signified by them, and thus be apt to create the illusion that *things* follow words. It is far from us to suggest however that, in ascribing to the word priority to everything else, the apostle laboured under this illusion. In doing that he obviously had no concern with the epistemological problem of meaning, but merely hinted at the metaphysico-theological conception of the Logos. But the illusion which perhaps could claim no victim in the circumstance of the philosophical simplicity of a bygone age, succeeded, in a subsequent age of philosophical sophistication, in exercising its magic spell upon the advocates of the theory of meaning under discussion.

The fact of the matter is this. If you and I are equally well acquainted with the use of a word, say, 'table', then when you or I

utter this word, its meaning is immediately brought home to you as well as me, and no doubt is left in your mind or in mine as to what is meant by it. And this is all that one can legitimately say with regard to the question of the meaning of the word concerned and, for that matter, any other word. In particular, it would, in the present context, be absolutely arbitrary and unwarranted to ask *whether* that which is meant is a fact and *how* we are to determine whether it is a fact or not. And what is thus true in connection with the question of the meaning of words such as 'table' may be said to be equally true in connection with the question of the meaning of sentences such as 'Desdemona loves Cassio'. The question which, speaking theoretically and theoretically only, could be significantly asked is, however, one which is of an altogether different kind—the question whether a word or a sentence is appropriate to that which it is ordinarily taken to mean. But even this question is ruled out in view of the *stability* that convention generally confers upon words as signs. And this brings to light the meaning of our earlier statement that words follow what are said to be meant by them and thus serves to convince us of, and to draw our exclusive attention to, the simplicity and limitation of the problem of meaning. It needs to be added however that it would only be indulging in unnecessary and useless hair-splitting to draw a distinction between *signification* and *meaning* with a view to arguing that what we have here meant by 'meaning' is really *signification* and that 'meaning' is what it is taken to be by advocates of the theory of meaning under discussion.

Let us now begin by observing that words as such, being signs of something or other, are meaningful, and, being *mere* signs, are obviously neutral—neutral in the sense that they neither serve to affirm nor to deny anything. And there may be, and actually there are, sentences which, though they are of the nature of affirmations or denials, are mere syntactical orderings of words with the sole object of conjuring up meaningful situations and so are themselves meaningful and yet likewise neutral. Not to mention anything else, much of literature, especially fiction and poetry are made up of sentences of this kind. But then, the situation is altered when the place of mere words and neutral sentences is taken by statements amounting to affirmations or denials of matters specially of the factual order. Thus the situation presented by my statement that 'there is a table in the next room' or that 'there is no table in the next room' is different from that which is presented by my merely uttering the word 'table'. And a similar difference is noticeable between the situations

respectively presented by the statement that 'Charles I died in his bed' or that 'Charles I did not die in his bed, but on the scaffold' and the statement that 'Desdemona loves Cassio' or that 'Desdemona does not love Cassio'. Whereas the word 'table' is merely meaningful and is absolutely unconcerned with any question except that of meaning, the statements that 'there is a table in the next room' and that 'there is no table in the next room', while being equally meaningful in themselves, are *judgments about fact*. And it is precisely on this account that they, while remaining intrinsically meaningful, are unavoidably required to meet the challenge of fact in the shape of the question whether they are *true* and the question concerning the *test* of their truth consequent thereupon—questions, to both of which the mere word 'table' is a complete stranger. And what is thus true about these statements in contrast with the mere word 'table' is equally true about the statement that 'Charles I died in his bed' or that 'Charles I did not die in his bed, but on the scaffold' in contrast with the statement that 'Desdemona loves Cassio' or that 'Desdemona does not love Cassio'.

Of course, there remains the curious fact that the statements: 'Desdemona loves Cassio' and 'Desdemona does not love Cassio' are not statements about facts and yet, unlike mere words, are respectively an affirmation and a denial. And on this account they are unavoidably thrown open to challenge. But then, the challenge in their case is not the extraneous challenge of fact, but one pertaining to their own domain, the challenge of *meaning* in the shape of the question whether they are *consistent* or, in other words, whether they have a place in a system of meanings or are integral parts of a meaningful whole. Incidentally this indicates that *consistency* cannot be, as according to the coherence theory of truth it is, the test of *truth* instead of a mere demand of meaning any more than (empirical) *verification* can be the test of meaning instead of a demand of truth.¹ However that may be, the statements such as 'Desdemona loves Cassio' or 'Desdemona does not love Cassio' share with bare words immunity from the question of truth and, consequently, from the question of the test of truth.

It is then evident that words as such are, by definition and use, inseparably bound up with some meaning or other. And sentences in so far as they conform to the rules of syntax and are made up of words, the ideas corresponding to which are coherent, are likewise meaningful. Why such ideas should be coherent is, however, too ob-

¹ Vide *infra* pp. 85-90.

vious a matter to need explanation. But why there should be rules of syntax at all, and why these rules should be what they are in the case of any particular language are questions which cannot be answered except with reference to a certain demand of meaning, the demand for its articulation. If the syntactical rules vary, and actually they do, from one language to another, the reason is that each language has a peculiar genius of its own, and that the demand of meaning in question is capable of being fulfilled in more ways than one. This, incidentally, goes to show that grammar—despite the fact that it is not one and the same for all languages, but differs in detail from one language to another—is not exclusively concerned with mere words and their connections but is, in its own way, concerned with the question of meaning. Maybe, the capacity of language for expressing truths, facts and actions is limited in many ways, and the syntactical rules governing any particular language are, in one respect or another, arbitrary and specially inadequate as means of the articulation of meaning. But these are difficulties which—notwithstanding the fact that philosophers, specially nowadays, consider them remediable and go so far as to suggest remedies for them—are, after all, inevitable and yet, as we shall see in due course, are such that they are in no way prejudicial to the understanding of the meaning of meaning. In the meantime, it would perhaps be worthwhile to consider some of the ways in which the twofold difficulty may be dealt with.

II

MYSTICISM AND NEOLOGISM

One of the ways of treating the two difficulties may consist in considering both of them irremediable and, as a measure of despair, resorting to silence about those matters which cannot be spoken of or even about all matters, irrespective of whether they can be spoken of or not, and thus resting content with the inexpressible or unspeakable. But this would amount to a kind of renunciation, partial or complete, which is characteristic of mysticism—the outlook which may prove satisfying to rare individuals filled with excessive spiritual enthusiasm, but leaves the common herd absolutely uninformed, and which, in any case, commands the abdication of philosophy; for without the use of language as its sole instrument philosophy may remain, if it at all does, in name but without substance. Hence it is evident that

philosophy, strictly speaking, cannot begin with mysticism, and that, if it ends in mysticism as it has sometimes done in the hands of many a great philosopher, that would amount to the nullification of what it has established earlier. It is precisely on these grounds that the path of mysticism cannot be philosophy's own. In order that it may hold its own, philosophy is in unavoidable need of the use of language.

Should philosophy then proceed by ignoring or recognizing the difficulties under consideration? But to ignore the difficulties is to refuse to think properly, which is the same as to deny the possibility of any discipline whatsoever. In fact, a discipline, strictly speaking, needs to be essentially *critical*. Any *criticism*, in this context, demands the recognition of these difficulties followed by a procedure free from the disadvantage and inconvenience caused by them. But then, of the two difficulties, the one that relates to the limitation of the capacity of ordinary language may be regarded as all-important and primary. Accordingly it may be held that so far as philosophy is concerned, its success would depend not on the replacement of ordinary language by a newly created language, whether of the same kind or of a different kind, but on the enrichment of ordinary language through the evolution of a vocabulary competent to reveal hitherto unexpressed meanings, including new meanings yet to be expressed—a vocabulary appropriate to the task which it is given to philosophy to perform. And this seems to envisage an alternative to mysticism.

As regards this alternative, it is of course to be admitted that ordinary language, at no stage of its career, is fully formed, but is subject to growth in several ways, of which the following are specially important. One of these consists in the incorporation of words signifying concepts peculiar to some specialized field of investigation or other such as any of the natural sciences, or in the assimilation on the part of one language of words and phrases belonging to another. Another is confined to the particular language concerned, but is complicated, permitting as it may do certain words to shed their original meanings and acquire new ones, and certain others to acquire a meaning or meanings in addition to that which originally belongs to them. Obviously, however, these two ways can neither singly nor jointly change the nature of ordinary language so as to make it free from the difficulty under consideration. Hence there arises the demand for a third way which, from the nature of the case, should be adventurous, consisting in the acquisition of newly coined words, the coinage of new words depending on the need felt for giving verbal expression to experiences or aspects of experiences, old or new,

familiar or unfamiliar, that are not represented in the vocabulary of the language concerned, however enriched it may have been as a result of its development in the first two ways.

Now the need referred to above obviously relates to the demand for the articulation and communication of meanings, the fulfilment of which constitutes the very essence of language. But then, the coinage of new words with a view to the enrichment of ordinary language seems to be open to a serious difficulty. Since a newly coined word, obviously, is not already in use, it is pertinent to ask whether it actually expresses the experience or the aspect of experience which it is intended to express, and, further, whether there is at all any experience or aspect of experience corresponding to it. To answer these questions in the affirmative on the testimony of the person who coins the word or words concerned—and this seems to be the only way in which the questions could be answered affirmatively—is to admit what may be called *private language* alongside of, and yet in distinction from, ordinary language. But the admission of private language is obviously not far removed from the admission of such a thing as inexpressible or unspeakable experience which constitutes the essence of mysticism. If the latter be called unqualified or pure mysticism the former may aptly be designated as linguistic mysticism as opposed to unyielding faith in the capacity of ordinary language as the means of expressing truths, facts and actions. All this seems to indicate that to try and overcome the limitation of ordinary language by enriching it with newly coined words is to invite the danger of undue etherealization of language and, what is worse, fanatical fondness for barren and useless verbalism.

III

LANGUAGE, LITERARY ART AND PHILOSOPHY

It should be borne in mind however that language, although it is primarily the means of inter-personal communication, is required to serve as the unavoidable instrument of the activity of the human mind in the field of literary creation. But so far as ordinary language is concerned, it is peculiarly suited to express our day to day experiences in a certain condition, namely, as rounded off and sufficient unto themselves. And so it is unable to indicate adequately the nuances, overtones and specially suggestions borne by these experiences—precisely the things which it is the aim of literary art to

portray in words. On this account it is perhaps unavoidable for works of fiction, drama and specially poetry to resort to analogies and metaphors. But then, analogies and metaphors, if not misleading as they are apt to be, obviously cannot overcome the inadequacy of ordinary language so as to help literary art fulfil its aim to its entire satisfaction. And this indicates whatever justification there may be for neologism in the field of literary creation, no matter whether the votaries of literary art do or do not have recourse to this device or whether they do that rarely or commonly.

Nevertheless, as argued above, the language that includes newly coined words is not strictly public, but subject to the disability of private language. But this, instead of being of adverse consequence to literary art as it seems at first sight to be, is but an indication of the peculiarity of the aim and function of this art. Since the aspects of experience which literary art seeks to delineate are foreign to the language that is characteristically and by usage purely public, the language which it has to use must be peculiarly its own in order that its aim may be fulfilled. Thus the language of literary art, no matter whether it is entirely made up of ordinary words or includes words newly coined, should be in a sense private. But that is in no way prejudicial to the communication of the aspects of experience which it is the prerogative of literary art to portray in words. Communication in the field of our day to day affairs, the medium of which is public language, is *eo ipso* bare communication—communication having no essential relation to any kind of *appreciation* on the part of those who are communicated with. If any manner of appreciation accompanies bare communication, it can at best be externally related to the latter. In the field of art, on the other hand, communication is not worth the name without the element of appreciation as its essential feature. But what else can artistic appreciation be except re-living the experiences or aspects of experience which the artist himself lives, and which it is the function of art, including literary art, to communicate?

Of course, literary appreciation is not easy of attainment; and yet the fact remains that in its absence communication in the field of art would be out of the question. But that is not likely to affect the compatibility of the privacy of the language of literary art with the communicability of the experience with which this kind of art is concerned. In fact, the difficulty of communication in the field of art due to the privacy of the language used therein is not insurmountable, but is really such that without its redress the purpose of art

would be defeated. And so far as literary art, specially poetry, is concerned, the redress in its case is effected by means of a certain manner of manipulation of words, whether exclusively ordinary or inclusive of newly coined words, with the sole object of creating aesthetic value through the intermediary of rhythm and balance. This clearly indicates how private language may have relief from mysticism and be made to open a door to communication. But even then, it needs to be borne in mind, communication in the field of art is but the meeting of the artist with others united with him by the tie of a common outlook, a common temperament and specially a common taste. All this perhaps suggests a theory of art, including literary art, the elaboration of which falls outside the scope of this work.

The point that emerges is however that the manipulation of words in the sense mentioned above rather than the coinage of new words is of special importance in the case of literary creation. It is in virtue of such manipulation that the language of literary art, specially poetry, while being in a sense private, serves as the instrument of communication, subject to the limitation already indicated. Now, granted that neologism is as much in demand in the field of philosophy as in the field of literary art, the language of philosophy, in so far as it comes to include newly coined words, cannot, for the reason previously mentioned, avoid being subject to the disability of private language. But, it may be contended, this would not matter if in the case of philosophy as in the case of poetry, the mysticism of private language could somehow be tempered so as to yield place to communication. And the effective means to this end, so far as one could see, should be none other than the manipulation of words. But then, the adoption of this means on the part of the philosopher would obviously presuppose that he, like the poet, is exclusively concerned with aesthetic value. And what else can this mean except that he is unfaithful to his own calling and lays himself exposed to the risk of speaking or writing nonsense, which he as a philosopher certainly does not intend to do? Philosophy in so far as it has recourse to neologism, is then caught between the Scylla of mysticism conspicuous for its belief in the incommunicability of meanings and the Charybdis of gibberish.

Nevertheless, one can ill afford to ignore the fact that, irrespective of whether this is a mere historical accident or a matter of inviolable necessity, there was a time when language in its poetic form wielded supreme authority and, consequently, the language of philosophy approximated to that of poetry. This circumstance, it is worthwhile

to notice, points to the truth that poetic language is in a sense the paradigm of whatever language is chosen as the instrument of a serious enquiry. The reason seems to be that the language of poetry is not only *appreciative* in the sense previously indicated, but is imbued with an unusual spirit of *discipline* and is reflective of deep insight as language should be in order that it can serve the purpose of any adventure of the human mind, whether intellectual, artistic or religious.

But what is said above should not be construed as conveying the suggestion that a language that is not poetic is of no use in the conduct of an enquiry, whether philosophical or other, or that no enquiry is genuine if the language used as its instrument is not of the poetic form. On the contrary, at least three of the basic enquiries with which the human mind is respectively occupied in the fields of science, mathematics and logic are so peculiar that in their case both ordinary language and poetic language have proved not only inadequate but unsuitable, and have eventually yielded place to symbolic language—the typically unconventional language far removed from verbal language, whether poetic or ordinary. But even then, the paradigmatic character of the language of poetry is not lost upon these disciplines. For it is, so it seems, in the interest of the disciplined way of thinking that is naturally in demand in their case, and for the sake of deeper insight into their respective subject-matter that science, mathematics and logic have no option but to have recourse to symbolic language. The use of symbolic language then serves the same purpose in the case of these disciplines as does manipulation of words in the case of poetry. Thus these disciplines, despite the fact that, in ordinary estimation or on a superficial view, they are in a class apart from poetry, are really united with the latter by a strong tie.

The community between poetry on the one hand and science, mathematics and logic on the other, which has been noticed above, is obviously *methodological*. In consideration of the peculiarity of their respective aims, poetry and, for that matter, literary art in general and these disciplines do, however, fall apart from one another. For literary art aims at aesthetic value, whereas science, mathematics and logic are devoted to the pursuit of truth¹, and, further, aesthetic value and truth do not admit of being understood in terms of, nor are reducible to, one another. But even then, the community in question

¹ 'Truth' is here understood, not in its narrow sense as consisting in empirical verification, but in its wide sense in which one may speak of mathematical and logical truths as well as of scientific truths.

ultimately remains unaffected in view of the fact that aesthetic value and truth equally owe their allegiance to *meaning*, although neither of the two is identifiable with it. And this is significant in that it suggests the need for an independent investigation of the problem of meaning and at the same time serves to indicate the main line of the investigation which may be stated as follows.

There is no doubt about the fact that in a world where there are no *persons*, the question of meaning is absolutely irrelevant. In such a world all that is merely *is*; but nothing is or can be *meant*. So meaning is peculiarly personal. Language, being a social product and, in particular, being the foremost medium of inter-personal communication, should of course be likewise personal. But then, curiously enough, whereas meaning is unalterably personal, language, intended to express meanings, is essentially characterized by the tendency to be *impersonal* and perhaps is not worth the name if it is not actually so in practice. And it is on this account that language, specially verbal language, is anomalous in nature, being at once the vehicle of meanings and, this is unquestionably true, conspicuous for its capacity for disguising and even distorting meanings. And this, on the one hand, accounts for the difficulties of ordinary language which we have already had occasion to notice, and, on the other, conveys the suggestion that no treatment of the problem of meaning is worthwhile, if it is confined to mere analysis of language, and if the emphasis of interest be not shifted from the surface of meanings, viz., language, to their centre, that is, person or persons or, as we should rather say, the realm of the personal.

IV

MEANING AND TRUTH

It is far from us to suggest however that language is unconcerned with meaning. On the contrary, it is the foremost means of the articulation and communication of meaning. Nevertheless, in view of what we have already seen, language, however it be critically considered and made to conform to the demands of logic, cannot, in virtue of this process alone, reflect all meaning or everything about any particular meaning. It would, however, be arbitrary and unwarranted to jump from this to the conclusion that meaning in general or even in certain specific cases is linguistically intractable or recalcitrant to linguistic expression, the conclusion which constitutes the

essence of mysticism. For, while logic (or rather logical analysis) goes to one extreme in its treatment of meaning as purely linguistic and so as exclusively impersonal, mysticism goes to the other extreme in regarding meaning as purely personal, personal in a sense different from ours, in the perverted, individualistic or private sense. The conclusion that is legitimately deducible in the present context is one that lies midway between the two extremes and consists in that meaning is inseparable from language regarded as the vehicle of its expression and yet is essentially personal, personal in the genuine sense in which it is *public*, not *private*; *objective*, not *subjective*. And this brings to light the remarkable truth that there is not only no conflict but perfect harmony between meaning's inseparability from language in the present sense and its being essentially personal, as is evidenced by the fact that both these equally signify the *publicity* and *objectivity* of meaning.

The case of truth is, however, different from that of meaning. Of course, there is no denying the fact that truth, too, is *personal*; because in a world where there are no persons no assertion can be made, and because the question of truth and falsity cannot arise in the absence of any assertion. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that while some of our assertions are of the factual kind, there may be others that are of a different nature, and that the question of truth and falsity concerns assertions of the former kind and not those belonging to the latter, although the fact remains that the question of meaning is relevant to all our assertions. The point that is of greater importance in this connection may, however, be stated thus. Neither truth nor meaning is properly so called if it is not characterized by publicity and objectivity. But while meaning, strictly speaking, owes these characteristics to the realm of the personal, truth, one should not fail to notice, looks as if it is impersonal and indeed is naturally such that it does not lend itself to treatment except in the light of the view that it is impersonal. In consequence, truth, unlike meaning, is in unavoidable need of being looked upon as *purely linguistic*; so that in its case the characteristics of publicity and objectivity are not derivable from the realm of the personal, but should instead depend upon something else, which, considering that the question of truth is solely and exclusively concerned with assertions of fact, can be none other than *empirical verification*. And it is here that there arises the urgent necessity for guarding ourselves against certain misunderstandings which are apt to vitiate philosophical thinking.

Our previous observation regarding the *impersonal* character of

truth should not be construed as signifying that truth ultimately falls apart from the realm of the personal and is unconcerned with meaning. On the contrary, since the application of the question of meaning, as already mentioned, is not confined to those assertions to which the question of truth is irrelevant, but extends to assertions of fact which are open to this question, the assertions that are *true* (or false) may be *meaningful* at the same time. But while this, perhaps, is universally admitted, philosophers have generally lost sight of the proper perspectives in which meaning and truth need to be respectively viewed, and have failed to realize that meaning and truth are not the same, but *distinct*, irreducible to each other. In consequence some of them, specially those who have scant regard for ordinary ways of thinking and are concerned with the universe as a *whole* and with *ultimate truths* or else are inspired by the hope of discovering the fundamental basis for all judgments of value, have emphasized the all-importance of meaning by placing meaning above truth and misconstruing truth as mere consistency. In this they have been mainly governed by the idea of vindicating philosophy or rather metaphysics. But they are completely unaware of the fact that they have thereby brought the cause of science and logic to ruin—science concerned with matters of fact with regard to which the question of truth is supremely important, and logic which is devoted to the pursuit of truth and as such is certainly concerned with language in that aspect in which it is made up of statements that are in need of being assessed as being either true or false. And, what is still worse, they have failed to see that that metaphysics which demands the sacrifice of science and logic for its own vindication can at best be a body of fictions.

The position considered above is, in fact, one of the two extremes, of which the other consists in reducing meaning to truth or, in other words, understanding meaning in terms of empirical verification, and so is but a tribute to the supremacy of science and logic and is avowedly anti-metaphysical. The latter, with which we are at present concerned, is a reaction against the former and deserves to be called scientism-logicism as opposed to traditional metaphysics. It has naturally gained considerable prominence in an age such as ours which is characterized by phenomenal developments in the fields of science and logic. While considering it, one cannot, however, do without admitting the fact that science and logic are not worth the name if they are not devoted to the pursuit of truth, on the clear and definite understanding that truth is, *as it were*, purely impersonal. But then, there seems to be no reason why meaning* should be

reduced to truth, instead of being regarded as constituting a sphere to which truth is affiliated, when the fact remains that the very question of truth is inadmissible apart from reference to the realm of the personal, which is intrinsically related to meaning. This is far from suggesting however that truth is reducible to meaning and not *vice versa*. For truth, from all that we know about it, seems so peculiar that it is as repellent to its reduction to meaning as it is unable to absorb meaning.

What then is meant is that meaning and truth, as we have been insisting, are distinct and irreducible to each other, and yet that meaning holds truth under its sway, whereas, it should be specially noted, the converse is not true. The view that meaning is not reducible to, or identifiable with, truth is not only sound in theory, but is well fortified by the fact that not only a statement that is characterized by truth is meaningful, but a statement that is characterized by the opposite of truth, viz., falsity, may likewise be so. And this indicates that, whereas the question of truth and falsity is subordinate to the question of meaning, the latter question may be sufficient unto itself without being involved in the question of truth and falsity and even without providing any occasion for the question to arise. This point may well be argued from the linguistic point of view as follows.

The uses of language, as is well known specially nowadays, are many and various. We may use words not only to make statements of fact, but to ask questions, give orders, express wishes, to give undertakings and for many other purposes without making statements. Of these uses of language only that which is concerned with making statements of fact comes within the purview of the logical question of truth and falsity, while the rest obviously do not, and yet are such that the question of meaning does not, on that account, lose its relevance to them, but, on the contrary, may remain operative in their case. Thus sentences such as 'Are you tired?', 'Don't disturb me', 'May I have a cup of tea?', 'One should not eat stale food', etc., are meaningful, but obviously do not admit of being assessed as being either true or false.

The foregoing discussion perhaps suffices to indicate that scientism-logicism, conspicuous for its intolerance, arrogance and, above all, fanaticism, which has undermined traditional metaphysics, and itself passes for philosophy *par excellence*, is vitiated by a 'category mistake', which, as some of the votaries of scientism-logicism themselves warn, should be avoided in philosophical investigations. The mistake

in the present case consists in confusing meaning and truth or bringing both these under the same category in the most arbitrary manner. And it is the same as that which lies at the foundation of the kind of traditional metaphysics we have previously considered—the same because the reduction of truth to meaning and the reduction of meaning to truth, though apparently opposed to each other, equally amount to bringing both meaning and truth under the same category. It is, therefore, one of the strangest events in the recent history of philosophy that traditional metaphysics should stand condemned as, to use a Spinozistic phrase, 'an asylum of ignorance', while scientism-logicism should be hailed as the advent of a new era of philosophic wisdom. But then, it behoves the philosopher not to be overwhelmed by the tantalizing influence of logic and specially science and to realize in the light of his native wisdom that that scientific-logical attitude which allows *truth* to override the authority of meaning is self-stultifying and cannot hold its own except at a heavy cost, the cost of the demands of the realm of the personal.

The consideration which stands out is however that, whereas the question of truth and falsity is subordinate to the question of meaning, the converse is not true; so that there may be meaning which is unconcerned with truth and falsity and so is, unlike truth, free from the necessity of playing an *impersonal* rôle and, in that sense, purely personal.¹ This is one of the considerations of fundamental philosophical importance which seems to be universally ignored, and to which both traditional metaphysics and scientism-logicism are, undoubtedly, complete strangers. But, so far as our understanding goes, it is this consideration which, among other things, indicates the possibility of a new way of philosophical thinking and perhaps opens up a vista to the future of metaphysics. In any case, it is, as we shall immediately see, of supreme importance in the treatment of the problem of the meaning of time with which we are here mainly concerned.

If there be, and, so far as our finding goes, there must be, such a thing as purely personal meaning or, as it may rather be called, meaning as such, then one has no option but to admit that the determination of meaning as such, speaking negatively for the present, is not, as the determination of truth and falsity must be, dependent on the analysis of language. It is not implied however that meaning as

¹ It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the word 'personal' means that which relates to the realm of the personal and not to the individual who is but an ego, that is, an abstraction from the realm of the personal.

such does not admit of linguistic expression. On the contrary, meaning is not determinate and so nothing at all for us if it is linguistically intractable. But then, the meaning that is said to be determinable through linguistic analysis is really meaning presenting itself in the shape of truth or falsity and hence is not meaning as such, but only another name for either of the two. How meaning then can present itself in this manner is, of course, a legitimate question, but it is one that is easily answered with reference to the fact that there is no rift between the realm of the personal and the world of impersonal things, and that the inter-relation between the two, though obviously not a matter of logical necessity, is an accomplished fact as is eloquently testified to by much of our ordinary language. While commending this to the notice of all those who have been labouring in the field of linguistic analysis with a view to the regeneration of philosophy, we may draw their special attention to a more important point in order that they may be awakened to the sense of discrimination between the proper and the improper ways of philosophical thinking, and scientism-logicism may be restored to sanity.

V

THE PSEUDO-CONCEPT OF MEANINGLESSNESS

We are now required to consider the notion of 'meaninglessness' which a considerable number of the votaries of scientism-logicism have employed in dismissing metaphysics. According to these philosophers, metaphysics is only fit to be condemned as a pseudo-science, because, as they hold, the statements of which it is made up are meaningless. And a statement, in their view, is meaningless if it is not actually verified or is incapable of being verified. But, apart from the polemic that centres round the theory of verification, the question that is most pertinent here is: how does the present conception of meaninglessness differ from that of falsity? Obviously there is no difference between the two. And that being so, meaninglessness, in the view of these philosophers, should be but another name for falsity. But, as a matter of fact, they would not accept such a position, because a statement that is false, as they are wise enough to realize, may well be meaningful, and because they condemn metaphysical statements not on the ground that these are false, but on the ground that they are, as they say, meaningless. And yet the position is obviously such that they really have no escape from it. Hence is revealed the

predicament to which much of contemporary philosophy has reduced itself as a result of its anti-metaphysical attitude.

Let us, however, consider the meanings of the word 'meaningless' as given in the English dictionary. There it is synonymous with the word 'absurd', which in its turn has several meanings. But setting aside those meanings that are rather popular and rhetorical in character and so are of doubtful philosophical significance such as 'silly', 'ridiculous', etc., one would find it wiser to concentrate one's attention on the synonym 'incongruous' or 'inconsistent'. Now 'incongruity' or 'inconsistency' must be either *factual* or *logical*. So meaninglessness should mean either factual or logical inconsistency. In the former sense it is obviously indistinguishable from, and in fact the same as, falsity; and in the latter it is but another name for invalidity as opposed to validity and so is of no relevance except in the fields of mathematics and logic. But since those who declare metaphysical statements to be meaningless do not obviously understand meaninglessness in either of these senses, we are driven to the conclusion that the word 'meaningless' is itself meaningless in the context where it is specially used by them. And this suggests the way, indeed the only way that there may be, out of the predicament referred to above, which we may now try to explain as follows.

Of course, the word 'meaningless' (or 'nonsense') is not devoid of signification in all contexts. It may be significantly used in common parlance with a view to the fulfilment of the demands of certain situations. But, despite the fact that the English dictionary treats it as synonymous with more dignified words such as 'absurd' and 'inconsistent', its signification remains unalterably popular and rhetorical. This is precisely the reason why the word meaningless is, strictly speaking, foreign to mathematics and logic (in so far as it is concerned with inference) whereas the use of the word 'absurd' or 'inconsistent' on suitable occasions meets with the approval of these disciplines. And that is also the reason why the word 'false' rather than the word 'meaningless' is specially suited to answer to the negative demand of the assessment of statements concerning matters of fact, whether in the domain of science or in that of logic in so far as it is concerned with the analysis of statements of fact. In view of the derogatory position which the word 'meaningless' would naturally have in the estimation of no less a discipline than mathematics or logic or science, it is very strange however that philosophers of all people, specially those among them who profess to be experts in linguistic analysis, should come to attach unusual philosophical import-

ance to this word and, what is more, make use of it with a view to the elimination of metaphysics in every possible sense—metaphysics which, in some sense or other, as one may still believe, constitutes the very essence of philosophy.

It, therefore, seems reasonable to conclude that the remedy for the predicament referred to above is to be found nowhere else than in the dismissal of the notion of 'meaninglessness' as of no philosophical importance. It is not suggested however that metaphysics as it has been handed down to us, that is, traditional metaphysics, is invulnerable and must be taken for granted. What is meant is that if traditional metaphysics is worthless, its worthlessness needs to be established in a strictly philosophical way and not in the manner in which the contemporary enemies of metaphysics seek to do, viz., by bringing meaning and truth under the same category and admitting the distinction between meaningfulness and meaninglessness on the analogy of the distinction between truth and falsity, with a view to ascribing meaninglessness to metaphysical statements. The fact of the matter is really this. The distinction between truth and falsity and the distinction between consistency and inconsistency cover between them the three fields of science, mathematics and logic, and the scope of these distinctions, whether in their pure forms or as distorted or embellished in any manner whatsoever, cannot be legitimately extended beyond the province of these disciplines. But that does not necessarily imply that there can be no additional concept of fundamental importance comparable to either of the two pairs of opposites: truth-falsity and consistency-inconsistency, and that there is no major discipline besides science, mathematics and logic, where some fundamental concept other than truth-falsity and consistency-inconsistency could play a dominant rôle.

As previously seen, anyone who is not bewitched by the Cartesian *cogito* or the behaviourist-phenomenalist treatment of the problem of knowledge, but is alive to the essential implications of the epistemological situation, is unavoidably led to admit the concept of the realm of the personal.¹ And on the admission of this concept there comes within view the concept of meaning together with the truth that there is such a thing as purely personal meaning—meaning that is not subject to *impersonalization* through its presentation in the shape of truth or falsity and, on this very account, is not determinable by means of the analysis of language. Now the very idea of the impossibility of meaning's being impersonalized necessarily implies that in

¹ Vide Part I Sections III and IV.

the sphere of meaning as such there is no distinction between meaningfulness and meaninglessness corresponding or analogous to the distinction between truth and falsity, consistency and inconsistency. In this sphere there is only meaning with the possibility of the distinction between meaningfulness and meaninglessness completely ruled out. If this offers, and it seems it does, a clue to the possibility of metaphysics in some sense or other, then metaphysics would certainly be proof against any attack with the notion of meaninglessness used as the weapon. But this raises a point which falls outside the scope of our present discussions. Our immediate concern is with the question how meaning as such, that is, purely personal meaning is to be positively determined, the question which still remains unanswered.

VI

ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHIC VISION

With a view to the positive determination of meaning as such one cannot do better than begin with the consideration of the use of language for indicating actions to be performed or desisted from, as distinguished from its use for making statements. For the former, unlike the latter, is invariably *personal* and also *purely* meaningful—*purely*, because the question of their being assessed as being either true or false is obviously irrelevant in the case of sentences such as 'go home', 'do not disturb me', etc. The importance of this consideration for our immediate purpose can hardly be exaggerated and may gradually be brought out as follows.

In order that the analysis of language may be thorough-going and fruitful, it would not be enough merely to investigate the various uses of language. What is specially necessary here is to ascertain how the importance of language itself varies in its various uses. To ignore this task is to put undue restraint upon the freedom of philosophic activity and, in consequence, to leave philosophy in a state of sterility. This indicates a truth which is easily brought home to any student of philosophy who can maintain a critical attitude towards, instead of succumbing to the influence of, the kind of linguistic analysis that is masquerading in the contemporary philosophical scene in the name of a 'revolution' in philosophy. However that may be, making no reference to symbolic language or non-verbal language in general, with which we, for obvious reasons, are not immediately con-

cerned, and confining ourselves to the consideration of verbal language, we may, perhaps, be justified in dividing the uses of verbal language under two main heads: (1) for making *statements* and (2) for indicating *actions* to be performed or desisted from.¹ It may be added that for our immediate purpose it is immaterial whether statements are made unconditionally, conditionally or disjunctively, and how actions differ among themselves in one respect or another.

The difference between the two kinds of the use of language is really the difference that there is between *description* and *indication*—indication, not of any accomplished fact, but of some action or other to be performed or desisted from. Although it may be that description and indication are not mutually exclusive so as to deserve their being placed in two water-tight compartments, their difference in respect of intent and functions together with the peculiarity of the indication concerned, consisting in its having nothing to do with any accomplished fact, perhaps suffices to warrant the treatment of them as separate.

Now granting as we should that description is in a class apart from indication, we can have no option but to admit that in the treatment of description, description as such, and not that which is described, is our primary concern. And since no description is possible apart from the use of language, description is unavoidably linguistic; so that language is all-important in the case of description. Further, since description is essentially linguistic, and since language, as previously observed, must be impersonal in practice, description cannot but share this characteristic of language. And this, on the one hand, serves to explain why descriptions are subject to assessment as being either true or false, and, on the other, goes to show that description has no direct reference to the realm of the personal. All that is thus true about description, it is needless to point out, is true about *statements* the essence of which consists in description. Here, then is an account of how and with what consequence language itself is important in the case of its use for making statements.

But in the case of the use of language for indication the importance of language itself and the consequence of its importance should, as demanded by the change of the situation, be very different. Of course, indication, like description, is dependent on the use of language. But then, in the case of indication, specially when that which is to be

¹ Even granted that our division of the uses of language is not strictly logical, that is not likely to be of any prejudicial consequence to the point we wish to make here.

indicated is no accomplished fact but some action to *be performed* or *desisted from*, the importance of the language used pales before the importance of what is indicated, whereas in the case of description the similar consideration cannot hold good. So, in the treatment of indication, what we are primarily concerned with is not the language used for indicating, but actions to be performed or desisted from. This conclusion is, of course, in perfect harmony with the fact that in connection with sentences used for indicating actions to be performed or desisted from such as 'go home', 'do not disturb me', etc., the question of truth and falsity is absolutely irrelevant. But, what is more, it serves to differentiate *indication* from *description* by suggesting that the former, unlike the latter, must be *personal* in view of the fact that an action to be performed or desisted from is inconceivable apart from reference to some person to perform or desist from the action concerned.

The shift of importance from language itself to the *person*, which our analysis of the language used for indication suggests, has a further implication which is of a far-reaching character. Sentences used for indicating actions to be performed or desisted from involve reference to persons not only in the sense mentioned above, but in a deeper sense—the sense that these undoubtedly speak of ways of communication between a person and a person. And judged in this light, the use of language for indication may aptly be characterized as *inter-personal*. At this point it is necessary to say a word to allay the misunderstanding that our present procedure is apt to create. It is true that the analysis of language can at no stage, not even when it leads to the overthrow of the importance of language itself, do without the use of language. But then, this only testifies to the all-importance of language as a means of all human transactions, including the analysis of language, but, it is important to note, this is far from suggesting that language is unavoidably an end in itself.

It would appear that the final result that the analysis of the language used for indication could yield consists in the discovery of inter-personal relations, and that the positive determination of meaning as such should depend on this result. But that cannot really be the case. For although there is no dearth of philosophers who would accept the concept of inter-personal relations as sufficient unto itself, it seems that this concept cannot be so, nor, in particular, can serve as the remedy for the poverty of the philosophical thinking which ignores the concept of the person in one manner or another or stops short at the concept of the ego. From what we have observed in Part I

of this work it is evident that the attempt to understand the concept of the person with reference to behaviour is a failure or a subterfuge and amounts to ignoring the importance of this concept which cannot really be ignored except at the cost of the erroneous understanding of oneself and others on the analogy of impersonal things. It is also evident that the admission, of course dogmatic, of the ego in the plural is but the admission of false abstractions with all its awkward consequences, and is vitiated by the additional fault of multiplying abstractions. But the main difficulty here is that the inter-personal relation would be a sheer absurdity, if human individuals were uncompromisingly plural.

It is perhaps with a view to avoiding this difficulty that philosophers have sometimes been driven to admit such a thing as the Absolute regarded as purely impersonal or else personal in a superhuman sense. And they have done that on the understanding that the Absolute in either of these senses may enable individuals handicapped by sheer plurality to achieve what lies beyond their own power, viz., relief from their abstractness and consequent isolation from one another, resulting in their mutual relation. But then, the remedy thus suggested is by no means preferable to the want for which it is intended to be the remedy. For individuals as mediated by no less an intermediary than the Absolute in either of the above senses are, of course, free from abstractness and mutual isolation; but they have this gain at the cost of their identity. Stated otherwise by means of the use of appropriate pronouns, the reason is that the Absolute in the former sense is *It* and in the latter *He*, and that neither of these two pronouns can indicate the inter-relation of persons as is clearly shown by the fact that persons as inter-related or held in mutual relation cannot but be 'we'=I with others. Thus we are surprisingly but surely led to our familiar concept of the realm of the personal which is no Absolute nor even a thing or an entity but only the *raison d'être* of inter-personal relations, and the discovery of which, so far as we can see, should be the culmination of the analysis of the language used for indication.

In view of the unusually keen interest that a large section of contemporary philosophers and students of philosophy are taking in the importance of language in philosophy, it would perhaps be useful to reiterate a point which we have already had occasion to notice. The point is that, however important language may be in philosophy and however necessary linguistic analysis may be in philosophical investigations, in the interest of philosophy as an independent discipline

linguistic analysis should be carried to its furthest limit where the importance of language itself ceases so as to allow for the emergence of a vision which is hidden from ordinary language and, which, in the fitness of things, has the authority to sit in judgment upon language. But even then, it should be borne in mind, the use of language remains important, nay, necessary, it being clearly understood that that language should proceed from and be illumined by the vision in question, and certainly is not one which is in need of being subjected to analysis.

Of course, it may be that what is taken at any time and by any philosopher to be the vision in question is not what is meant by this dignified term, but is only another name for illusion. But that hardly justifies the conclusion that philosophy has no option but to rest content with the analysis of language. On the contrary, the search after the vision, regardless of success and failure, is the sort of adventure—and we may not even mind calling it a 'game'—with which philosophy is required to occupy itself in order that language, which is really a tool for man and his fellows to use, may not make slaves of them all. In this respect the task of the philosopher is comparable to the task of the humanist, specially in a technological age, which is primarily to bring home to man that he as the creator of machines is really the master and not the slave of them. But, no matter whether or not humanism is in demand in all ages, philosophy certainly is; because language is as old as man, and because man has the natural tendency to allow himself to be enslaved by what he himself creates, including language. It needs to be borne in mind however that an irresolvable paradox is ingrained in the very possibility of philosophy in so far as philosophy must have recourse to linguistic analysis and yet should have to throw overboard the importance of language itself. But this is bound to be so, because whatever is excellent is set in a paradoxical background, and because, of all things, human nature to which philosophy owes its origin, is perhaps the most paradoxical.

In the light of what has been observed above, the concept of the realm of the personal may be said to be the point of convergence of philosophic vision and the culmination of the analysis of the language used for indication. Whether philosophic vision must stop at that point or it is given to it to proceed beyond and/or travel in other directions would obviously depend on considerations other than that which relates to the final result of the analysis of the language used for indication. So this question does not call for our immediate attention. We set out to determine meaning as such and, with that object

in view, undertook the analysis of the language used for indication, on the understanding that language thus used could be of special help in this matter. And as the final result of the analysis, we reached the concept of the realm of the personal. But here lies the real crux of the situation. We have left language behind and so have deprived ourselves of the help of language—language with which meaning is usually associated. Of course, the concept of the realm of the personal is at our disposal. But then, it is precisely the concept to which pre-eminently *meaningful* language, that is, language used for indication, loses its importance. How then, can it be of any use in the determination of meaning as such, with which we are immediately concerned?

Not to speak of the difficulty raised above, even the idea of understanding meaning as such with reference to the concept of the realm of the personal would have been absurd had this concept been merely the final result of the analysis of the language used for indication. But the situation completely changes on the admission of what has previously been called philosophic vision and, in particular, on the recognition of the fact that the concept of the realm of the personal is the meeting-point of philosophic vision and the culmination of the analysis of the preeminently meaningful language. If language does, as it must, fall apart from the task of the determination of meaning as such, there is philosophic vision to help the fulfilment of that task by making use of its own resources, including a language, which, as previously indicated, should of course be different from what has been left behind. Yet, one should not fail to note, philosophic vision would be utterly useless with respect to the determination of meaning as such had it not been a fact that there is such a thing as language that is preeminently meaningful and that its analysis culminates in the concept of the realm of the personal.

VII

TIME AND MEANING

We are now concerned with the question how philosophic vision is to deal with the concept of the realm of the personal with a view to the determination of meaning as such. It is necessary here to note that philosophic vision, though obviously it is in a class apart from linguistic analysis, is nothing without its capacity for analysis, but that what is given to it to analyse are concepts instead of language. Now

the concept standing in need of analysis in the present context being that of the realm of the personal already familiar to us, we may, for the sake of facility and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, fall back upon some of our earlier findings about the implications of this concept.

One of the points that our treatment of the concept of the realm of the personal has already brought to light, the point that is of fundamental importance for our present purpose, is that this concept is the presupposition of *time*, but time as it is for us. Of special interest in this connection however is the curious fact that, whereas the analysis of preeminently meaningful language is conspicuous for its tendency to ascend, as it were, and, in fact, does ascend as high as the concept of the realm of the personal, philosophic vision, contrary to ordinary expectation, is characterized by the opposite tendency, but does not follow the same path in its descent as does linguistic analysis in its ascent. Why the concept of the realm of the personal must descend towards, or speaking philosophically, be presupposed by time, cannot be explained except in this way. On the one hand, you and I and others as individuals are in time; and, on the other, 'we', that is, 'I with others', as indicated by the 'with', as opposed to the 'and', must fall apart from time. As both these considerations seem valid, there arises the demand for their reconciliation. But, it seems, the demand cannot be fulfilled except on the supposition that 'we', that is, the realm of the personal is the presupposition of time, of course time as it is for us.

But what has time to do with meaning? This is the crucial question. It must be satisfactorily answered lest all that we have already done may come to be treated as undone, and what is called philosophic vision will turn out to be nothing better than illusion. But to avoid unnecessary worry on this account we may turn our attention to the following points. In the first place, time referred to here is time as it is for us on the one hand, and presupposes the realm of the personal on the other. Time in this sense, then, is unquestionably *personal*. And this, considering that meaning as such is purely personal, is significant in that there is a tie to bind time with meaning. But then, this community between time and meaning, one may demur, is superficial, having nothing to do with what they respectively are in themselves; and it may be objected further that our 'approach to time' gives no indication about the community between the two.¹ Now, of these two difficulties we may only deal with the latter,

¹ Vide ante pp. 48-9.

because it is more fundamental and is obviously such that with its removal the removal of the former is assured as a matter of course.

In dealing with the present difficulty we find it necessary to observe at the outset that no approach to time is free from the charge of being dogmatic, which starts by ignoring, instead of taking, as we have taken, special notice of, time as it immediately presents itself to us, viz., as the temporal triad before-now-after. Of these three members of the temporal triad, the first two, as we have previously seen, are respectively associated with, or rather respectively present themselves in and through memory and perception. Now perception and also memory as we have conceived them to be are alike concerned with *description* as distinguished from *indication* in the strict sense in which it relates to actions to be performed or desisted from. And since description, despite the fact that it is usual to speak of it as meaningful, is primarily concerned with the question of truth and falsity, the question of meaning could not arise in connection with 'before' and 'now'. But we did not leave the matter at that, and this brings us to the second point concerning the question of the relation between time and meaning, which may be stated as follows.

Right in the beginning of our treatment of the problem of time we emphasized a truth, though in its negative aspect, unknown to linguistic analysis unaided by philosophic vision, which consists in stating that the 'after', while being, like the 'before' and the 'now', an aspect of time and a member of the temporal triad, is in a class apart from, and in particular, recalcitrant to interpretation on the analogy of the latter. And this went to show at least this, that the 'after' regarded for the time being as a mere aspect of time is unconcerned with *description*, although what it is specially concerned with remained unsaid. But this was bound to be so in the absence of the apprehension of the positive aspect of the truth under consideration. This drawback is, however, made good by the third point which, as we shall see below, is as strange as it is important for understanding the affinity between time and meaning.

The point just now before us concerns the positive aspect of the truth of which the negative aspect has been considered above. And it brings to light the real nature of the 'after' in contrast with that of the 'before' and the 'now'. It consists in stating, on the one hand, that the 'before' and the 'now' are temporalized spatial determinations as distinguished from time as such and, on the other, that the 'after' is time itself in distinction from the temporal triad or any temporal series. Although it has already been argued at length, this point,

judged from the point of view of the history of philosophy till this day, is, to say the least, fantastic. But if it be true as it seems to us to be that, not to speak of other disciplines, philosophy at least is *anthropocentric*, then the philosopher, in his treatment of the problem of time, has no option but to refer to time as it is *for us*. And once this is granted, the position to which one is unavoidably committed is that the essence of time lies in the 'after', and that the 'before' and the 'now' are inseparable from space, though, of course, held even then under the sway of time. If for the view explained here we have to acknowledge our indebtedness to the suggestion of any master, it is to Immanuel Kant, because, as we have previously observed, it is perhaps he alone who ventured to adopt the anthropocentric standpoint in the treatment of time. But then, as we have already had occasion to indicate, our view of time is divergent from his. The consideration of the divergence would, however, be most useful for our immediate purpose, because it can conveniently lead us to the understanding of the affinity between time and meaning.

No treatment of the problem of time is strictly philosophical and likely to be fruitful, which does not proceed from the answer to the question: why should this problem be raised and discussed at all? The answer, which, in fulfilment of the special demand of philosophy, should be anthropocentric, would consist in stating that the problem arises due to the fact that we ourselves are *in* time, and that it should be discussed in order that the deeper significance of this fact may be brought to light. But then, in view of the fact that we are *in space* as well as *in* time, should it not be held that in the present context the problem of space is on a par with, and as fundamental as, the problem of time? And it is the peculiarity of our answer to this question that draws the dividing line between the position of Kant and the position upheld in this work.

So far as Kant is concerned, despite the fact that he ultimately came to recognize the supremacy of time over space, and this obviously for a reason different from ours, his answer to this question was in the affirmative whereas ours is in the negative. The reason for our difference from Kant mainly lies in the consideration that we are *in* time in a more fundamental sense than we are *in* space. Although even here Kant may be said to be with us, his agreement would be only nominal, not essential, for he, as we have previously observed, could not rise above the ordinary mistake of understanding time on the analogy of space and, consequently, being in time and being in space should, in his view, be essentially indistinguishable. And here

lies a difficulty the solution of which is to be found in a reconsideration of the nature of time, which in fact constitutes the fourth point that we are required to take into account with a view to answering the earlier question as to what time has to do with meaning.

On the understanding of it on the analogy of space, time cannot but be, as according to Kant it certainly is, *serial* and *granular*. And that being so, our being in time would obviously mean our being unavoidably divided from one another as we must be in so far as we are in space, with the result that inter-personal relations would turn out to be an unrealizable dream. It may be that in day to day affairs we often behave as if we are *ultimately* in space. And that must be due to our being under the influence of an illusion traceable to no other source than an inexplicable anomaly in our nature. But that is no argument for the incurability of the anomaly in question nor an indication of our essential nature. On the contrary, the very fact that we have the capacity for distinguishing between the two kinds of behaviour respectively governed by egoism and respect for inter-personal relations and for approving of the latter and disapproving of the former goes to show that we are essentially inter-related and not divided from one another. And this suffices to indicate that we are in time in a more fundamental sense than we are in space, and that time must be understood on its own account and, in any case, apart from reference to space.

Time, then, is in need of being extricated from the conception of it as the so-called temporal triad or temporal series. And at the same time we are required to steer clear of the two extreme views of time, which are not only not compatible with the recognition of inter-personal relations, but which amount to throwing the very concept of person overboard: one represented by Zeno's denial of the reality of time, and the other by Bergson's conception of time as a mysterious, unexplored and unexplorable region. And as a result of this process of elimination we are left with the view which, through a critical consideration of the temporal triad, finds it necessary to relegate the 'before' and the 'now' to the region of space and, being unable to treat the 'after' in the same manner, comes to realize the truth that the essence of time consists in the 'after'.

It still remains for us to answer the twofold question as to how our conception of time can account for inter-personal relations, and how it bears upon meaning. So far as these two questions are concerned, they seem to be such that they may be answered together or else not at all. But granted our view of time, they are, as we shall now try to

show, amenable to a joint answer. In this respect we have to take into account a new point, in fact, the fifth and the last point, which concerns the essential implications of the view which holds that the essence of time consists in the 'after'. Now, once the place of the temporal triad or temporal series is taken by the 'after' in the conception of time, time comes into its own, involving no reference to space within itself and being purely temporal. In consequence, it is completely extricated from reference to the question whether it has a beginning or not; because this question, though it apparently relates to time, cannot really arise except in the context of space. And, further, time presents itself as *essentially* onward,¹ and, being essentially onward, it is endlessly so; because nothing can be essentially onward, which is subject to an end. But then, to speak of the onwardness as endless is only to clarify the meaning of the *essentiality* of onwardness with reference to space and so is only a figurative device but, it must be admitted, of great use. However that may be, being essentially characterized by onwardness following from its non-spatiality as implied by the 'after', time presents itself in a profoundly significant aspect, viz., as being primarily concerned with *indication* as distinguished from *description*. And this brings within view a point which, on its own account, and specially in consideration of the far-reaching importance it is likely to have in respect of the residue of our present task, is in need of elaboration.

So far as description is concerned, although it would appear at first sight that it has as much to do with time as with space, it is, strictly speaking, exclusively concerned with space, having nothing to do with time as such. For in the case of its so-called concern with time, it makes use of the 'now' and the 'before' which are but temporalized spatial determinations. Of course on this account description may be said to be concerned with time rather than with space, because all descriptions are descriptions of situations, either *present* or *past*. But then, description is absolutely precluded from making reference to the 'after', that is, time itself; because the 'after' due to its very nature, is recalcitrant to description. And this leaves no doubt about the fact that description is essentially related to space, or, to express the same idea in Kantian terminology, that space is the *form* of

¹ If it be objected that the word 'onward' does not convey a purely temporal sense, the reply may only be that ordinary language is generally suited to the requirements of space, and that this difficulty should as far as possible be overcome by understanding the meaning of words with reference to the context in which they are used.

description. But to bring in time in connection with the understanding of description and to regard it, as Kant may be taken to have regarded it, as an additional, nay, the more fundamental form of description would not only amount to losing sight of the peculiar logical character of description, but, as will be evident in due course, also amount to ignoring the unique importance of time in the understanding of what may rather vaguely be called human relations.

If time as such then is unconcerned with description, is it of no use, or, if it be useful at all, how may it be so? Of course, it is hard to dismiss time as useless, because to do so is to deny the undeniable fact that the world including ourselves is a temporal order. But apart from that—and this is especially important for our immediate purpose—time, as Kant had the wisdom to realize, has no less a claim to be recognized as a form than space may be said to have. And once time comes to be, and it must be, accepted as a form, the question of its usefulness presents itself as irresistible. But since no one can speak of a bare form as useful without indulging in an absurdity, and since a form, then, can be useful only as the form of something or other, the question before us must relate to that of which time may be regarded as the appropriate form.

Now it is of paramount importance to note that the word 'form' is used here not in the popular but in the logical sense, in fact in the sense in which Kant may be said to have used it, viz., as the *universal* way of our reacting to certain situations. This interpretation of the word 'form' is obviously not psychological, but logical as is clearly shown by the use of the qualifying word 'universal'. A form then should be concerned with either of the two alternatives recognizable as strictly logical in the present context: *description* and *indication*. In consequence, time, not being concerned with description, must be the appropriate form of indication, that is, the universal way of our reacting to certain situations in the manner of indication. It may be added, however, that, even granted that description and indication do not between them exhaust all the possible alternatives of their kind, our conclusion would remain unaffected, because time, being essentially the 'after', cannot as a form be said to be concerned with anything other than indication.

Now there is no gainsaying the fact that 'form' is a meaningless abstraction except as the correlative of some *matter* or *content*. And this is as true about time regarded as a form as about space similarly regarded. But the point here is different from that which is brought out by our earlier finding that space and time are respectively the

forms of description and indication. The latter refers to the ways in which space and time function—and the ways are respectively description and indication—but is silent on the question regarding that towards which they function in these ways. And it is precisely with this question that the former point is concerned. Now as regards space, that to which it is applicable, or, in other words, the content or matter in its case, is some fact or other; because facts alone are amenable to description. Incidentally it is to be noted that, in virtue of the peculiarity of the nature of fact, description is unavoidably subject to assessment as being either true or false. However that may be, the question about the content or matter in the case of time, unlike in the case of space, is somewhat difficult. The reason is that time, as we have previously seen, is conspicuous for its personal signification, and that, not to speak of ordinary people, even philosophers generally emulate the example of scientists, mathematicians and logicians in confining their interest to matters impersonal and so are of little help in the treatment of this question.

But let us in this respect depend, as we have no option but to do, upon our own resources, and first consider the importance of the kind of language which we have come to regard as preeminently meaningful such as is illustrated in sentences like 'go home', 'do not disturb me', etc. The meaningfulness of such sentences, as we have already seen, has nothing directly to do with *fact*, but is essentially related to *action*. Meaning then is inseparable from reference to action—action not as an accomplished fact, but action to be *performed* or *desisted from*. But the most surprising thing—and it must be surprising, because the way of the revelation of truths is generally so—is that what is thus revealed through linguistic analysis about the nature of meaning is on all fours with what is brought to light by the analysis of the concept of time about the same matter. As previously observed, the relation between the 'after', that is, time itself, and its content or matter is so peculiar that it cannot be external, but must be internal. And this, together with our earlier finding that the 'after' is essentially *onward*, well argues the view that the content of the 'after' regarded as the essence of time is related to *action* as distinguished from *fact*—of course, action to be *performed* or *desisted from*.

But, notwithstanding the fact that it throws light on the nature of meaning by pointing to the inseparability of the idea of meaning from the idea of actions to be performed or desisted from, the result, which has been found to be common to the two kinds of analysis, does not seem to yield the final answer to the two questions as to how time

bears upon meaning and what meaning ultimately is. For time being *one* and *universal*, meaning supposed to be internally related to it should likewise be one and universal, whereas actions to be performed or desisted from should naturally be many and various. Moreover, actions cannot be performed or desisted from except *in* time, whereas meaning *ex hypothesi* is of time. But then, it is precisely these two considerations which together do in a different way lead to the view that meaning ultimately is *the plan for action* and thereby serve to offer the long awaited answer to the two questions with which we have been occupied so long.

We are thus brought back to one of the main results of our earlier discussions especially in Chapter VII of Part II of this work, where the concept of the plan for action has been dealt with at length. Considering that our present result is in substance the same as that which we reached earlier, the long and complicated discussions with which we have so far been occupied in this part of our work may, however, be judged to be useless and superfluous. But in reply to this objection we have only to observe that the foregoing discussions are urgently called for by the state of confusion that prevails at the present time in the philosophical world with regard to the problem of the relation between philosophy and language and allied problems including that of meaning. Besides, these discussions, as the discerning reader may not fail to notice, have brought out several new points including one which, as we shall immediately see, is of special interest in as much as it conveys the answer to the question how time accounts for inter-personal relations.

VIII

HUMAN DESTINY OR INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS?

There is no dearth of philosophers to draw our attention to the fact that we form part of the temporal order of the universe or, simply, that we are in time. But we are not peculiar in this respect; because it is equally a fact that the physical world consisting of material objects or impersonal things is *in* time. The question then is whether we are in time in the same sense as impersonal things or in a different sense altogether. And as regards this question, it seems that it has seldom received the serious consideration of philosophers which it deserves. In any case, when philosophers have come to deal with it, they have generally looked at it in the wrong perspective. In fact, they

have construed it as having exclusive bearing upon the destiny of the human individual. And having interpreted it in this light, they have found either of two answers to be within their easy reach: one consisting in that the human individual is finally destined to go the way of nature and share the same fate as impersonal things; the other, that, of all things, the human individual is above, and unaffected by the mutations of time and so is destined to be immortal (*amṛta*) in the midst of the vast panorama of birth, growth and decay presented by nature.

But both these answers are obviously based on the erroneous acceptance of an abstraction, namely, the human individual or the ego in place of something concrete, namely, the person, and consequently are respectively motivated by the two common frailties of human nature: *despair* in the former case, and *hope* in the latter. And this clearly brings out the absurdity of the confusion of the question under discussion with the question concerning the destiny of the human individual. Whether the latter question is genuine or not may be a different matter. What is certain is that the question whether or not we are in time in the same sense as impersonal things needs to be treated entirely on its own account. But then, if it be that on this view the question of human destiny is left with no ground to stand upon, then obviously we shall have no option but to dismiss it as absurd and irrelevant.

In a deeper analysis, the question of the destiny of the human individual is found, however, to be the outcome of a gross misunderstanding of the 'after' (future). Those who ask, or try to answer, this question do so under the misapprehension that the 'after' is a mere member of the temporal triad, and that it is to be understood on the analogy of the 'before' and the 'now' and so, like these two, is a spatial determination, though, of course, temporalized, that is, held under the sway of time. Thus the 'after', according to them, has a predominantly *factual* or *existential* import. Accordingly the question of the destiny of the human individual presents itself to them in this way: whether the individual, who existed in the past and exists at present will continue to exist in the future. The answer would of course depend on what kind of a philosopher deals with this question, and would depend specially on his upbringing, temperament and outlook on life in general. But no matter how it is answered, the answer together with the question itself goes into liquidation once the proper understanding of the 'after' comes to prevail.

As previously seen, the 'after', while presenting itself as a member

of the temporal triad, really embraces the temporal triad itself and is time as such or, in other words, purely temporal involving no reference to space within itself. Further, time, whose essence consists in the 'after', is such that we are in it, and yet it is for us on the one hand, and presupposes the realm of the personal on the other. And all this brings out at least two points. In the first place, the senses in which we ourselves and impersonal things are respectively in time are fundamentally different. In fact, impersonal things, unlike ourselves, are in time in the sense of temporalized space, and not in time regarded as purely temporal. And this is precisely the reason why the question of destiny, no matter how it is to be answered, may be relevant in the case of impersonal things, but not in the case of ourselves. Secondly—and this is especially important for our immediate purpose—time, as distinguished from pure or even temporalized space, in which we ourselves are said to be, is itself devoid of any factual or existential import, and is only pregnant with a meaning which, in fact, is meaning *par excellence*, and is none other than the plan for action. And this serves to lay bare the deeper significance of our being in time, the significance lying in this, that we are inseparably related to one another in virtue of the one universal plan for action. Thus time, time as essentially the 'after', untouched and untarnished by space, time that is for us and presupposes the realm of the personal, does, in the fitness of things, as nothing else can, account for inter-personal relations.

IX

INDICATION, DESCRIPTION AND MEANING

We are not yet out of the wood in our treatment of the problem of meaning. For it may be objected that we have elevated ourselves to an ethereal height only to look down upon barren land. Having somehow landed ourselves in the realm of the personal we have made use of so-called philosophic vision to arrive at the view that this realm holds the key to the understanding of what time is for us, and that time in its turn is not vacuous, but filled with the one universal plan for action fit to be designated as meaning *par excellence*. But this process as a whole amounts to ignoring the ordinary belief, the belief which, moreover, prevails in the philosophical world, that meaning is so peculiar that it is nothing in isolation from, and without being ascribable to, language. Now, as regards such an objection, it may be

straightaway replied that the first part of it relating to the inseparability of meaning from language is absolutely out of court. For, as we have already argued, linguistic analysis leads, through an inner necessity, to a point where language itself is lost to meaning, and meaning finds its way to its own discovery in a non-linguistic context. Incidentally it may be observed that it is perhaps on this ground that philosophers have sometimes felt encouraged to ascribe meaning to history. But then, they have thereby consented to bear the unnecessary burden of a misplaced belief: they have tried to find meaning in temporalized space where it does not really belong. However that may be, the second part of the objection, relating to the ascribability of meaning to language, carries sense, although as we shall immediately see, it really does not amount to an objection, but merely conveys a demand for further clarification of the standpoint we have already come to adopt.

With a view to the fulfilment of this demand we are required to refer to the two kinds of the use of language we have already distinguished, in connection with which the question of meaning is relevant, and to consider how or whether at all the concept of the plan for action may be said to have any bearing upon meaning in their case. Now, of the two kinds of the use of language, the one that is concerned with indication, as we have previously seen, primarily relates to *action*, of course, action to *be performed or desisted from*. But the mere fact that a sentence such as 'go home' relates to action is not sufficient to account for the meaningfulness of the sentence concerned; far less can it show that the concept of the plan for action bears upon it. This is far from suggesting however that meaning is unconcerned with action. On the contrary, reference to action, whether direct or indirect, is essential to meaning. What then is meant is that an action to be performed or desisted from, in order that it can make room for meaning, must be set in the background of inter-personal relations. And this is exactly the point which, among others, has been yielded by our analysis of the language used for indication and to which sentences such as 'go home', 'do not disturb me', etc., answer. But since a plan for action is nothing apart from the idea of a way of adjustment of persons among themselves, what else may an action's being placed in the background of inter-personal relations mean except that it is to be performed or desisted from under the aegis of a plan for action? And this perhaps suffices to indicate that the concept of the plan for action bears upon, and indeed accounts for, the meaning of language used for indication.

But, in the context of our present discussion, the case of the language used for description is different from, and cannot be settled as easily as the case of language used for indication. Statements or descriptive sentences such as 'the table is brown', 'the kettle is hot', etc. obviously involve no direct reference to *action*, far less to the concept of the plan for action. So if they are to be, and there is no doubt that they should be, treated as meaningful, besides their having to be treated as being either true or false, it would appear that our theory of meaning is inapplicable in the explanation of their meaningfulness. But it would be hasty to jump from this to the conclusion that our theory of meaning is unwarranted or that the question of meaning is absolutely irrelevant in the case of the language used for description. The fact is that this kind of language, due to its very nature, is unavoidably and directly open to the challenge of fact and so is under the *necessity* of being assessed as either true or false. But the question of meaning, if it does as it may well do arise in its case, does so not necessarily but *contingently*, depending on the need that one may feel for considering the bearing of a given description upon an action to be performed or desisted from. And it needs to be specially noted that the description of relevant situations is generally of considerable importance in respect of our decision to act or not to act. Incidentally all this implies that language is not exclusively indicative or exclusively descriptive. In fact, the view that understands language in the former sense is as extreme and one-sided as that which understands language in the latter sense. If the view of language as purely indicative undermines the cause of science, mathematics and logic, the understanding of language as exclusively descriptive is bound to prove ruinous to the cause of philosophy including metaphysics.

What we have observed above about the peculiarity of the meaningfulness of the language used for description has, however, been generally ignored by philosophers in so far as they have confused meaning and truth or falsity. It is as a result of this confusion that they have arrived at the erroneous view that in the case of this kind of language the question of meaning is as *necessary* as the question of truth and falsity. But once this error is removed and it is realized that in its case the question of meaning, unlike the question of truth and falsity, is only *contingent* in the sense already indicated, no doubt can be left about the applicability of our theory of meaning in the explanation of the meaningfulness of descriptive sentences, and this for the reason that the contingency in question refers to actions to

be performed or desisted from, and that these are mere abstractions in isolation from inter-personal relations and sheer impossibilities apart from the background of a plan for action.

It needs to be added however that the distinction between meaningfulness and meaninglessness does not hold good in the case of the language used for description any more than it does in the case of the language used for indication. And this is explained by the fact that meaning is not the same as, but distinct from, truth or falsity, and specially that the question of meaning is not necessary, but contingent in connection with the language used for description. If in the case of a descriptive sentence the question of meaning turns out to be such that it cannot be answered in the affirmative, what this would mean is not that the sentence concerned is meaningless, but that this question is irrelevant in its case. The position thus reached, of course, amounts to defying the authority of linguistic usage, according to which the word 'meaningless' is no less significant than the word meaningful. But the philosopher should have no worry on this account; for, in order to prove faithful to his own calling, he should look beyond, and not remain enmeshed in, the linguistic tangle.

It would be worthwhile to notice in this connection that pragmatism, while confusing meaning and truth, does, in a sense, understand meaning with reference to *action*. But then, with a view to understanding meaning in this manner actions may be dealt with in either of two ways: one, which is exactly the same as we have adopted, consists in tracing actions back to what they *presuppose*, viz., inter-personal relations and the plan for action; the other does not take into account what they *presuppose*, but what they *produce*, that is, their *result*, *utility* or *usefulness*. And it is the latter alternative that pragmatism has chosen to adopt. In consequence, this doctrine is not only committed to the mistake of admitting the distinction between meaningfulness and meaninglessness, but to that of construing *abstractions*, viz., actions in isolation from inter-personal relations, as *concrete*, and *fictions*, viz., actions apart from the context of the plan for action, as *realities*. And, what is worse, these theoretical difficulties naturally have their counterpart at the practical level. Actions treated, as pragmatism treats them at least by implication, as detached from inter-personal relations, cannot be said to be useful except in a purely individualist and relativist sense. Thus an action which is useful to me may not be so to others. And this difficulty is such that any attempt on the part of the pragmatist to resolve it is bound to be a failure or a subterfuge. For once one starts with the

consideration of actions apart from reference to the idea of interpersonal relations and all that it implies, one leaves this idea behind once for all with the result that usefulness and meaning consequent thereupon remain condemned to privacy and relativity with no prospect of their restoration to publicity or universality. In view of this difficulty, those who put forward the suggestion that the question of the publicity or universality of the usefulness of our actions is ultimately the question of social adjustment, labour under the erroneous assumption that our adjustment to one another's *convenience* is the same as our *mutual understanding*. Here then is an account of the difficulties to which pragmatism lays itself exposed, but from which our view of meaning seems absolutely free.

Thus the theory of meaning advocated in this work, however strange it may appear to be in ordinary estimation and on a superficial view, may be suitably and fruitfully applied in the linguistic context where it is usual to ascribe meaning to language used for making *statements* as well as *indications*. And this, on the one hand, may relieve the philosopher's mind of the tormenting apprehension that meaning finally understood apart from reference to language would lose its bearing upon language itself, and, on the other, serves to reaffirm the truth, missed by philosophers more often than not, that meaning is not the same as, but distinct from, truth and falsity. The importance of our theory of meaning does not, however, end here. As has already been indicated and as we shall try to show in due course, it can successfully fight the climate of opinion which makes the conception of man as a *person* yield to the conception of him as a *thing*, a mere part of nature, and which allows science, mathematics and logic to predominate with the result that ethics, aesthetics and religion can survive, if they at all may do, only by obeying the dictates of these powerful disciplines.

PART FOUR

MEANING AND PERSONS

I

LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHY

It may be worthwhile to begin here with the following general remarks. Philosophy, in order that it may serve a useful purpose and specially be a discipline of importance on its own account, should not be ancillary to, or emulate in any manner the example of, any other discipline, in particular, that of science. This idea may be fulfilled provided only that philosophy remains unceasingly aware of the importance of man in a world where there are powerful non-human and even pseudo-human forces to hide his importance from view; and it addresses itself to the consideration of the problems which are of concern to him. And it is on this account that philosophy may be said to be anthropocentric in a very special sense. Maybe, these problems are no less related to the world into which he is destined to come, and in which he is equally destined to live, than to his own peculiar nature. But even then, they are of concern to *him* and not to the world. And this means that in the context of the problems strictly called philosophical it is man and not the world that is central. And this points to a truth which is of supreme importance for the future of philosophy, because it is precisely this truth that has been generally neglected in the history of philosophy, with the result that philosophy has seldom taken man and his peculiar problems into serious consideration. This is evident from the fact that philosophy has generally concerned itself with the world including man, variously regarded as mundane or divine or supernatural in some other sense, and has done so on the understanding that man is but a part of the world, and that the problems that may be of concern to him are subordinate to, or mere aspects of, the problems relating to the world as a whole. Thus philosophy has proved subservient to the cause of science or of religion or else has committed suicide by lapsing into mysticism. In any case it has seldom found the way of coming into its own.

Now, as regards philosophy conceived to be essentially linguistic analysis, it is obviously concerned with the enquiry into what is of man and is the foremost medium of communication between man and man, viz., language. But, it seems, even then it is no exception to the misadventures of the human mind masquerading as philosophies that have been characterized above. For language, despite the fact that it is of human origin and the foremost means of inter-personal relations, must, as previously observed, be *impersonal* in practice and so is in need of being treated as a part of the world into which man comes and in which he has to live. It may still be argued however that since it is devoted to the clarification of the meaning or the use, as the case may be, of language and thus may be in a position to contribute to our mutual understanding, linguistic analysis may be regarded as philosophy in the sense on which we are insisting. But this argument calls for the following comments.

First, granted that philosophy is concerned with the problem of our mutual understanding, in the treatment of this problem, it should, in the fitness of things, be concerned with the determination of the meaning, implications and presuppositions of inter-personal relations rather than with the investigation of the factors which may contribute to our mutual understanding. What is suggested is not however that such an investigation is unnecessary or useless. On the contrary, it is more likely than not that it serves a useful purpose. In any case, it is perhaps a part of the business of sociology. But even supposing that it is obligatory on the part of philosophy to undertake the investigation, clarification of the meaning or the use of language, however important it may be as a factor contributing to our mutual understanding, is not the only factor of this kind nor even as important as the others that there may be. In fact, cases of lack of our mutual understanding due to the obscurity, vagueness or unclarity of the language used by us are rare rather than common.

Secondly, so far as we know about linguistic analysis in theory and in practice, we do not have any indication that philosophy, according to it, is concerned with any *specific* question such as that of inter-personal relations. If it can be said to be concerned with any question at all, that question, in the view of linguistic analysis, is the most fundamental of all questions that philosophy may have to deal with, the question: What is philosophy? Now the very idea of asking this question obviously *presupposes* the view that there is something fundamentally wrong about philosophy as it has so far been. And there is no doubt that the idea of philosophy as a discip-

line is old and not a sudden emergence in the minds of the votaries of linguistic analysis. All this indicates a background which is not peculiar to the procedure of the contemporary analysts, but indeed is common to all attempts at fresh thinking that have been made from time to time in the history of philosophy.

But then, no answer to the question as to what philosophy is likely to be fruitful or even satisfactory except in the light of the answer to the question as to what philosophy must do. And yet it should be borne in mind that it is the answer to the former question that is primarily in demand, and that it would be left unanswered if the latter be answered independently, and without reference to its *presupposition*. This really brings out what is of fundamental importance in any attempt to rehabilitate philosophy. It is due to the neglect of this point that many an honest and serious attempt to restore philosophy to its proper position failed in the past. But it goes to the credit of the protagonists of linguistic analysis to keep this specially in view in their attempt to deal with the question as to what philosophy must do.

The analyst's answer to this question, as expected, is original. It does not depend on the usual consideration that philosophy has been generally vitiated by wrong solutions of problems regarded as legitimate in themselves or by the treatment of illegitimate problems in the name of legitimate ones. Its real basis lies in the new realization that philosophical problems as such spring from the 'bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'. And this obviously cuts the ground from under the feet of traditional philosophy, and, what is more, rules out the very conception of philosophy as a discipline having some problem or other of its own to deal with. Accordingly the analyst states that a philosophical problem has the form: 'I do not know my way about', that in the field of philosophy, there is nothing to be revealed, discovered or explained, so that philosophy can do away with all explanation. If philosophy then has no problem to deal with, what is it required to do? The answer of the analyst, speaking generally, is that its business is to fight against the bewitchment in question.

But the business of philosophy as conceived by the analyst, as one may well judge it to be, amounts to dealing with a *problem*—the problem created by the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. Of course, it may be replied that this problem is not philosophy's own in the sense in which the so-called philosophical problems may be said to be, but is rather imposed upon it. But this

really is open to the difficulty that since *ex hypothesi* there can be no such thing as philosophy properly so called in the absence of this problem, the question of this problem's being imposed upon philosophy cannot arise at all. The analyst, therefore, has no option but to admit that the problem under reference leads to the emergence of philosophy properly so called. But still there remains the question why that which thus emerges should be called philosophy instead of being given any other designation. If the answer be that it is called philosophy because it is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence from which so-called philosophy has sprung, then any discipline that, in one manner or another, proves, as science at one time proved, hostile to so-called philosophy, may be designated as philosophy in the proper sense of the term. In any case, the analyst has no escape from the absurd position that philosophy, strictly speaking, is dependent on what philosophy has so far been, and yet is a negation of the latter.

The conclusion that seems to follow from the above discussion is that philosophy, in order that it may not be a mere word, but an independent discipline, must have a problem or problems of its own, and should not, as the analyst holds, be in a class apart from other disciplines, being marked off as that which has no problem to deal with. And this will be clearer and all the more evident from the analyst's view of the exact way in which philosophy is to fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. According to the analyst, the bewitchment of our intelligence is not due to our not knowing what the words used by us mean or our being unable to use them correctly. On the contrary, we do know their meaning and so are able to use them appropriately. That being so, it seems that language has no means of bewitching our intelligence. But no, continues the analyst, there may be unclarity about the uses of words and, in particular, we may be tempted to distort or misrepresent their uses. And in so far as we fail to notice this unclarity or fall victims to such a temptation, our intelligence is bewitched and we are entangled in perplexities and puzzlements with the result that we are confronted with the so-called philosophical problems about which all that can be said is that we do not know our way about. Here then is a brief account of the latest phase of the change in the philosophical situation which, as we shall see below, is appalling, being a complete departure from the very idea of philosophy.

The number of words contained in any language is undeniably vast, and languages are many and various. One, therefore, cannot help

wondering how the description of the uses of words is feasible at all. But even granted that the words, the uses of which are to be described, are only the key-words contained in philosophical literature, the difficulty still remains that it is much too much to expect that there should, in all cases, be perfect correspondence, even in respect of *meaning*, not to speak of *use*, between such words contained in any two languages. Let us not mind these difficulties however, and let us, in the present context, rest content with the assumption, of course, the most unfair assumption one could resort to, that there is only one language, say, English or German or French. But even then, we are not rid of the questioning spirit, and are compelled to ask: why is it necessary to describe the uses of words, when the fact remains that, as the analyst himself admits, we know what words mean and are also able to use them correctly? If no satisfactory answer to this question is available, one will have no option but to regard the description as unnecessary and superfluous, and the very idea of the description as childish.

But answer there is; and it refers to the temptation to misrepresent the uses of words. In view of this temptation, as the analyst suggests, the description of the uses of words is necessary in as much as it may serve as a 'reminder' and, thereby, oppose the temptation. And this really brings out the crux of the situation. The temptation to misrepresent the use of a word obviously presupposes *knowledge*, not *ignorance*, of its use. And that being so, the description of the uses of words can serve no useful purpose in the present context, and indeed leaves the temptation absolutely unaffected; because it can only provide what is already presupposed by the temptation, namely, knowledge of the uses of words. What then is to be done with a view to a successful opposition to the temptation in question is to enquire into its causes and to discover a suitable remedy for it. But to this end what is in demand is the advice of a psycho-therapist and not the vain labour of a philosopher in the shape of the description of the uses of words.

The description of the uses of words may, however, be of importance in a different way, viz., as a weapon to fight with against *ignorance* about their uses. But even then, it should be borne in mind that ignorance about the use of a word is really due to ignorance about the *meaning* of the word concerned. Thus, for instance, one's ignorance of the difference between the uses of the word 'is' in the statements: 'he is honest' and 'he is John's brother' is due to one's ignorance of the fact that this word, logically speaking, has different

meanings in the two statements. In fact, the consideration of the mere use of the word 'is' without reference to what, from the logical point of view, it means in different contexts, would result in the erroneous understanding of all statements or propositions as of the subject-predicate form. So, on every account, one is left with the impression that nothing can succeed better in bewitching the intelligence of philosophers than the analyst's attempt to rescue them from the bewitchment of their intelligence by means of language.

But one cannot at the same time help wondering why philosophers should make a fuss about the uses of words in the face of the fact that we are able to use words correctly, and specially that the uses of words are determined by their meanings and not the latter by the former. The shift of emphasis from the meaning to the use of language, which characterizes the latest phase of the changing philosophical situation is, however, the worst disaster that could break in on the philosophical world. But then, it is in consonance with the spirit of the age through which are now passing, the machine-age conspicuous for its insistence on utility, which compels us to concentrate our whole attention on the *uses of tools*, including language, to the neglect of the purpose for which tools need to be used.

If in the consideration of language *meaning*, then, is more fundamental than *use*, and it is not use, but meaning that is of primary concern to us, how does this go to help the cause of philosophy and, in particular, what problem or problems does this present for philosophy to deal with? At first sight it would appear that neither of these questions admits of a positive answer, because, as a matter of fact, we do know what words *mean*—for otherwise they would be nothing to us—and that would be the end of the matter. But no, the matter cannot really come to an end so easily, in view of the fact that language not only involves the question of meaning, but that of truth and falsity, and that, not to speak of laymen, even philosophers—and, mind you, the philosophers who speak of meaning as well as truth and falsity—have fallen victims to *ignorance* about the distinction between meaning on the one hand and truth and falsity on the other. And since the determination of truth and falsity is rather easy, depending on verification as it does, and is specially *useful* at the same time, philosophers have proved so slothful and unimaginative as to understand meaning in terms of truth and falsity.

What has been observed above really amounts to ignoring the essential comprehensiveness of language by unduly emphasizing the importance of language used for *description*, to the utter neglect of

that which is used for *indication*. In consequence, the disciplines that are directly and also ultimately concerned with the question of truth and falsity and—let us add as we may justifiably do—with that of consistency and inconsistency, whether science or logic or mathematics, should be, and they actually are, unassailable individually and jointly, whereas those that are differently concerned such as philosophy, including ethics and aesthetics have no option but to fight with their backs to the wall. But of what use is it to go on harping, as philosophers have been in the habit of doing, on the importance of the concepts of the Deity, divine purpose, freedom, immortality and even value with a view to the rehabilitation of philosophy and its allies? Obviously the words conveying these concepts have no rightful place in language regarded as exclusively usable for description and solely concerned with the question of truth and falsity.

What then is the remedy for the predicament of philosophy which is thus brought to light? This question, although it relates to remedy, has no psycho-therapeutical sense, because it refers not to any such thing as the *temptation to misrepresent* the use of words, but to the *ignorance* of the distinction between the uses of language for description and indication respectively, and because falling a victim to ignorance does not indicate any malady of the mind as does falling a victim to an undesirable temptation. In fact, the remedy in demand here is of the kind which science is well known for providing by dispelling ignorance in the light of *knowledge*. But in this case, the service of science is of no avail, because science, being exclusively interested in the language used for description, is itself unaware of the distinction under discussion. About the remedy in demand one could then say only this, that it is meant for philosophy and yet is in need of being provided by philosophy itself. Thus does philosophy find itself placed on its own orbit, and, judged from the linguistic point of view, has to start from the *knowledge* of the distinction between the uses of language for description and indication respectively. But then, the question, in fact, the question that affects the very possibility of philosophy, is: what use can philosophy make of this knowledge?

The first step in the answer to this question is marked by the emergence of the problem, which, from the linguistic point of view, is of fundamental importance in philosophy. Once the distinction between the uses of language respectively for *description* and *indication* is brought clearly to light and, in consequence, it is realized that the latter use is primarily concerned with meaning and the former with truth and falsity, and that meaning does not admit of

interpretation in terms of truth and falsity, the problem that irresistibly presents itself to the thinking mind is: what is meaning? Of course, this problem is no more important and irresistible than the problem: what is truth? But the latter really is not much of a problem in as much as it is easily solved with reference to the principle of verification which even laymen employ in their day to day affairs, no matter whether or not they are conscious of it as a principle.

Why then philosophers have bothered themselves so much about the problem of truth and have arrived at conflicting theories of truth is explained by the fact that they have been misled by the confusion of meaning and truth. The case of the problem of meaning is, however, different from that of the problem of truth. For the very idea of meaning's being verifiable in some sense or other necessarily implies the surrender of the concept of meaning to the concept of truth. Of course, as we have previously observed, preeminently meaningful sentences are those that relate to actions to be performed or desisted from. But then, the meaningfulness of a sentence can no more be indicated by the mere fact that it relates to some action to be performed or desisted from than the truth of a statement can be by the mere fact that it relates to some accomplished fact. Moreover, the question of verification is irrelevant in the case of actions to be performed or desisted from, for the simple reason that these are not accomplished facts.

So we are divided from the analyst by the view that it is incumbent upon philosophy to deal at least with the *problem* of meaning and thereby explain, discover or reveal what meaning is. Of course, we do know what words *mean*. But certainly we cannot know what *meaning* is merely by knowing what words mean. To dispute this is to entertain the erroneous presupposition that meaning is the same as truth or falsity or else to refuse to admit the importance of linguistic analysis in the determination of what meaning is. What is suggested is that if meaning be not, as it should not be, confused with truth or falsity, the determination of what meaning is, which stands out as necessary, and is essential to the business of philosophy, must depend on linguistic analysis in particular, the analysis of that kind of language which is preeminently meaningful. Thus we join the company of the votaries of linguistic analysis, and yet are divided from them in fundamental respects: with respect to the manner and object of the analysis of language, and specially with respect to how

the importance of language itself is affected by linguistic analysis carried to its furthest limit.

We feel the necessity of resorting to the analysis of language, not with a view to performing the unnecessary and superfluous and indeed fruitless task of ascertaining and describing the *uses* of words, but with a view to determining what meaning is, which is an unquestionable philosophical demand. And it is precisely for this reason that the kind of language which we have undertaken to analyze is that which is preeminently meaningful, that is, language used for *indication* as distinguished from language used for *description*. As regards the language used for description, it is, from our point of view, in no need of analysis; because truth and falsity, with which it is primarily concerned, do not present a problem of philosophical importance, but, as previously observed, are determined easily and, indeed, as a matter of course. And this suggests a point of paramount philosophical importance, the point that linguistic analysis properly so called proceeds with a view to opening up a vista to what is significant with no obligation to submit to the authority of verification. In other words, linguistic analysis as a philosophical method is not *empirical*, but to use Kantian terminology, *transcendental*. And it is hardly necessary to add that in the case of philosophy linguistic analysis is but a means or a method, never an end in itself.

But our difference from the analyst reaches the furthest limit in our discovery that linguistic analysis inevitably culminates in the total loss of the importance of the very language that is submitted to analysis. And this, however surprising it may be, must be true, for otherwise the purpose of linguistic analysis will be defeated. When the fact is that the language that is preeminently meaningful is so on account of its shining with the reflection of, and thus conveying information about that which is meaning, how can this kind of language, as a result of its analysis, lead to the determination of meaning itself, unless its importance is exhausted at some point where the discovery of meaning may be made? If this does not happen, it is needless to mention, we shall have no option but to rest content merely with preeminently meaningful language, with no prospect of our being able to determine what meaning is. Not only that; the consequence will really be still worse; because in the absence of our knowledge of what meaning is, we shall have no means of recognizing the so-called meaningful language as meaningful.

All this indicates that linguistic analysis is essential to philosophy, and yet that philosophy comes into its own by outgrowing the neces-

sity of linguistic analysis and embarking upon what we have called philosophic vision. Linguistic analysis, as we have already tried to show, leads us, through the concept of inter-personal relations, to that of the realm of the personal. And thus its appointed task is fulfilled, and nothing else is left for it to do or to achieve. But it must be admitted that neither the concept of inter-personal relations nor even that of the realm of the personal can directly and immediately tell us about what meaning is. Are we then to conclude that linguistic analysis has proved deceptive and misled us into an arid zone where all is lost and nothing is found? This is the crucial question that is to decide the fate of philosophy.

But philosophy may be free from worry about its future if it only awakens itself to the importance of, and specially the promise held out by, the concept of the realm of the personal. As we have seen in Part I of this work, this concept is the ultimate presupposition of our knowledge of the external world, and of our assertion, nay, vindication, of the existence of others as well as ourselves. And in view of this it is no wonder that it should also be, and actually it is, the final goal of the analysis of the language that is preeminently meaningful, and that it should be of service in the determination of meaning. But then, what is in demand in the interest of philosophy is not to ignore, or make wrong use of, but properly to utilize, the service it is capable of rendering. Of course, it is not given to linguistic analysis to utilize this service. But that does not matter, because it is given to philosophic vision to take up the task left unfinished by linguistic analysis.

But still there is need for caution. For philosophy, in the name of making proper use of philosophic vision may come to exaggerate the importance of, and the promise held out by, the concept of the realm of the personal and use it as a springboard for leaping into a dark, unexplored and unexplorable region filled with supernatural and supra-personal entities. But that would really go to the credit of myth-making fantasy and not to that of philosophic vision. From what we have so far been able to judge about the importance of the concept of the realm of the personal, it seems that this concept does not admit of *transcendent* use, and the limit of the promise held out by it is reached in the unfolding of the mystery of inter-personal relations. And this, on the one hand, indicates the limit of the capacity of philosophic vision and, on the other, gives a clear hint about the nature of the service that philosophic vision is capable of rendering.

II

MEANING, PERSONS AND INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS

Although it is not generally realized, yet as we have already seen, it needs to be admitted, that the concept of inter-personal relations presupposes the concept of the realm of the personal. But this alone is obviously no explanation of how the inter-personal relation is *actualized*. Hence arises the question how the concept of the realm of the personal, while being the logical presupposition or, as one might say, the *raison d'être*, of inter-personal relations, leads to the actualization of the latter. And this, in the present context, is exactly the question which awaits answer at the hands of philosophic vision. For the answer to this question it is of first and foremost importance, however, to consider the distinction between an *individual* and a *person*, which is generally spoken of, but seldom properly understood.

An individual is an *ego* and, as such, is insular, divided from others presenting themselves equally as individuals. And since divisibility is inseparable from the concept of space, an individual is essentially in space. Of course, he may still be spoken of as being *in time*. But time referred to here should obviously be temporalized space, that is, the temporal series before-now-after. And this implies that the individual, besides being divided from others of his kind, is divided within himself. So in the case of individuals, the inter-personal relation would be but a delusion and an unrealizable dream. In order that this relation may be actual, there must be *persons* to be held in it. But no manner of tinkering with the concept of the individual can yield the concept of the person. Strictly speaking, the latter concept demands the neutralization of the spatiality inseparable from divisibility as connoted by the former. So persons are essentially *in time*—time which tolerates no manner of division within itself. And this, incidentally, sets at rest the irrational controversy between materialism and spiritualism with regard to the question of the nature of the human self. It is far from us to suggest, however, that a person is *not* in space. On the contrary, in order that the crude spiritualist conception of the human self as a disembodied spirit may be avoided, one must admit that the self is also in space. But then, since man is essentially in time, his occupation of space can make no difference to his integration within himself or the interrelation in which he is held with other persons.

The actualization of inter-personal relations, then, demands that there must be *persons*—persons as we are in so far as we are *essentially* in time. And this, in the light of our earlier finding that the concept of the realm of the personal is the presupposition of time as it is *for us*, seems to reveal the importance of this concept in the explanation of the actualization of inter-personal relations. But then, it may be objected that this concept, being the presupposition of time as it is *for us* instead of time in which we are, cannot really have the importance which one may ascribe to it. This objection is, however, most welcome. For it really does not amount to an objection, but only allows us the opportunity of clarifying a point which is of vital importance in the present connection. And to this end we have only to observe as follows. Of course, it is admitted on all hands, and there is no avoiding the admission, that we are, in some sense or other, *in* time. In other words, the mere fact that we are in time is beyond dispute. But, in order that we may be said to be held in inter-personal relations, we must be *persons* and not mere *individuals*. And, as we have previously seen, we are persons in so far as we are in time in a specific sense, in the sense that we are *essentially* in it. But how can we be said to be *essentially* in time, if time itself be *foreign* to, and not *for* us? Hence is evident the importance of the bearing of the concept of the realm of the personal on the actualization of inter-personal relations.

We have now come closest to our main thesis which consists in that the actualization of inter-personal relations, while depending ultimately on the concept of the realm of the personal and penultimately on time conceived to be that in which we essentially are, depends directly and immediately on what we have called the plan for action. This point, however, is substantially the same as that which has been central in some of our earlier discussions, has appeared and reappeared for consideration on many occasions in the foregoing pages and has been previously argued at length. But it has been presented here in a different form to suit the requirement of the trend of thought followed in this chapter. Accordingly our earlier argument is in need of restatement, because, in view of our present task, it has to centre round the idea of our being essentially in time—of course, time regarded as being essentially the 'after'. And briefly restated the argument is as follows. Since the idea of our being *essentially* in time is but the synthesis of the idea of time's being *for us* and that of our being in time, the conclusion that one is entitled to deduce from this is that *time* is *meaningful* and, indeed, preeminently so, and that

time being essentially the 'after', besides being for us and also being that in which we are, its meaning should be none but the plan for action as already characterized by us.

Now, merely to speak of the inter-personal relation and to speak of it tirelessly, as philosophers are apt to do, does not obviously take us any nearer to showing how this relation is actual. But so far as the question of its actualization is concerned, philosophers have either completely ignored it—and they have done this more often than not—or they have offered such answers to it as, to all intents and purposes, amount to explaining away the very concept of inter-personal relations. The best known and the most popular of these answers are of two chief types, consisting, in either case, in ascribing the actualization of inter-personal relations to the credit of a super-personal agency which is mundane, being the state in one case, or supramundane, being the Deity in the other. But apart from their special difficulties depending on how they respectively conceive the state and the Deity to be, both these types of answer are vitiated by the difficulty arising from the consideration that, in spite of any relation that is established between one person and another in virtue of the power, will, mercy, grace, kindness or even love of an intermediary, the persons related still remain in themselves aloof from, and foreign to, each other with no prospect of their being held in the relation of essentiality to one another. And if they are thus deprived of the prospect of being in interrelation with one another, they hardly deserve to be called persons and, indeed, are false abstractions fit to be designated as mere individuals. And this completes the *reductio ad absurdum* of either of the two attempts to explain inter-personal relations with reference to a super-personal intermediary.

Since the explanation of the inter-personal relation with reference to a super-personal intermediary and, for that matter, to any kind of intermediary whatsoever is only a way of rendering the very concept of the inter-personal relation nugatory, one has no option but to admit that this relation is direct and immediate or, in other words, that persons *qua* persons are held in this relation. And it is perhaps this consideration that has influenced some of those who have apparently eschewed reference to any intermediary in their understanding of inter-personal relations, and have expressed these relations in terms of the formula: 'I—thou'. But then, strictly speaking, this formula is pregnant with a problem rather than contains the solution thereof. For, to say, as this formula amounts to saying, that persons *qua* persons are held in the inter-personal relation is not really to state

an indisputable fact, but to point to one which is in need of being explained. Thus there arises a problem, the problem as to what is meant by the concept of the person, which most befittingly takes the place of the crude and illusory problem as to what the intermediary is which is to establish the relation between one person and another. So in the absence of a solution of this problem, the formula I-thou may not impress one as anything better than mere jargon. Or else it may be a mere linguistic device consisting in making use of the two pronouns I and thou joined together by a hyphen, which has no better purpose to serve than to bypass the problem, the solution of which is essential to the explanation of inter-personal relations. In any case, it offers no guarantee that, if any problem needs to be solved with a view to the explanation of the inter-personal relation, that problem is not the crude and illusory problem referred to here, but the genuine problem concerning the very meaning of the concept of the person.

If a formula be needed for expressing the inter-personal relation, it cannot be 'I and thou' regarded as dependent on the power, mercy, grace, kindness or love of a supra-personal intermediary. Nor can it be 'I-thou' *per se*. The former, far from conveying the meaning of the concept of the person, ignores this very concept through mistaking the individual for the person, and the latter, if not vitiated by the fault of mere verbalism, is, as is more likely than not, open to the same difficulty as the former or else is suggestive of a way of escape from the present problem. We are then left with the formula: 'I with others (you, he, she)' which is our own. This formula, it is hardly necessary to remind the reader, is but the way of expressing our old concept of the realm of the personal. How this concept is essential to the concept of time as it is for us, and how the latter, on the one hand, leads to the concept of the plan for action and, on the other, serves, as nothing else can do, to differentiate the person from the individual, and, indeed, to reveal the essence of the person—all this has already been explained, and the explanation needs no repetition.

It is, however, left for us to observe in conclusion that persons are persons not because of their mere *respective being* nor because of their mere *respective doing* or *acting*. For, obviously, neither of these two is a tie to bind them together, and in the absence of such a tie they are but individuals, not persons. And it is precisely for this reason that philosophers have sometimes felt the need for calling into existence such a tie by invoking the authority of a super-personal agent, whether *mundane* or *supramundane*. But then, they are oblivious of the fact that thereby they can only succeed in making heavier the

weight of the bondage that already hangs heavy on *individuals*. The fact is however that persons as such are in no need of a tie to bind them together. In themselves they are *with* or essential to one another. Thus they are essentially free, removed from bondage. But they are so not because they respectively *are*—and, strictly speaking, the question of their respective being is irrelevant—but because they are participants in one, universal plan for action, which, be it noted, is of them for the simple reason that it is the inner *meaning* of time as it is for us all, and that they are *essentially* in time. And all this, it may be added, testifies to the fulfilment of the promise held out by our concept of the realm of the personal expressible in the formula: 'I with others' = we.

III

RETREAT FROM THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON

Our theory of meaning with its implications may be best established in an indirect way. And in view of this we may only try to give an account of the gloomy and dismal outlook on life which, as it seems to us, is unavoidable except on the view which holds that meaning as such is the one universal plan for action, borne by time as it is for us and bearing the reflection of the realm of the personal. Now considered apart from the plan for action thus conceived, you and I and others are but individuals, not *persons*. The individual is, of course, in time. But, as previously observed, the time in which he is said to be is not time as it is for us all, but temporalized space or the temporal series which is obviously *neutral* in relation to him, pointing to no purpose of life and indifferent to his hopes and despair, to his happiness and misery, to good and evil, indeed, to everything that affects him deeply and vitally. Thus, outwardly, he is an inhabitant in a non-human world where he is a complete stranger. But he has no means of feeling at home in his inward world either. Subject to the rule of the temporal series he is divided from, and foreign to, others of his kind, and, what is still worse, is alienated from himself as a person.

Thus life for man as an individual is a life of absolute, relentless and unmitigated loneliness. If he is not, and actually he is not, aware of this fact about himself, and he behaves, as he actually does, as if he is not lonely, that is an illusion born of the great illusion that leaves him condemned to a life of loneliness. His loneliness proceeds

relentlessly and unswervingly on its usual track, producing effects for him to bear. Fear, the first and the foremost offspring of loneliness, brings in its train jealousy, hate, pugnacity, greed—indeed, all the sordid frailties of man of which he remains a slave, not a master. And as a bondman he passes through the brief span of life vouchsafed unto him until he is engulfed in the temporal series never to rise again.

But the picture of the life of man as an individual which we are trying to portray is not complete as yet. For its completion it is important not to forget that, even as an individual, he is still a person—but a person masquerading as an individual under the misleading influence of the circumstances of his life, which he proves too powerless to control. In fact, man as an individual is divided between himself as a person and himself as an individual except in cases where his personality completely loses itself to his individuality so as to deprive him of his status as a human being. And it is due to this dual nature of man that the dark clouds of the ignoble passions which cast their shadow on his life and reduce it to a long tale of suffering, have a silver lining of charity, friendship, sympathy, benevolence, kindness, in fact all the sentiments that, in ordinary estimation, are noble, which lends a peculiar significance to his life so as to make it worth living.

But then, the so-called noble sentiments, while being of inestimable value to man as split between himself as a person and himself as an individual, are peripheral to the person as such; because persons themselves are *with*, or *essential* to, one another, so that they are above the need of a tie in the shape of any of these sentiments to bind them together. Being essential to one another, persons are in themselves bound together, and, the tie by which they are united is only another name for love. But love is not a sentiment determined by the principle of selection and waiting for occasions to arise. Positively it is the inexorable law that governs the entire realm of persons. It is, therefore, strange that love should be counted, and in fact is uselessly counted, as one of the so-called noble sentiments. Love thus counted is not, however, love in its purity that is essential to interpersonal relations, but love tarnished by selfish desires including lust, as it must be in the case of man divided between himself as a person and himself as an individual.

Nevertheless, as the naïve belief goes, man, endowed with the gifts of the noble sentiments as he is, should find himself in a position to feel at home, or live at peace, with himself and others. But that can-

not really be the case for the simple reason that, owing to the duality of his nature, his noble sentiments are in unavoidable conflict with his ignoble passions. Granted, however, that, although this is most unlikely to be the case, the conflict is unreal, or that he takes this conflict to be a mere matter of course, and is indifferent to it as is usually the case, the fact remains that he is *lonely*, and that he is seized with fear born of his loneliness. This fear, which, as previously seen, is the mother of the ignoble passions, is in itself the fear of himself, the fear of others and, to crown all his fears, the fear of death, the termination of his being in the temporal series. But fear inevitably leads to suffering. And suffering is peculiar in that it has the inherent tendency to end itself and this because of the fact that the individual, who is subject to suffering, is after all, a person, though a person appearing falsely as an individual, and that the person as such is unaffected by suffering. Hence in the case of the individual there arises the need for a remedy for his fear in all its three aspects. The remedy in question may be sought for in many ways, two of which, however, are outstanding and may be said to hold the field between them.

One of these is offered by traditional religion specially of the theistic kind in terms of the belief in the loving, kind and merciful Deity, with the assurance that man's fear of himself and of others and his suffering consequent thereon will disappear in his love of the Deity and the Deity's love of him, and that his fear of death will be conquered by immortality vouchsafed unto him by the Deity out of His mercy or grace. But apart from the theoretical difficulties that surround the problem of God and immortality, the remedy offered by theistic religion is wedded to the irrational demand that man should ignore the past and the present which are bad, and live by the hope that the future will be good—irrational, because hope is a frailty of the human mind which should be far from, instead of being given a prominent place in, the religious outlook on life, and because, as we have previously seen, the future cannot be said to be concerned with 'what will be' in contrast with 'what was' and 'what is' with which the past and the present are respectively concerned. Moreover, how can that religion be worth the name which cannot save man from the evils of the past and the present? And how can one feel assured of a good future in defiance of a bad past and a bad present except by having recourse to blind faith? On fact, the religion that feeds itself on the blind faith of its votaries, does so at a heavy cost—the cost of the enquiring spirit of man.

The fundamental difficulty which still remains to be mentioned is, however, that it is hard to believe that he who fears himself, and fears, and is feared by, others, can love, and be loved by, the Deity. Even granted that mutual love between man and God is somehow possible, that love cannot be what the word strictly means, but is determined by selfish desire on the side of man, and by pity on the side of the Deity. And this means that man's love of God and God's love of him is only another name for the submission of the weak to the benevolent mighty in prayer and worship, much to the frustration and disappointment of the religious aspirant. But then, these difficulties are unavoidable, considering that the remedy in demand must be illusory, when man's fear of himself, of others and of death for which it is intended to be the remedy is itself illusory. It is far from us to suggest however that religion as such is illusory. We only want to pose the question as to what that religion must be which is the fulfilment of the demand that we are persons essential to one another.

The other remedy is not professedly offered by, but is, in a way, derivable from, the concept of the *secular* state. Reference to the theocratic state is here excluded for the reason that such reference is rendered more or less superfluous by the above discussion of the remedy offered by theistic religion. It should be borne in mind however that, as a result of the rapid growth, in modern times, of the enquiring spirit of man as manifested in the ever increasing importance gained by science, the state as a visible institution has come to play the same important rôle as religion with its belief in the invisible Deity at one time used to play in the dispensation of all matters concerning the vital interests of man. Even when a state is avowedly theocratic, its affiliation to religion is nominal rather than real; and, in practice, it is—thanks be given to the spirit of the modern age—as secular as any professedly secular state.

Now supposing that the problems of individual life with which the state has to deal are, in essence, the same as those with which traditional religion may be said to be concerned, the solutions offered to them by the former should be, and indeed they are, from the nature of the case, different from those which the latter has to offer. In dealing with all matters concerning the mutual interests of individuals, the state has recourse to what is technically called *administration*, economic, legal, political, military, medical and educational, in every case dependent upon the knowledge provided by some science or other, whereas, in the same respect, traditional religion insists on the all-

importance of mutual love between man and the Deity and of divine mercy or grace. Of course, from this difference it is evident that, from the material point of view, the achievement of the state should, and actually it does, outweigh that of religion. But then, man's fear of himself, of others and of death, although illusory from the point of view of the person, is real from the point of view of himself as an individual. And there is no doubt that this threefold fear gives rise to a serious problem in individual life. But whereas this problem is of special concern to traditional religion, it can attract no notice from the secular state and indeed falls outside the scope of the administration which such a state takes upon itself. And one may well construe this difference as signifying the negation of the advantage which the secular state may have over religion, and, further, find in that very difference the explanation of the fact that individuals today more than ever are unable to live at peace with themselves and with one another.

But we are not here concerned exclusively with the relative advantages and disadvantages of religion and the state in respect of the solution of the problems of individual life. Nor is it a fact that the two are mutually exclusive rivals. On the contrary, religion, unless it falls a prey to the spirit of uncompromising renunciation, needs the existence of the state. And the state, if it is not, owing to any unfortunate accident in the historical process, seized with insensate anti-religious fanaticism and misled by the delusive aspiration to be a substitute for religion in any sense whatsoever, may on the one hand, have a religious foundation, and, on the other, be the foremost means to the fulfilment of the demand of religion in its proper sense. It is the latter point that primarily concerns us here, and brings us to the question of the administration referred to above, which sums up the entire business of the state.

Now administration involves at least two essential factors: the personnel needed for carrying out the administration and the machinery through which administrative programmes need to be implemented, comprising various kinds of organization, whether economic, political, legal or other, corresponding to the various aspects of administration. And to this is to be added the consideration of the fact that states are many, not one and, consequently, that administration varies from one state to another and, what is more, the variation may be, and sometimes it is, unfavourable to the maintenance of cordial relations between one state and another or the avoidance of conflict between them. Now, as regards the personnel, despite the

fact that the manner of its selection varies depending on whether the state is democratic or totalitarian, it unavoidably consists, in either case, of individuals who are not free from, but are themselves deeply involved in those very problems, the solution of which is committed to their care. And this speaks of an anomaly which is inseparable from the concept of the state. The attempt to resolve this anomaly by having recourse to the conception of the state as super-personal in some sense or other would, however, amount to idolizing the state at the cost of the individual, which might be satisfying to a Plato or a Hegel or a Karl Marx, but which belies the purpose of the state which is after all concerned with individual life.

An equally serious difficulty arises in connection with the question of the duration of the usefulness of the administrative machinery made up of the various kinds of organization. This machinery must be either essential to, and coeval with, the life of the state or be of merely temporary use. But the former alternative obviously implies that the problems which the state is required to solve remain unsolved throughout its life and thereby points to the utter uselessness of the state as an institution. The latter clearly indicates that the state must be short-lived or else it may live usefully for some time, after which it exists nominally, but must be functionally dead. And this is in agreement with the well known idea of the 'withering away' of the state. But then, even the idea of the temporary usefulness of a state cannot hold its own, when considered with reference to the variability of the administrative machinery from one state to another, and specially the possibility of conflict between one state and another due to this variability. Of course there is no denying the fact that the problems concerning the state vary from one state to another, and that these need to be solved with special reference to the circumstances prevailing within the state concerned. But, in view of the interests of the individuals constituting a state, this should not be, as it more often than not is, the reason for the conflict between one state and another resulting in the creation, in place of or even in addition to the already existing problems, of fresh problems adversely affecting individual life on a larger or a smaller scale.

The conclusions following from the foregoing discussion are then as follows. First, the problems with which the states concern themselves individually and severally are generally ill conceived. Secondly, the administrative machineries with which the states are respectively equipped succeed only in preventing the individuals from coming into their own and leaving them in a world of make-believe. Lastly—

and this is the most important conclusion to which we are entitled here—the existence of many states is self-contradictory, being repulsive to the very purpose which the states are intended to serve. And this obviously implies that either there should be one universal state or none at all. But since there is no denying the fact that individuals as such are inevitably involved in problems of their own, the former alternative must hold good to the exclusion of the latter. And yet the question remains whether the one universal state should still be called 'state' or be given a different designation. But, considering that ordinary language has a peculiar way of producing convictions, it may be called the state provided that it justifies its existence by trying to fulfil the demand that individuals are after all persons essential to one another.

The main point brought to light by the foregoing discussion is that the future of religion and the future of the state are, in the final analysis, identical with the future of mankind which consists in the fulfilment of the demand that we are not mere individuals, but *persons*, characterized by mutuality or essentially to one another. But then, it needs to be shown that this demand is not utopian nor absurd, but realistic and legitimate, pertaining to the very concept of man. And it is specially this requirement that the theory of meaning propounded in this work, as it seems to us, is eminently competent to fulfil.

IV

THE REMEDY FOR THE BEWITCHMENT OF OUR INTELLIGENCE

Our discussions so far have yielded a twofold result—negative and positive. On the negative side, the result is rather considerable, consisting as it does in the elimination of the worst confusions which prevail in various fields, including those of linguistic analysis, religion and the theory of the state. On the positive side it is but modest and is limited to the vindication of our old concepts of the realm of the personal, time as it is for us and the plan for action, all together yielding the concept of the *person* that serves to lay bare the hidden truth that we as human beings are essential to one another. But then, the problem of meaning is a *problem*, specially a philosophical problem properly so called, not because its solution has ultimately led to the discovery of a truth or truths. For, as we have previously had occa-

sion to observe, truths as such are only in need of our recognition, and provide no occasion for any problem to arise in connection with themselves. Of course, truths are not always easy of recognition. But that does not mean that they give rise to problems concerning themselves, but, on the contrary, that their recognition or discovery demands painstaking investigation or research as in the case of science.

Strictly speaking, problems, specially philosophical problems, arise in connection with the presentation of truths in false appearances. This phenomenon is due, not to anything in the truths themselves, but to an anomaly in human nature, consisting in the fact that man is an individual and yet is a person. And this anomaly, from its very nature, produces and, in fact, is the ultimate cause of, the bewitchment of our intelligence, which produces the great illusion that man is a mere *individual*. That this illusion is compelling and that it assumes the present form does not, however, stand in need of logical vindication, but is established beyond doubt by the effects produced by the illusion.

Of the many and various effects following from the bewitchment of our intelligence as their cause, some of which have been incidentally considered in the course of our foregoing discussions, the one that is of fundamental philosophical importance and has been discussed at length is the illusory idea that meaning is confined to the linguistic context and is identical with truth or falsity. On the recognition of this idea as illusory a hitherto unsuspected problem presents itself, and the problem conveys the demand for the fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence to which the illusory idea owes its origin. The weapon to be used, of course, is linguistic analysis, because the illusion concerned consists in meaning's being misconceived to be exclusively related to language. But to employ linguistic analysis with a view to investigating and describing the uses of language, instead of with the object of extricating meaning from its illusory confinement to language, is really to miss the aim of the fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence and so is, in a sense, to give up the fight itself or else to fight against it and yet to be held under its spell. And this indicates the inner contradiction that vitiates what passes for linguistic analysis in our day.

Now, granted that our intelligence is bewitched by means of language, there remain at least two relevant questions as to why our intelligence is thus bewitched, and whether the bewitchment is fundamentally linguistic. As regards the first question, since linguistic analysis, as its contemporary votaries themselves admit, can only tell

us about what we already know, viz., the uses of language, our intelligence can be said to be bewitched by means of language only in so far as we think or behave *as if* we do not know the use or uses of language. But this is obviously due, not to anything wrong with language itself or even with our knowledge of the uses of language, but to something wrong with ourselves. And this obviously goes to show that the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language is not self-explained, but is in need of explanation with reference to what is wrong with ourselves. Such explanation would, of course, differ according as what is wrong with us would differ in different cases of the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. But then, the different specific instances of what is wrong with us cannot, for obvious reasons, be said to hang apart from one another but should be traceable to what is fundamentally wrong with us. And nothing, it seems, can be spoken of as fundamentally wrong with us except our illusory idea that we are mere individuals.

The conclusion to which we are inevitably led, then, is that the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language—and we are bewitched by means of language in so far as we come to misconceive meaning to be exclusively related to language—is only an instance of the general bewitchment of our intelligence resulting from our illusory idea that we are mere individuals. This conclusion, on the one hand, leaves us with no option but to offer a negative answer to the second question as to whether the bewitchment of our intelligence is fundamentally linguistic. On the other hand, it clearly indicates that the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language cannot be fought to a finish until the solution of the problem of meaning culminates in the revelation of the truth that we as human beings are persons essential to one another.

V

THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND ACTION

The history of modern European philosophy began by emphasizing the all-importance of *thought*. But this circumstance of philosophical thinking, whatever may be the determining factors that brought it about, is involved in a twofold inexcusable confusion—the confusion of an abstraction, viz., thought with a concrete situation, viz., thought of something or other; and, still worse, but worthy of special notice in the present connection, the confusion of a species, viz., *thinking*

with a genus, viz., acting. The former confusion is directly responsible for vitiating epistemological thought, and there is no doubt that epistemology has always been in a bad way ever since the abstract view of thought was set on foot by Descartes. But the latter surpasses the former by its promise of cutting the ground from under the feet of philosophy as an independent discipline. Of course, thought as such is essential to philosophy. But it is so in the sense of an instrument which philosophy, like many other disciplines, is required to use for the purpose of its investigations. This does not, however, preclude the treatment of thought as the subject-matter of an independent enquiry. But thus treated, it is not thought as such which is but an instrument, but thought as a way of action. Even logic, which is ordinarily said to deal with thought, uses thought as an instrument but studies thought in a form relieved from the instrumental character of thought. In any case, to hold, as Descartes and his successors held, that philosophy is primarily concerned with thought as such is really to liquidate philosophy by means of holding that philosophy has an instrument to use, but nothing whatsoever to investigate by means of that instrument.

The shift of emphasis from the importance of thought to that of language which is one of the most outstanding characteristics of contemporary philosophy signifies a change of the old philosophical situation marked by the admission of the importance of thought and the relative unimportance of action which was brought about by the Cartesian doctrine of the *cogito*. Language is no more a respecter of thought than of actions. It is common to both in as much as *description* and *indication*, which are respectfully concerned with thought and action, are equally in need of the use of language. So the recognition of the importance of language serves to change the old situation by restoring action to a place of importance which it had earlier lost to thought. But then, the new situation, far from being an improvement upon the old, really represents a stage of further deterioration of the situation. In fact it surpasses the old situation in its misleading and harmful effects. Whereas in the old situation action lost its importance to thought, in the new both thought and action, each apparently important on its own account, have fallen victims to the usurped power of language, as was bound to happen in consequence of the treatment of language as all-important. When thought and action are thus rendered relatively unimportant and consequently man has an easy exit from the philosophical scene, leaving one of his creations, viz., language, to dominate it, it is easily understandable why, accord-

ing to the votaries of linguistic analysis, philosophy should have nothing to explain or reveal and no problem to solve and indeed should have no task to perform except that of describing the uses of language, and that, too, with a view to saving itself from entanglement in bewildering philosophical problems, whether set forth anew or handed down by tradition.

What is suggested is not however that language is unimportant. On the contrary, it is important on its own account, and none can deny its importance without contradicting himself, because the denial itself is in need of the use of language. But the word 'use' used here indicates the exact sense of the importance which language as such has. Like thought, language is an instrument, the instrument of communication by way of description of facts or indication of actions to be performed or desisted from. And, as an instrument in this sense, language is of importance in the affairs of our day to day life as well as in the investigations conducted by various disciplines including philosophy. But then, its importance, as is evident from this, is in a class apart from, if not subordinate to, that of thought and action, so that it is not given to it to hold the place of preeminence which the contemporary linguists have allowed it to hold in virtue of the supersession of the importance of thought and action.

Of course, language has another aspect in which it is a subject-matter for investigation rather than an instrument of investigation—the aspect in which it is a species of acting in the form of speaking or writing. But then, the importance of language in this aspect, like that of thought in a similar aspect, is really that of a genus as shared by a species. This consideration, it is needless to say, is profoundly significant. It indicates that the remedy for the deterioration of the philosophical situation under discussion lies in the rehabilitation of action in terms of its recognition as a genus, of which both thought and language are but species. And, further—this is specially important for our immediate purpose—in the light of what is thus indicated, it reveals the truth that linguistic analysis devoted to the task of solving the problem of meaning ultimately reduces itself to the analysis of our ordinary actions having for its object the solution of the problem relating to these actions. And this brings us back to the heart of the earlier discussions in this part of our work.

VI

THE PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANALYSIS OF OUR ORDINARY ACTIONS

The problem of meaning, so far as we have been able to judge, is *immediately* due to the illusory idea that meaning is inextricably bound up with language and is the same as truth or falsity. And this illusory idea itself is but the expression of what may be called the bewitchment of our intelligence by *means* of language. But then, the phrase 'by means of', as our argument in this regard has indicated, does not here mean 'due to' but 'in reference to'. And, as we have already found, the bewitchment in question, while it undoubtedly has *reference* to language, is *due* to our general illusory idea that we are mere individuals. So the problem of meaning, as we have come to understand it, must be said to be *ultimately* due to this very idea. And judged in this light, the so-called problem of meaning loses its independent significance, and is in need of yielding place to a problem more fundamental than itself, which should be free from the limitation of its applicability to language and meaning and relate to our ordinary actions in general including speaking and writing, that is, language in the sense of action. But this raises a difficult point—difficult because its vindication would obviously depend on establishing a fact which psychology as the science of human behaviour cannot even dream of, the fact that our ordinary actions bear the impress, or are held in the grip, of our illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals.

How can psychology help us ascertain the inner nature of our ordinary actions hidden behind the veil spread by the illusory idea in question, when, owing to its self-imposed limitation as a science, it has to rest content with the study of mere phenomena? To this end we have, therefore, no option but to refer to the result of the analysis of our ordinary actions with which we started our investigations. As previously observed,¹ our ordinary actions, irrespective of their differences of kind, betray a certain looseness of relation between knowledge and performance of which they are made up. And this looseness is but the indication of a want or deprivation which is none other than the non-fulfilment of the human or rather personal norm of conduct. Thus there comes within view a characteristic of our ordi-

¹ Vide ante pp. 41-5.

nary actions which is so curious that it defies all attempts to account for it in the usual scientific way and is really in need of being construed as the effect of a scientifically inscrutable cause which, considering the nature of the case, cannot be anything but the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals. Our ordinary actions are then found to betray the presentation of the truth about ourselves in its false appearance—the truth that we are not only individuals but *persons*. And, considering that problems, specially philosophical problems, inevitably arise in connection with the presentation of truths in their false appearances, our ordinary actions should be treated as the embodiments of a serious philosophical problem, instead of being taken, as they are usually taken for granted.

The problem relating to our ordinary actions, which is due to the presentation of the truth about ourselves in its false appearance, is in itself but the demand for bridging the gulf between knowledge and performance with a view to the fulfilment of the personal norm of conduct leading to the rehabilitation of the truth about ourselves. And this new demand, on account of its being related to our *actions*, instead of merely to language, conveys the deeper sense of, and indeed is nearer to philosophy than the old demand for the extrication of meaning from the linguistic context and for the removal of the confusion of meaning with truth or falsity. Of course, the fulfilment of both the demands, it is hardly necessary to remind the reader, equally presupposes the concepts of the realm of the personal, time as it is for us and the plan for action—the concepts that cooperate so as to reveal the hidden truth that we are not mere individuals, but persons and as such are essential to one another. But the importance of the fulfilment of the new demand is specially in evidence in the explanation of why these concepts should cooperate instead of operating independently or even not operating at all, and, in particular, why their cooperation should lead to the revelation of the truth about ourselves as persons instead of any truth or truths about the world of impersonal things. And this, as we have previously seen, goes to the credit of Imagination as an activity of the human mind.

Since the problem under consideration relates to the gulf between knowledge and performance, it is obvious that these two, neither singly nor together, can even lead to the recognition of the problem itself, not to speak of their contributing to its solution. And since the gulf between the two, as previously observed, is but a deprivation pointing to the non-fulfilment of the strictly human or *personal*

norm of conduct, at least the recognition, if not the solution, of the problem must be dependent upon an activity of the human mind which may be said to have its source in the realm of the personal or, in other words, occupy the personal level as opposed to the individual level. It is precisely to this description of mental activity that Imagination completely answers. Thus it is evident that but for Imagination the gulf between knowledge and performance and the deprivation consequent thereon would have remained absolutely unrecognized and, consequently, the problem in the shape of the demand for bridging the gulf would never have arisen.

It is necessary to observe here that the question of the activity of our mind arises in connection with our ordinary *actions*, and not, as Kant held,¹ in connection with our *knowledge*, nor, as the popular view holds, in connection with our bare *performances*, that is, our organic movements. The reason is that, strictly speaking, neither our knowledge nor our bare performances are due to any *activity* on the part of our mind, and that our ordinary actions are vitiated by a gulf between knowledge and performance which is in need of being revealed as well as bridged, the need that cannot be fulfilled except by the good offices of an activity of our mind. It is, however, far from us to deny the difference that there is between knowledge and performance in virtue of the fact that the former in a *sense* falls on the mental side and the latter on the physical. But that, as we cannot help feeling, can no more warrant the view that knowledge is the product of a mental activity than the view that performance is a similar product. The fact seems to be that neither of the two is a mental product, but that both just happen on occasion or, in other words, on the fulfilment of certain conditions. But knowledge and performance are similar in another respect which is specially important for our immediate purpose, and which consists in that both, as is obvious, are concerned with, or tell us about, the external world or the world of impersonal things in their respective ways. And it is in contrast

¹ Kant's admission of the so-called synthetic activity of the human mind in his explanation of the possibility of knowledge was necessitated by his arbitrary admission of such things as the immediate data of sense and of a gulf between these and the objects of knowledge proper. And one mistake led him to another in so far as he subordinated Imagination to the so-called cognitive activity, failing to realize that Imagination is not concerned with *knowledge* as such, but with actions, and that it is intended to reveal, and try to bridge, the gulf between knowledge and performance of which our actions are made up.

with this fact that the peculiarity of our mental activities including Imagination comes to light.

Not being concerned with knowledge as such or with performance as such, Imagination, of course, has nothing to tell us about the world of impersonal things. And this means that Imagination is not intended to serve the cause of science, but not that it is dumb and uninformative, and has no useful purpose to fulfil. On the contrary, it is the foremost ally of philosophic vision and the sole trustee of, and the bearer of responsibility for coordinating, the concepts of the realm of the personal, time as it is for us, and the plan for action, all yielded by philosophic vision. And as such it serves to save philosophy from its subordination to, or its degeneration into a mere appendage of, science, by revealing, in the light of these concepts, the truth, unknown to science but essential to philosophy, that we are not things nor even mere individuals, but persons characterized by essentiality to one another. Thus does Imagination tell us, in the language of philosophic vision, the truth about ourselves, as distinguished from the world of impersonal things, which lies beyond the capacity of science. And, further, in the light of this truth, it makes the unusual discovery that our ordinary actions in general fall short of the personal norm of conduct, involving as they do the rift between knowledge and performance.

VII

THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEM

What has been observed above about Imagination, it is hardly necessary to mention, merely points to its *epistemic* importance, and really amounts to stating that it is the prerogative of Imagination to reveal the truth about ourselves as persons just as it is given to knowledge to contribute to the revelation of the truths about the world of impersonal things. But, whereas knowledge is no product of any mental activity, far less a mental activity itself, Imagination is itself an activity of the human mind and as such has an additional aspect which is foreign to knowledge. And since Imagination has neither to deal with knowledge as such nor with performance as such, but with our ordinary actions, and since our ordinary actions are vitiated by a gulf between knowledge and performance, and hence are in need of being dealt with by a mental activity, Imagination as an activity of the human mind is, in the fitness of things, required to

bridge this gulf with a view to the removal of the effect of the illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals and the rehabilitation of the truth about ourselves as persons. But this brings within view the real crux of the whole situation.


The gulf between knowledge and performance which vitiates our ordinary actions and the consequent deprivation to which we are subject are but the results of our *heteronomy* or *bondage* due to the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals. So the bridging of the gulf with a view to the restoration of the operation of the personal norm of conduct in the sphere of human affairs and the rehabilitation of the truth about ourselves as persons should depend upon an activity of the human mind that is purely *autonomous*, that is, released from the influence of our illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals. But it is here that the difficulty arises. For, as previously seen,¹ Imagination, the only activity of the human mind with which we have so far been well familiar, is not purely autonomous or completely free from bondage, but, after all, is heteronomous, although, curiously enough, it is so in a welcome positive sense as well as in an unwelcome negative sense.

Positively, Imagination is heteronomous in the sense that it is dependent upon the realm of the personal for its origin as well as its function, which means that it is free from the limitation of the *individuality* of the I or the ego as well as of the *collectivity* of 'I and others', and is free unto and within itself, being pervaded by the *wholeness* of the we=I with others. Thus the heteronomy of Imagination in the positive sense is only another name for its autonomy. And, what is more, on account of its dependence on the realm of the personal, the autonomy, which is its own on the same account, is, in its case, invested with *authority*, so that Imagination is free and has the necessary authority to carry out the behest of the realm of the personal by way of disabusing our mind of the illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals and restoring us to the dignity of persons characterized by essentiality to one another.

* But then, neither freedom nor authority is itself power, far less a power strong enough to overcome any rival power or powers that there may be. And that being so, Imagination can successfully play its appointed rôle provided that there be no power to frustrate its efficaciousness. But it is precisely this condition that is left unfulfilled to the disadvantage of Imagination, on account of its own hetero-

¹ Vide Part II, Chapter VII, pp. 58-60.

nomy in the negative sense. And this refers us to human passions. Of course, Imagination is by no means dependent upon the passions as it is upon the realm of the personal. On the contrary, there is no tie of common interest to bind Imagination with the passions. This accounts for the most significant fact that, whereas Imagination is merely free and invested with authority derived from the realm of the personal, the passions are neither, but are mere powers. And the significance of this fact lies in that the freedom and authority of Imagination are subject to the challenge of, nay, the threat of extinction from, the power of the passions, with the result that the task of restoring human beings to the dignity of persons, which Imagination claims to be its special trust, is left unfulfilled. Hence a serious problem rears its head, which, obviously, is not the absurd problem of the extermination of human passions themselves, but the genuine problem of the liquidation of the dehumanizing power wielded by them. As the detailed investigation of this problem will lead us far afield and really falls outside the scope of this work which *inter alia* is intended to be a critique of Imagination, what we may at best do next is to put forward a few suggestions bearing upon this outstanding problem, which may serve the purpose of an epilogue to the present work and of an introduction to a future one.



PART FIVE

OF HUMAN LIBERATION

I

THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT

The problem of the liquidation of the dehumanizing power of human passions with which we are left by Imagination is really our old problem made definite and concrete and brought nearer home to us by the good offices of Imagination itself. So if instead of being able to solve the problem which it is its special prerogative to solve, Imagination has thus left behind the same problem in a new form, its service merits appreciation, not condemnation nor even disapproval. For, after all, the clear, definite and straightforward formulation of a problem is sometimes more important than, and preferable to, the solution that one may have to offer to the problem concerned and many a problem is usually left unsolved or is solved badly on account of the vagueness and unclarity that surround the problem itself. Moreover, there can be no doubt about the genuineness of the problem in the new form when it is warranted by the authority that Imagination owes to the realm of the personal. But even then, the problem as newly formulated retains the seriousness and profundity of the old problem and so deserves a detailed, careful and painstaking treatment. In view of our own limitation we do not, however, have any option but to confine our treatment of the present problem to a few statements which, from the nature of the case, are bound to be more cavalier and, still worse one may say, more dogmatic than those that make up the main body of this work. But then, one should not fight shy of straightforwardness and even dogmatism when the fact remains that arguments do not always produce convictions, and that in the case of all investigations, the philosophical not excepted, convictions are no less important than arguments.

Now considering that that of which the liquidation is in demand is power, the dehumanizing power of human passions, and that this power is egoistic in view of the fact that it is mainly the passions

that make up the ego or the individual, the liquidation, it may be held, should depend upon the service of a rival power strong enough to overcome the power of the human passions. But such a rival power cannot be non-human, because the passions, though in a sense human, are not strictly so, and because any non-human power that there may be is more likely than not to join hands with and strengthen, instead of rivalling, the power of the passions. Nor can the rival be egoistic for there perhaps is no egoistic power other than that of the passions, and even supposing that there may be some egoistic power or other in addition to that of the passions, it would likewise strengthen rather than rival the power of the passions. It is then certain that the rival in demand should be human in some sense or other and definitely non-egoistic. And one may on this ground feel tempted to trace the rival to the realm of the personal. But that would be utterly futile, because the realm of the personal, *strictly* human as it is, is the one, and only one, source of freedom and authority which are not only no powers themselves, but are symbols of warning against, and indeed are conspicuous for their demand for the liquidation of, all kinds of dehumanizing power, whether human in any sense or absolutely non-human.

In this connection the popular saying 'knowledge is power' seems most significant. But it cannot be so in the literal sense, because, as previously seen, knowledge as such is neither an activity nor even an action, and, though knowledge may be followed by performance, the relation between the two, to say the least, is loose. And this is enough to indicate that knowledge by itself is no power. But from this it does not follow that the saying is altogether devoid of significance. On the contrary, its true significance seems to lie in its suggestiveness. And what it may be taken to suggest is that, though knowledge by itself is no activity nor power, it is both in so far as it is determined by the need of, instead of having in vain to determine, performance or, in other words, is performance-with-a-view-to-knowledge which, under the title of Understanding, as we have observed earlier, is an activity of the human mind distinguishable from Imagination characterisable as knowledge-with-a-view-to-performance.

The nature of Understanding, like that of Imagination, has, however, been generally misunderstood and has been so done in various ways. In this respect the rationalists have gone to one extreme in so far as they have exaggerated the importance of Understanding by regarding it as the highest, if not the only, activity of the human mind. And the empiricists, the philosophers who have misconceived

the human mind to be purely passive, have obviously gone to the other extreme by completely ignoring the importance of Understanding as a mental activity. But in any case even those who have recognized its importance have usually regarded it as a purely *cognitive activity* which really is a fiction. Strictly speaking, no activity can be said to be mental or of the mind, if it is merely one-dimensional, whether cognitive or performatory. It should be at least two-dimensional, whether knowledge-performance (knowledge-with-a-view-to-performance, that is, Imagination) or performance-knowledge (performance-with-a-view-to-knowledge, that is, Understanding) as the case may be.

The reason why philosophers have then fallen into the mistake of conceiving Understanding to be a purely cognitive activity, however, seems to lie in the fact that they have erroneously regarded science in the sense of a body of knowledge about the world as the sole concern of Understanding, while the truth is that science in this sense is an abstraction from a concrete whole which is technology-science. As is testified to by the history of civilization from comparatively early times, specially from the time of the ancient Egyptians and Greeks, to our day, technology and science go hand in hand and do not nor can possibly fall apart from each other. So by saying that understanding is concerned with science what is meant is that the interest of this mental activity is not limited to either science or technology, but is wide enough to embrace a complex whole comprising both of these together. Now since technology and science, obviously, are matters of performance and knowledge respectively and since, despite the fact that science contributes to the development of technology, technology supplies the primitive or original motive to science and not the latter to the former, Understanding is performance-with-a-view-to-knowledge, instead of knowledge-with-a-view-to-performance which is Imagination.

Now the very fact that Understanding is not mere *knowing*, but knowing as informed with performing obviously implies that it is a source of power. But the power derived from it is in a class apart from the power of the human passions. For, whereas the power of the passions is blind and reckless, that of the Understanding, from the nature of the case, is characterized by foresight and caution and regard for consequences. But this may only suggest, but by no means proves, that the power of the Understanding, unlike that of the passions, is non-egoistic. Yet the suggestion is so strong as to leave no doubt about the availability of the proof. And the proof may be had through

the enquiry into the source and the nature of Understanding. One thing, however, is certain: if it cannot be said to owe its origin to the I or the ego, that is, the human passions, its source cannot be I with others, that is, the realm of the personal either, because it is a source of power and power is out of place in this realm.

But then, since technology and science are too well established to be ignored, the claim of Understanding to be recognized as an activity is beyond question, and there must be some source or other to which the origin of this activity can be traced. And in view of the result of the process of elimination we have already employed, it seems that we have no option but to hold that the source of Understanding is 'I and others' which is none other than what is ordinarily called *society* as distinguished from the 'I' or the individual on the one hand and from the 'we'=I with others, that is, the realm of the personal on the other. What this view amounts to is that Understanding belongs to the social nature of man or, in other words, is essentially *social*, not *egoistic*, though it does not admit of characterization as *personal*. And this is in perfect correspondence with, and indeed accounts for, the undeniable fact that technology and science are not mere products of individual efforts, but originate in a social atmosphere of mutual cooperation.

Understanding as a source of power, then, is non-egoistic. Positively speaking, it is social. Thus it is the bearer of social power. And since egoity and sociality are contraries, it looks as if Understanding is the only effective rival of, and alone competent to overcome, the power of the human passions. But then, since that which it is expected to rival and overcome is the *dehumanizing* power of the passions, Understanding could really be what it at first sight seems to be provided that it is strictly human. And here lies the crux. To be strictly human is to be personal—personal, not in the popular sense, but in the sense we have been insisting on. But, as previously observed, Understanding, being of I and others, not of I with others, is only *social*, not *personal* and, consequently, not strictly human. As such it is at best the contrary, never the contradictory, of the human passions with their dehumanizing power. And, strictly speaking, that which is contradictory to power is the negation of it and may only be freedom and authority. So between Understanding and the human passions there may only be rivalry, but not hostility.

But worse than what has been observed above is what immediately follows. Let us here look back to the earlier consideration that Understanding, though it is, like Imagination, an activity of the human

mind, is, unlike the latter, of *I and others*, not of *I with others*. And this, in the light of one of our previous findings, implies that Understanding is alien to time as it is for us, time in this sense being inseparable from the realm of the personal, that is, *I with others*. In consequence, this activity of the human mind is unconcerned with the one universal plan for action meant by time as it is for us, which, as we have previously seen, is the underlying principle of inter-personal relations or, as we should rather say, the essentiality of human beings to one another. Divided from time and its meaning as it thus is, Understanding can find no scope for its activity except in temporalized space or temporal series. And this is precisely the reason why it should be, and actually it is, mainly concerned with history on the one hand and with technology and science on the other.

The point here is however that, whereas in the case of history, as we have previously argued, the question of meaning, that is, the one universal plan for action, is irrelevant, and indeed no question of the plan for action can arise at all, in the case of technology and science the place of the question of meaning in this sense is usurped by the question of social plans for action. And this is so for a reason comprising two parts, the second of which is the corollary of the first. The first part is that history is mainly concerned with the past, with what was or what happened, while technology and science are mainly concerned with the future, of course, the future as a member of the temporal triad and not in the sense of time itself. The second consists in stating that the past as such is in no need, and indeed is beyond the reach, of any present or future plan for action, whereas the future in this sense inevitably calls for more and more of such a plan. This difference is due to the fact that, although it is common to history on the one hand and technology and science on the other, Understanding as performance-with-a-view-to-knowledge is, in the case of history, a helpless sufferer of deprivation in the shape of the loss of performance to knowledge, whereas in the case of technology and science it remains in its undiminished native form and functions accordingly.

The fact that stands out, indeed the fact that is of special importance for our immediate purpose, is that technology and science regarded as one whole, being a social product and being at the same time knowledge as informed with performance, is inconceivable apart from the idea of some social plan for action or other. Of course, so far as man as a mere individual or an ego is concerned, his performances cannot be said to proceed from any plan for action worth the

name, but are determined by the urge of his passions. But the same cannot be said about his actions as a member of some society or other. For to say that would amount to denying the undeniable fact of the existence of such a thing as society and of his membership thereof. In fact, no action performed by man can be said to belong to his social nature if it is merely determined by his passions and not governed by a social plan for action or a social standard.

But then, there remains the most significant fact that society is after all *I and others*. And this obviously means that we as members of society are *somehow together*. Our being together, it is needless to point out, is, however, fundamentally different from our being essential to one another as implied by the concepts of the realm of the personal, time as it is for us and the plan for action. And one of the main points of difference between the two relates to the *additive* process which underlies the formation of society, but which is foreign to the idea of the realm of the personal or to our essentiality to one another. That being so, the very concept of society is unavoidably involved in the question: How do we come together so as to form ourselves into a society? Apart from the fanciful answers, both ancient and modern, which have failed to stand the test of the critical investigation of the social nature of man, the answer that may be considered suitable to this question is that some *social plan* for action or other brings us together, with the result that there is a society with ourselves as its members. But this answer obviously involves the fallacy of begging the question. For, by admitting such a thing as a social plan for action in its explanation of the formation of a society, it assumes that very thing, the explanation of which is demanded by the question.

The difficulty noticed above does not, however, show that there can be no such thing as a social plan for action, but that any such plan that there may be presupposes the existence of a society, and not the latter the former. What then can the formation of society be due to? The obvious answer seems to be that we do have certain *common interests* and that these bring us close together as nothing else can do, with the result that there is society with ourselves as its members. But this answer, however attractive it may be, cannot be final. For our interests, after all, are determined by our *desires*, so so that our common interests, in the final analysis, are but the off-spring of our *common desires*. That being so, there is no denying the fact that society, while being apparently subject to the governance of our common interests, really owes its existence to our common

desires. And this, as we shall immediately see, argues that the concept of society involves a contradiction.

Of course, it cannot be denied that we share with one another certain desires, whether academic, cultural, religious and the like, and that these respectively constitute the foundations of appropriate social organizations. But the very fact that such desires are many and various and sometimes even mutually exclusive clearly shows that they are common in a very restricted sense, and that there can be no one society, but many of its kind and even mutually conflicting ones. Thus society in a sense unites individuals and in a sense leaves them divided among themselves. Hence the contradiction that vitiates the concept of society. And this is bound to be so in view of the fact that the additive process which underlies the formation of society is subject to some principle of selection or other, and that selection and rejection are inseparables. But a worse consequence would follow upon the attempt to account for one, universal society, glorified as humanity, in terms of the view that, besides the specific desires in question, we have certain generic desires, desires that are common to us all. And the consequence would be none other than the demonstration of the impossibility of the formation of society. For the generic desires are primarily biological in character—being desires for food, shelter and protection, that is, self-preservation and propagation of the species, and as such are subject to the law of struggle for survival, indeed the most potent of the factors to resist the formation of society.

But apart from this extreme consequence—and there is no doubt that it is extreme—and granted, as one has no option but to grant, that society is an accomplished fact, it is still to be admitted that society, though it is distinguishable from the individual or the ego, is after all I and others, and consequently, that it is *heteronomous* in some measure or other, being subject to the biological law of struggle for survival. And this makes no secret of the fact that society as such, if not characterized by the tendency to self-destruction, is at least prone to instability. But the consequence that is still worse is that the relation between one society and another, specially when both are invested with paramount power and assume the form of states, is exposed to the risk of being governed by the law of struggle for survival and so is apt to be vitiated by competition and hostility with their attendant evils: jealousy, anger, fear and hate.

The main point emerging from the foregoing discussion is that, despite the fact that it is not egoistic but social, Understanding with

technology and science as its primary concerns is not only contradictory to the passions with their dehumanizing power, but, because of its very sociality, is apt to command immeasurably greater dehumanizing power than the passions constituting the ego or the individual can possibly do. That this is not a mere fanciful hypothesis but a hard fact is amply substantiated by the most gruesome and devastating effects upon man and his affairs following from the abuse of technology and science, to which the history of civilization, specially in its latest phase, is a helpless witness. However that may be, the present consideration, in the light of some of the main conclusions of this work, serves to reveal the gravest predicament of man. And the predicament obviously consists in this, that man is divided between Imagination and the passions with Understanding as their possible ally; between the authority of the realm of the personal demanding the fulfilment of the one universal plan for action, the veritable principle underlying his essentiality to his fellows, and the power of the passions reinforceable by that of the Understanding, holding out to him no prospect except that of his being ceaselessly involved in the struggle for survival; popularly speaking, between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Moloch.

II

THE NATURE OF LIBERATION

The predicament in question is *universally* human because of the inexplicable fact that no human being is strictly human or, in other words, is a person without having to undergo the ordeal of individuality. And being universally human, it is as old as the human race. But from this it does not follow that man has no escape from it, and that its redress should demand the highest sacrifice, the extinction of the human race. On the contrary, the fact that man is an animal and yet is above the level of other species of animals, if it on the one hand necessitates the predicament to which he finds himself exposed, is on the other pregnant with the significance that his destiny lies in the redress of the predicament resulting in his *liberation*. But then, the question is whether liberation is something which man can only hope for in the belief that it rests with some superhuman power, whether divine or mundane, to grant it to him out of love or mercy, or it is nothing to be hoped for, nor anything to be given by someone and taken by someone else, but something which belongs to his very

nature, and to which it is given to him to awaken himself by means of breaking through the illusory idea of himself as a *mere individual* and realizing the truth that he is a *person*.

Now as regards the former alternative, its obvious difficulty, which is also the most fundamental one, consists in that liberation as envisaged by it is really bondage firmly established. For it amounts to holding that man's bondage within himself, which is his original bondage, not only remains where it was, but is strengthened by the superinduction of his bondage under a being higher than himself. But as regards the latter, it seems to indicate the true nature of liberation by insisting that liberation is essentially the prevailing of personality over individuality. For what else can human bondage be but another name for man's individuality, his ego-centricity, his circumscription within the small world dominated by the interplay of his passions? And considering this, one obviously cannot come to conceive liberation except in terms of the conquest of individuality. But then, one should not be so over-zealous as to construe liberation as contradictory to individuality, because individuality cannot be contradicted except by its own annihilation, which is absoluteness of a kind or else vacuity *śūnya*,¹ in either case conspicuous for its non-human character, and because liberation is not worth the name unless it is not only not non-human, but, on the contrary, is human, and human in the strictest sense.

It is precisely for the reason explained above that liberation is the conquest of individuality, not in the manner of its annihilation, but by personality. And this means that, whereas the individual *quā* individual is in bondage, the person is essentially liberated. For it is in the person that the illusory sufficiency of the individual unto himself and his insularity consequent thereupon yield place to his expansion, his essentiality to, and his entrance into the lives of, others. Not a gift for man to receive from a superhuman giver nor anything to arouse in his breast the horror of his absorption in the All or Nothing, liberation is thus man's true baptism through his discovery of himself as a person, inseparably bound up with his love of himself in and through his love of others, which is blessedness (*ānanda*).

Now, once it is realized that liberation consists in the individual's

¹ This refers to the boldest and yet the most absurd metaphysical speculation of the Mādhyamika Buddhists, which found in the concept of *śūnya* the key to the understanding of the universe comprising the material world as well as human beings.

discovery of himself as a person, and the significance of personality as brought out above is taken into consideration, it seems that the question concerning the *nature* of liberation is finally answered. It is curious however that philosophers, specially in India, should have had to invite a controversy about the nature of liberation and yet to proclaim in the end their inability to arrive at an agreed conclusion which could be regarded as the final answer to this question. But this seems to have been due to the fact that they proceeded on the absurd presupposition that the individual is *unalterably* characterized by individuality and yet is fit to be liberated, and that the falsity about individuality cannot be fought by anything that is of man and so the remedy for it should be superhuman in *some sense or other*. And in this they obviously failed to realize that individuality is inseparably bound up with a truth, and that the truth of individuality is personality which constitutes what is strictly human in man. In this connection it is worthwhile to observe that if it is—and indeed it is—frustrating to consider the question of the nature of liberation and yet not to be able to arrive at its final answer, it is harmful to ignore this question, the ignoring of which is one of the outstanding features of the modern outlook of man and his affairs. For while the former at least involves the sense of the human predicament in its universal form, the latter is apt to leave man in a state of irrational and deceptive complacency and thereby allow the predicament to assume devastating proportions.

III

THE WAY TO LIBERATION AND HUMAN AUTONOMY

The problem that still remains to be considered relates to the way to the discovery of oneself as a person—the discovery that constitutes the essence of liberation. Since it is solely and exclusively dependent upon the termination of an illusion, the illusory idea of oneself as a *mere individual*, this discovery is *unique*, being in a class apart from other kinds of discovery. On this account and from the nature of the case, the way to the discovery cannot but include an entire gamut of *disciplines* which may be called spiritual, but are more appropriately characterizable as *humanizing*. Thus the problem under consideration is the obvious *practical* problem which the very concept of liberation necessitates, and indeed is the fundamental aspect of the whole problem of education. For, strictly speaking, education is not

worth the name if its recipients cannot live a liberated life, if they cannot cease to behave as mere individuals and live as persons held in essentiality to one another. And considering that we are essentially persons and, consequently, there can arise no question of our *becoming* persons, one seems to have no option but to hold that the aim of education in its fundamental aspect, the aspect in which it relates to the humanizing disciplines, is *negative* rather than positive, being the *undoing* of our original bondage, our bondage within ourselves due to the illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals.

But then, no treatment of the problem of the way to liberation is worthwhile and, what is more, the problem itself is likely to turn out to be absurd unless special cognizance is taken of two important truths. One is that proneness to bondage is not peculiar to this man or that, but universal to mankind, owing to the fact that none is a person without being an individual at the same time and, consequently, that everyone is apt to behave as if he is a *mere* individual. The other is the necessary correlate of the former in virtue of the curious anomaly of human nature which disallows the divorce of personality from individuality as it, on the other hand, disallows the divorce of individuality from personality. And it consists in that liberation is not only the universal demand of man but constitutes the essence of human existence. This is far from suggesting, however, that liberation is one's *individual* concern or even the concern of a society or a nation. Liberation thus construed is only another name for *security* and *prosperity* (*abhyudaya*) which are the inevitable demands of uncompromising egoity, whether individual, social or national, and hence amount to the negation of liberation itself. Moreover, how can security and prosperity, being essentially egoistic, hold their own in defiance of the universal demand for liberation? Not only that; whereas liberation is essential to man's *existence*, security and prosperity are but the objects of his *craving*. And since craving knows no final satisfaction, security and prosperity are self-stultifying. In any case, to say that some are *liberated*, while others remain in bondage is to draw the inhuman distinction between the *fortunate* and the *unfortunate* and yet to affirm that all are equally in bondage. And this argues that the applicability of the concept of liberation is governed by the principle: all or none, and that the problem of liberation can find no solution except in the liberation of *all*.¹ Here

¹ Apart from the difficulty of the Buddhist conception of liberation as Nirvāṇa, it is significant that the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism arrives at a similar view about the solution of the problem of liberation, with

then is a conclusion which, it is needless to add, is otherwise warranted by the twofold fact that proneness to bondage is universal to mankind and that liberation consisting in the prevailing of personality over individuality is but the fulfilment of the demand of the realm of the personal in and through the essentiality of human beings to one another.

Judged in the light of the above conclusion, the way to liberation, including the required humanizing disciplines, does not admit of particularization with reference to the peculiarities of individuals, societies, races or nations, but must be universal to mankind, and its applicability, like that of liberation itself, is subject to the principle: all or none. And this indicates that the question that is of fundamental importance with regard to the disciplines concerned relates to the (universal) *principle* or *principles* of conduct to which they are required to conform or from which they are in need of being deduced. So, unless it is based on a satisfactory answer to this question, any attempt to determine the disciplines needed to serve as the way to liberation is doomed to failure or else would amount to evading the main issue. And it is precisely for this reason that much of what passes for religious or moral teaching about the *rules* of conduct, not to speak of its being futile, is ill-conceived.

But then, philosophically and even otherwise, the question that is foundational in connection with the principles of conduct concerns their basis. This, however, indicates one of the major points, if not the sole point, the consideration of which is needed for the vindication of philosophy as an independent discipline. For unless the basis with reference to which the principles of conduct could be formulated is ascertained, the very notion of 'principle of conduct' is thrown open to misuse. And in consequence philosophy, as is amply testified to by its history, can have no better lot than to be committed to the care of, or sometimes even lose its identity in, some other discipline, specially any one of those that insist on the importance of the notion of 'principles': pure physics, logic, mathematics, politics, ethics, aesthetics and religion. Thus does philosophy fall a victim to escapism. But this is only one side of the picture. The other side is obviously this, that judged from the standpoint of philosophy regarded as primarily concerned with the problem of liberation and, consequently, as the independent enquiry into the principles of

reference to two of its well-known concepts, the concepts of Bodhisattva and Mahākārunā.

conduct, all these disciplines, while being what they are in their own right and useful in themselves, are enemies of, and ways of escape from, philosophy. And this raises a point which is well worth consideration and may be considered as follows.

Understanding as an activity of the human mind, as we have already seen, is bi-dimensional, being performance-knowledge, and as such it is the source of technology-science and, consequently, of power. And, though power itself is not bad, the power of Understanding as manifested in and through technology-science is liable to be united with the dehumanizing power of the passions and may thus prove to be bad. But then, Imagination, though exclusively devoted to the cause of the freedom and authority of the realm of the personal and repugnant to power, after all belongs to the human mind as one of its activities as does Understanding. So, despite the fact that Imagination has no control over power, whether good or bad, and Understanding left to itself has no means of keeping its power free from dehumanization, *mutual influence* between the two activities, short of their synthesis through the intervention of a higher activity, is an easily realizable possibility. And the actual realization of this possibility is unmistakably demonstrated in the very foundation of politics, ethics, aesthetics and religion on the one hand and pure physics, mathematics and logic on the other.

In this respect the influence of Imagination upon Understanding, however, is of primary importance. The reason for this may be stated thus. Understanding is nothing but for its capacity for yielding power, and as such it is open to two and only two kinds of use: the reinforcement of the power of the passions, and service to the cause of the freedom and authority of the realm of the personal. But whereas the former may, and in fact does easily happen, the latter is difficult of realization. This provides Imagination with the opportunity to play the decisive rôle that it is given to it to play. It makes Understanding disregard its characteristic peculiarity consisting in the equilibrium of performance-knowledge which makes for its productivity of power. The result accruing therefrom is that, rendered oblivious of the power that belongs to its credit, Understanding functions as Reason with freedom to emphasize the importance of performance and knowledge *disjunctively*. And thus under the title of Reason it finds itself in a position to deal with performance and knowledge in a new context and with new connotations and, accordingly, to function respectively as Practical Reason and Theoretical Reason. In any case,

it is in both these capacities fitted to cooperate with Imagination, and this goes to the credit of Imagination itself.

What has been said above, however, describes only one side of the situation. And as regards the other side, it obviously calls for the conformity of Imagination to the requirements of Reason in order that the possibility of the cooperation between these two activities of the human mind which is within view may be realized. But this is a demand which cannot be literally fulfilled. For Imagination is too faithful to the dictates of the realm of the personal to make any departure from its appointed rôle and specially to submit to the requirements of Reason by allowing any manner of interference with the idea of time as 'after', that is, time as it is for us, and of the universal plan for action meant by time in this sense. And this is bound to be so, owing to the fact that, whereas human bondage is due to man's illusory idea of himself as a mere individual, his liberation, consisting in his essentiality to his fellows, belongs to his very nature and is founded on the universal plan for action in which he after all is an unavoidable participant.

But then, the demand of the situation is such that it cannot remain unfulfilled. So that which Imagination does not condescend to grant to Reason is brought about as a result of the influence of Imagination upon Understanding. Of course, Reason in its theoretical aspect is forbidden to entertain time as 'after', time as it is for us, and at the same time it is unable to look back towards the temporal triad before-now-after, which it has left behind once for all and which is inseparably bound up with Understanding. And in its practical aspect, Reason is correspondingly a stranger to the universal plan for action meant by time as 'after' and is debarred from the view of any manner of social plan for action that may present itself in and through the temporal triad. But it must have a task to perform in order that the influence of Imagination upon Understanding may not go in vain; and there must be a proper scope for the performance of its appointed task.

Now in view of the unrealizable possibilities considered above and from the peculiar nature of the case, it seems that, on the side of *knowledge*, nothing is left for Reason to deal with except whatever is of concern to the *specious present* as distinguished from time as 'after' on the one hand and from the temporal triad on the other. On the side of *performance*, it is likewise destined to function within a limited scope, and has no option but to confine itself to the investigation of *patterns* or *standards* of action in distinction from the universal plan for action as well as the plans for action varying from

time to time and from society to society. Thus we are provided with an indication of the fact that, having at its disposal the concept of the specious present and that of the pattern or standard of action, both derived from the influence of Imagination upon Understanding, Reason is preeminently fitted to contribute to the foundation of the basic theoretical disciplines: pure physics, mathematics and logic as well as of the equally basic practical ones, including politics, ethics, aesthetics and religion.

How the two concepts of the specious present and the pattern or standard of action are each diversified so as to lead to the differentiation of the disciplines on the theoretical and practical sides respectively, and how Reason itself, accordingly, functions diversely in either of its two capacities as Theoretical Reason and Practical Reason; these, however, are questions of paramount importance. But they obviously refer to a great many details and indeed complicated ones, the consideration of which falls outside the scope of this work. Of special significance to our immediate task is the fact which perhaps is evident from what has been observed so far. It is none other than that, in virtue of its abstraction from Understanding on the one hand and from Imagination on the other, and equipped with the theoretical and practical disciplines the foundation of which goes to its credit, Reason is invested with false self-sufficiency and misconceived autonomy to the neglect of the evils of power. The point here is that, free from the *authority* of Imagination and the *power* of Understanding, and insistent on the all-importance of *impersonality* in distinction from personality as well as individuality, Reason can succeed only in encouraging indifferentism in preference to the spiritual struggle against the dehumanization of man and in helping the non-human attitude of *complacency* to prevail over the human demand for the fulfilment of man's right to liberation. Reason is a source of *principles*, theoretical and practical. But so far as its theoretical principles are concerned, they can at best serve to *interpret* the universe or else to *regulate our thoughts*. And as regards the practical principles which it may go to its credit to lay down and formulate, they perhaps can serve no better purpose than to help man adjust himself to a life of bondage. In any case they are not the *principles of conduct* from which one could deduce the humanizing disciplines required to constitute the way to liberation.

Since the liberation of man is subject to the principle: all or none, in the treatment of the question about the basis of the formulation of the principles of conduct, a question which is still left unanswered,

we are unavoidably referred to the *universal predicament* of mankind. For what else can the demand of liberation be except that this all-embracing predicament be at an end? As previously observed, the predicament is not extraneous to man, but pertains to his inner being, primarily consisting as it does in his being divided between the authority of Imagination and the dehumanizing power of the passions open to reinforcement by the power of Understanding as manifested in and through technology-science. But then, in spite of its universality, the predicament thus characterized admits of being put an end to for a very special reason besides the reason already mentioned.¹ This reason not only relates to the authority of the realm of the personal as borne by Imagination, but to the fact that Understanding, while a source of power, is not egoistic but social and, therefore, is no cognate of the passions. On the contrary, though it functions differently from Imagination, Understanding is as much an activity of the human mind as the latter, on which account, as we have previously seen, Imagination may and actually does exercise its influence upon it so as to make it function in a new capacity as Reason. And that being so, the alliance of Understanding with Imagination with a view to serving the cause of the freedom and authority of the realm of the personal should be easier of realization, and in any case should not be less imperative than its alliance with the passions with a view to the reinforcement of the dehumanizing power of the latter. The point here is however that sociality, by which Understanding is characterized, is, strictly speaking, intended to pave the way for the conquest of the egoity or individuality which is peculiar to the passions, and it derives its true significance from the freedom and authority of the realm of the personal as borne by Imagination.

Why then, instead of serving to make the passions devote themselves to the cause of the freedom and authority of the realm of the personal, Understanding, despite its superior power, should, and it more often than not actually does, succumb to their egoistic and dehumanizing power is indeed exceedingly puzzling. And it seems at first sight that we have no means of interpreting this circumstance except as the most unfortunate accident in the history of mankind, an accident which, moreover, looks as if it is beyond human control and is bound up with the destiny of man. This perhaps provides whatever reason that there may be for the despair about the future of the human race with which thinking people, with the exception

¹ Vide *ante* p. 152.

of those who have firm faith in traditional religion, the religion of God, have been seized from time to time.¹

But then, it is necessary to go deeper into the matter in hand and realize that nothing can happen accidentally, and specially that whatever happens within the small world of human affairs, as Buddha had realized centuries ago, must be due to some cause or other. So the dereliction on the part of Understanding with which we are concerned here can be no accident, but must be the effect of a cause. Since the effect in this case, besides being of exclusive concern to man, is obviously of a negative character, the cause concerned should not only be of man, but also be a sort of deprivation of which he is an unconscious sufferer—a deprivation which, it is needless to say, is not externally imposed upon him, but is only an aspect of his own ignorance or, as we should say, his illusory idea of himself as a mere individual. Judged in this light, the cause in question can be none other than the lack of training with a view to man's regeneration or, stated otherwise, the non-fulfilment of the most human of all human demands, the demand for humanizing education. Any other way of conceiving the cause would presumably amount to a gross misunderstanding of the human situation and, what is more, to distracting the human mind from the need for, and the way to, liberation and thus leave man condemned to a life of bondage.

Essentially related to the point made above is the curious and yet the most fundamental fact about human existence, namely, that man, by birth, is of an anomalous nature, being both an individual and a person, and that, due to the peculiarity of his birth as a human being, this original anomaly of his nature is imbued with the demand for its own resolution. This demand is such that it cannot be fulfilled in a supernatural or superhuman way, because, as we have tried to show, that way is obviously uncalled for and perhaps also absurd. Its fulfilment, from the nature of the case, is possible only through man's *regeneration* in the manner of the prevailing of his personality over his individuality, which is but another name for his liberation. Since it cannot, for obvious reasons, be of a biological nature nor should be regarded as supernatural or even spiritual in a recondite sense, man's regeneration in this manner cannot but be the result of his education. The demand in question then, is basically the demand for the education of man. It should be borne in mind, however, that the education, the need for which is envisaged here, is not an alternative to, nor is

¹ Some of the contemporary existentialists may be counted among such thinkers.

intended to be a mere improvement upon, what this word is ordinarily taken to mean. In contrast with its ordinary meaning, its meaning in this context may, with a large measure of appropriateness, be expressed by the word 're-education' signifying the complete reorientation of man's outlook on life and human affairs. In any case the future of man rests on his education with a view to his regeneration, the lack of which, as we have already seen, is the cause of the universal predicament of mankind.

Now since the regeneration of man amounting to his liberation, as has been argued earlier, is not anything to be newly achieved by him, but is essential to his existence, the *primary* aim of education cannot but be the *undoing* of human bondage manifesting itself in the universal predicament of mankind. As regards the predicament, there is no denying the fact that it is known by its *visible* manifestations and is conspicuous for its capacity to produce devastating effects in the outside world of human affairs. But considered as it is in itself, as we have already seen, it pertains to the inner being of man. That being so, the undoing of the predicament cannot be due to any of the usually recognized devices, whether technological, scientific, social, political or economic. True, these devices, whether employed separately or collectively, may serve useful purposes in our *day to day* life. But this only means that they can at best produce superficial effects upon human nature. In any case they cannot affect the inner being of man so as to make him change his usual way of life and start life afresh with a completely reoriented outlook, as is demanded by his regeneration or the undoing of the predicament.

In view of what has been observed above, the undoing of the predicament regarded as the goal of education can have nothing else primarily to depend upon except the inner development of human nature in the manner of the conquest of man's inveterate self-alienation by his self-integration. Such a development, it is needless to point out, may be brought about only by an activity of the human mind, indeed the highest and the most perfect of its kind, which is competent to synthesize the *authority* of the realm of the personal as borne by Imagination with the *power* of Understanding and, through the good offices of Understanding, with the power of the passions. Be it borne in mind, however, that the passions as such are not bad, nor is their power necessarily dehumanizing. But unless Understanding is wedded to Imagination and the passions are subjected to the rule of Understanding thus wedded, the latter, instead of obeying the dictates of the realm of the personal, as they as an essen-

tial part of human personality are destined to do, become a law unto themselves and thus turn out to be a source of dehumanizing power open to reinforcement by the power of the former. So the logic of the ultimate destiny of the passions demands the need for the activity of the mind under consideration.

The synthetic activity of the human mind, the possibility of which is envisaged here, is then the dynamism of the whole being of man, as distinguished from his usual state of self-alienation. Further, it is the point of convergence of the authority of the realm of the personal and the power of Understanding manifesting itself in and through technology-science, together with the power of the passions as enlightened by Understanding. It is this activity that man has to depend upon for his title to *autonomy*. For human autonomy is out of the question apart from man's capacity for acting as the whole being that he is. And since authority without power may at best mean the *empty form* called *freedom*, and power without authority perhaps has no responsibility except the *blind determination* of actions, *autonomy*, in order that it may not be a mere abstraction, but something concrete and tangible, should comprise both freedom and determination and be the synthesis of authority and power. But then, *human autonomy* cannot be strictly so called unless the authority that is to contribute its *form* is derived from the realm of the personal and the power that must constitute its *content* is faithful to the authority thus derived. All this goes to show that man is autonomous in so far as he acts through his whole being and his actions are but tributes of obedience to the dictates of the realm of the personal. And this is of profound significance in the treatment of the problem of liberation. For human autonomy thus construed is obviously the undoing of, and the conquest over, the universal predicament of mankind and, what is more, is the basis, and indeed the key to the discovery of the principles of conduct from which could be deduced the humanizing disciplines required to serve as the way to liberation.

The importance of the principles of conduct for the undoing of human bondage or the universal predicament of mankind can hardly be exaggerated. But the idea of these principles has been generally confused with that of the *rules of conduct* or *moral disciplines*. And this is due to the ignorance of the fact that the rules of conduct and even moral disciplines are, no matter whether or not they are intended to be, none but the ways of man's adjusting himself to a life of bondage, whereas the principles of conduct are considered to be alone competent to show the way to liberation. Of course, some of the out-

standing founders of religion, specially Buddha and Jesus, and a few philosophers, of whom Kant was the most prominent may be said to have been seriously concerned with the problem of the principles of conduct. But the principles as formulated by them, however important and useful they may be in the proper conduct of our day to day life, do not seem to answer to the purpose they are intended to serve. This is due to the fact that both Buddha and Jesus as well as Kant ignored the importance of the concept of power, as is evident from Buddha's doctrine of *ahimsā* (non-violence), Jesus's famous saying: 'resist no evil' and, in the case of Kant, from his omission of reference to this concept in his formulation of the principles of conduct. But, considering that the passions and the Understanding, both sources of power, are essential constituents of human personality, the attempt to formulate the principles of conduct by ruling out the concept of power would be absurd and indeed no less so than the attempt to formulate them with *exclusive* reference to this concept, although the latter may be satisfying to anyone as proud as Lucifer, as arrogant as the Asuras of Indian mythology or as malevolent as Ahriman of Zoroastrianism.

Now to ignore the importance of the concept of power, as Buddha and Jesus and Kant may be said to have done, is to dismiss, at least by implication, the concept of human autonomy which, as we have already observed, is the synthesis of freedom and power and as such is the proper basis, and the key to the discovery of the principles of conduct. Having thus left behind the concept of human autonomy once for all, they had no means of formulating these principles except with reference to some inappropriate basis or other. Thus Buddha and Jesus took into consideration what are ordinarily called the *higher values* such as love (*maitrī*), charity and compassion (*karuṇā*), and what, on the other hand, are usually taken to be *disvalues*, for example, homicide, theft and adultery. And accordingly they formulated two sets of the so-called principles of conduct, one positive and the other negative in terms of the acceptance of the higher values and the rejection of the disvalues respectively. But, even granted that the principles thus formulated are of indisputable worth in themselves, they convey no indication of how man can be at peace with power. So they may at best hold out to us the *hope* of a better world to come. But they certainly cannot inspire us with *confidence* about the coming of such a world by way of showing us the way to the undoing of the universal predicament of mankind. For the predicament is but the conflict between freedom and power, and this conflict does not

admit of resolution through the elimination of power any more than through the elimination of freedom. But this, however adversely it may affect the value of the religious teachings concerned, can make no difference whatsoever to our appreciation of the spirit of the teachings of the founders of religion like Buddha and Jesus and, in particular, to our feeling of awe and wonder towards the most exalted kind of life lived by them.

As regards Kant, it is to be admitted that he perhaps stands alone among philosophers, ancient and modern, in his realization of the truth that the principles of conduct have their origin within man himself, and are in need of being deduced from human autonomy regarded as their basis. But, as one of the staunchest advocates of the cause of academic philosophy that he was, he on occasion attached importance to an abstraction in preference to what is concrete and even mistook the former for the latter. Thus, in the name of deducing the principles of conduct from human autonomy, he actually deduced them from the empty form called freedom. In consequence, the principles of conduct as formulated by him could not but be, and actually they were, purely *formalistic*. But since the principles of a purely formal character are of little use except in the fields of mathematics and logic which are directly concerned with logical possibilities, instead of with actualities or actual situations, and since the principles of conduct are intended to be of use in the undoing of an actual situation, the universal predicament of mankind, Kant's 'principles of conduct' do not deserve to be given this name. But if this criticism be considered too strong to be levelled against Kant's doctrine of the principles of conduct, the least that may be said against this doctrine is that it may be of importance in the hypothetical 'kingdom of ends' as conceived by him, but can be of little service in respect of the actualization of this kingdom in and through the 'world of means', the world held in the grip of the universal predicament of mankind.

IV

HUMAN LIBERATION AND THE TASK OF PHILOSOPHY

The most significant fact brought to light by the foregoing discussion is that the problem of the principles of conduct has not so far been treated in its proper perspective. This is due to the peculiarity of the manner in which religion and philosophy as handed down by tradition have proceeded to perform their task. As regards traditional

religion, it cannot, of course, be denied that it seeks to secure the rescue of man from the ravages of dehumanizing power. But to this end it, on the one hand, ignores the importance of technology-science and the human passions, the veritable sources of mundane power, and, on the other hand, leaves man to the care of a supramundane being. And this cannot but lead, and it has actually led, to the failure of traditional religion owing to the fact that mundane power is too actual and tough to be controlled by the ethereal influence of a hypothetical supramundane being. So far as traditional philosophy is concerned, it, among other things, espouses the cause of religion or else is indifferent to all religious matters, and, in some manner or other, enters into an alliance with science. But in the latter respect it obviously has no independent status and has nothing else to perform, except a vicarious task. And in the former respect it follows more often than not in the footsteps of traditional religion and, consequently, falls a victim to the same failure as the latter. The way out of these difficulties of religion and philosophy, however, seems to lie in their assimilation with each other and their rehabilitation under the common title of humanism, charged with the task of solving the problem of the principles of conduct so as to show the way to the undoing of the universal predicament of mankind. Thus and, it seems, only thus can religion and philosophy survive their proverbial failures and come into their own as essential elements of human civilization with no less an object in view than to warn man against the suicidal folly of submission to power and to meet the age-old challenge of technology-science coupled with the predatory instinct of the animal in man.

It is then evident that it does not become philosophy to undertake the vicarious task of *interpreting* the world; this task rightfully belongs to science. Philosophy's concern with the scientific interpretation of the world may, however, be only negative, consisting in its disapproval of, and even resistance to, the scientist's excessive zeal exhibited in his treatment of man as a mere cog in the gigantic wheel of nature. And this, not because man is not in time and as such a part of nature, but because he is in a sense apart from nature, being, as we have already observed, the presupposition of the temporal triad before-now-after. Besides, his destiny is different from that of things constituting nature for the simple reason that liberation is his inherent right, whereas the question of liberation is absolutely irrelevant in the case of nature.

In the determination of the business of philosophy the analysis of

language is, however, positively important as the interpretation of the world may be *negatively* so. The reason is that language is of man, while nature is an 'other' to him. But then, despite the fact that it is man's own creation and is the most effective means of the expression of his thoughts, feelings, desires, hopes and fears as well as the medium of his communication with his fellows, language is, after all, a tool for him to use and as such is in a sense an 'other' to him. Thus language is of a dual nature, and this perhaps indicates that the importance of linguistic analysis in philosophical investigations is subject to a limitation. Its importance lies not only in bringing the problem of meaning to the forefront of philosophic thought but in insisting that meaning as such cannot be committed to the care of the verification principle—the principle which is of exclusive use in deciding between truth and falsity and the recognition of the all-importance of which in the field of philosophy is a way of liquidating philosophy or else leaving it in a state of slavery to science.

So in order that linguistic analysis may serve a useful purpose in philosophical investigations, meaning should be understood as falling apart from truth and falsity. But even then, there is need for further caution. Meaning, the presence of which is easiest of detection in the linguistic context should not, on that ground, be held to be confined within the bounds of language and to be limited to *linguistic usage*. On this view, philosophy would obviously be co-extensive with the description of the uses of language and the philosopher practising so-called linguistic analysis would be deemed to be exclusively concerned with the vicarious task of the lexicographer. For this reason and especially in order that the possibility of philosophy as an independent discipline may not be ruled out, the analysis of language cannot be said to be concerned with any task other than that of merely posing, posing without making any attempt to answer, the question: what is meaning as such? Thus the culmination of linguistic analysis is reached in the curious situation consisting in the demand for the extrication of meaning from the linguistic context and the further demand for the answer to the question about meaning thus extricated. And this, as we have taken pains to show, opens up a vista to the possibility of philosophy. Hence it is evident that linguistic analysis is a stepping-stone, indeed an unavoidable one, to philosophy, and that philosophy begins where linguistic analysis ends.

But, despite the fact that it is associated with the school of linguistic philosophy, the recent conception of philosophy as primarily concerned with the undoing of the bewitchment of our intelligence is

of significance. In particular, it seems to have an advantage over the view which holds that the business of philosophy is to *change* the world—of course, the small world of man and his affairs—instead of *interpreting* the world in a wider sense comprising the world of human beings and the world of nature. As regards this view, it is to be admitted that it suggests a significant change in the philosophical outlook by emphasizing the importance of the treatment of the problems that concern man in preference to those that concern the world of nature. But granted, as it should be, that the world of man and his affairs is amenable to, and may be in need of, change, there is no denying the fact that change as such may in this case be for the better or for the worse or of no consequence whatsoever, being neutral, that is, neither good nor bad. That being so, it seems that what is of special importance to philosophy in this connection is not the mere demand for the change of the world of human beings nor how the change, if demanded, is to be brought about, but why any demand for the change should arise at all. But considering that this world has undergone changes at various stages in its history and yet there seems to be no prospect of an end to the demand for change, one cannot help feeling that there is something fundamentally wrong with man himself. So the question 'why' ultimately reduces itself to the question of undoing what is wrong with him. Hence is evident the deeper significance of linguistic analysis lying in the view that the business of philosophy is to show us the way out of the bewitchment of our intelligence.

Our use of the words 'the deeper significance of linguistic analysis' is, however, deliberate. And what we have in mind in using these words is none other than one of our earlier conclusions. As we have already argued, philosophy, although in the fitness of things it embraces linguistic analysis, must go beyond, and in any case is not identifiable with, the latter. And, further, the bewitchment of our intelligence is due to a cause which lies deeper and is more comprehensive than the mere abuse of language as the protagonists of linguistic analysis may conceive it to be. Judged in this light, linguistic analysis, while providing for the awareness, of course vague and inadequate, of the proper business of philosophy, misses the chance of developing into philosophy; so that, if it must be associated with the name of philosophy, it may well be designated as still-born philosophy. And this is due to the failure on its part to comprehend the truth that the bewitchment of our intelligence is ultimately the effect of the illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals.

The failure referred to above is not, however, peculiar to linguistic analysis, but is shared by many philosophers as well as schools of philosophy, old and new, including absolutism and naturalism and their supposed antithesis as worked out in the contemporary schools of existentialism. Absolutism, as the existentialists have wisely pointed out, commits the mistake of treating *essence* as prior to *existence* and thereby depriving human existence of any significance of its own. So, far from serving the cause of philosophy, absolutism only aggravates the problem which philosophy is primarily required to deal with—the problem concerning the rescue of man from his self-alienation and his restoration to himself. In view of this it is one of the unavoidable duties of philosophy to clarify or analyze the concept of man. To this end philosophy cannot, however, do without taking cognizance of the truth which occupies the serious attention of absolutism, but of which this doctrine fails to make proper use. The truth is none other than that man as a *mere individual* is insufficient unto himself. It is this truth that absolutism abuses by arbitrarily construing the insufficiency as *finitude*, *contingency* and *imperfection* and thereby making out a case for the conception of man as a *part of*, or else *absorbed in*, the Infinite Unconditioned and All-perfect, that is, the Absolute, amounting, in either case, to the denial of the independence and dignity that are essential to human nature. In this respect absolutism is not far removed from naturalism, the philosophical outlook fostered by science, according to which man is after all an item among other items in the objective order of the world, so that his status and destiny are qualitatively indistinguishable from those of the latter.

Now so far as the existentialists are concerned, it goes to their credit to have undertaken a phenomenological and psychological analysis, instead of merely depending on *a priori* reasoning as philosophers have generally done, with a view to understanding the nature of human existence. But there seems to be nothing unusual or extraordinary about the result of this twofold analysis in so far as it consists in holding the view that man is *free* or capable of choosing and deciding on his own account and is invested with the sense of *responsibility*. However that may be, this view, granted that it may serve to divide existentialism from absolutism and naturalism, obviously informs us only about the capacity or *potentiality* of man, but must be taken to be silent upon the question about the nature of *human existence*. For existence, being an actuality, is more than and so irreducible to potentiality. In fact, the attempt to understand

human existence in terms of man's potentiality or potentialities would amount to committing a mistake opposite to that which underlies the attempt to understand it in terms of man's *behaviour* regarded as the *manifestation* of his existence. This is far from suggesting, however, that the existentialists have neglected the question of human existence. On the contrary, there is no denying the fact that they are conspicuous for their emphasis on the importance of this question and for their earnest attempts to answer it.

But what we are driving at is that the understanding of the nature of human existence should be free from the mistake which absolutism commits in interpreting the fact that man as an *individual* is insufficient unto himself. The remedy for the mistake consists in realizing that the concept of *insufficiency* is not so subtle as to entail *finitude*, contingency and imperfection, but is simple enough to mean *deprivation* (*abhāya*), and that *existence* and *deprivation* are incompatible. So man's individuality, on which his insufficiency unto himself is consequent, cannot be said to constitute his *existence*. But this does not mean that man is not an *existent*, nor that he exists without being an individual. What is meant is that man exists, not because of, but *in spite* of his being an individual. And this implies the profound truth that the idea of man as a *mere individual* is illusory. It is precisely this truth that the majority of the existentialists have ignored in their attempts to understand the nature of human existence and this despite the prevalence of the distinction between *authentic* and *unauthentic* being in existentialist thought.

The fact is that existentialist thought is seized with a conflict between two irreconcilable tendencies. On the one hand, while absolutism surrenders the individual by conceiving him to be a part of, or else making him completely disappear in the Absolute, existentialism tends to make the individual himself *absolute* so as to reduce him to solitariness and insularity. On the other hand, existentialism, curiously enough, is characterized by the tendency to insist on the idea of human existence as contingent, the idea from which, among other things, absolutism derives its main thesis. The former tendency leads existentialism to affirm the *freedom* and *responsibility* of man. But the latter compels it to set limits to and even nullify the importance of man's freedom and responsibility. In view of this *impasse*, existentialism, anxious as it is to overcome the absolutist's arbitrary interpretation of human existence as a 'cypher', is helplessly reduced to the alternative of posing and trying to solve the problem as to how the individual, who is *ex hypothesi* solitary and insular,

can be at peace with, or attach himself to the world, his fellows, a determinate historical situation or God. But this is a problem, the very formulation of which, it is needless to say, is enough to reveal its absurdity and its defiance of any solution.

So existentialism's preoccupation with the problem of the relation of the individual to what are *others* to him, as well as absolutism's reduction of human existence to utter insignificance are but ways of escape from the actual human situation. Man is not a mere individual suffering insufficiency or deprivation which is incompatible with *existence*, but, as we have argued earlier, is a person held in the relation of essentiality to his fellows. And this points to the nature of human existence. To exist, strictly speaking, is to be sufficient, and to be sufficient is to be essential to one another as is signified by the concept of the person. Human existence thus understood is, however, another name for human liberation, for what else can our liberation mean except our essentiality to our fellows expressed in our love of others and our joy of living?

But then, it is hard for man to remain what he really is and to live a liberated life. This is due to the fact that, on account of the inexplicable anomaly of his nature consequent upon his unavoidable biological birth, man is prone to be a victim of the illusory idea of himself as a *mere* individual and to suffer self-alienation. Hence there arises a problem, not the absurd problem of his *becoming* anything which he is not, but that of his return to himself as a participant in the universal plan for action, the resolution of his self-alienation, the undoing of what we have called the universal predicament of mankind. Formulated in more definite terms, it is the problem of the principles of conduct required to serve as the basis of the humanizing disciplines to which human conduct needs to conform with a view to the undoing of the predicament in question. The problem thus formulated is obviously of concern to religion conceived anthropocentrically and to education directed towards the regeneration of man. But in the case of philosophy the concern is even more fundamental, indicating as it does the proper task of philosophy, the neglect of which is responsible for the age-long failure of philosophy to establish itself as an independent discipline.

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
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